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Posthumanist Animals in Art: France and Belgium, 1972-87
by
Arnaud Gerspacher

Advisor: Claire Bishop
This dissertation traces the changing role and increased importance of nonhuman
animals in art of the 1970s and 80s. Focused largely on artists in France and Belgium,
this period stands at the head of a wide-ranging re-conceptualization of animality that
continues to unfold today. Pivotal moments in ecology (beginning with the 1972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm), animal ethics and
ethology (such as the Universal Declaration of Animal Rights proclaimed in 1978), and
philosophy (specifically the biopolitical and deconstructive currents critiquing the
centrality of the humanist subject), all converge as stress points along long held
anthropocentric conceptions of culture, nature, and history. In simplest terms, the
resulting visual cultural shift qua the animal can be described as follows: hegemonic
forms of representation based on humanist iconography and symbolism began to weaken
in the face of a politics of nonhuman representation—including, crucially enough, selfrepresentation via indexical mediation or in situ installation and performance. I contend
that this radical shift presents a challenge to art historical research—since it is diffuse and
cannot be localized in any one movement or group—and opens pathways for assessing
the ways in which art making can pry open obdurately static conceptions of animality
(consequently making nonhumans sensible in culture and politics). Accordingly, my
research comprises four disparate case studies: Chris Marker’s ethologically inflected
iv

work of the 1970s and 80s; a history of exhibitions from the mid-1980s demonstrating the
enmeshment of posthumanist, transhumanist, biopolitical, and ecological forms of
thinking; Marcel Broodthaers’s interwoven treatment of animals, poems, and the
readymade; and eco-feminist strategies of identifying (or over-identifying) with animality
as resistance to violent, andro-humanist historical forces. This dissertation thus provides a
multi-faceted historical genealogy of the now widespread incorporation of nonhuman
animals in contemporary art and underscores the productive convergence of art history
with the posthumanities and critical animal studies.
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0.1 INTRODUCTION—POSTHUMANIST ANIMALS
This dissertation focuses on the increased importance and changing role of
nonhuman animals in art of the 1970s and 80s. Focusing largely on artists in France and
Belgium (with the occasional discussion of other Western European artists to underscore
the heuristic value of this study), I argue that this period in art and culture reflects a wideranging re-conceptualization of animality. While my analyses are centered on specific
case studies—Chris Marker’s ethologically inflected work, three exhibitions in the
eighties that variously question the human-animal line, animals in Marcel Broodthaers’s
visual art and poetics, and the eco-feminist sensibilities of Louis Bourgeois, Annette
Messager, and VALIE EXPORT—this dissertation should not be understood as
diachronic but rather as thematic. This theme is singular—the nonhuman animal—yet it
tends towards multiple expressions: a recognition of nonhuman animal interiority (such
as sentience, emotion, and cognition); an interest in highlighting the existential and
environmental overlaps between human and nonhuman animals (which can be both
liberating and oppressive for all involved); appraising the consequences of treating the
animal as a readymade object (in art or otherwise); and lastly, identifying (or overidentifying) with animality as a critical strategy.
Focusing on the animal necessarily conjoins a multi-disciplinary set of influences
and discourses, many of which germinate in precisely the same period, that is, the 1970s
and 80s. These include: ecology and a thinking of systems and relations, cognitive
ethology wherein the human-animal line is manifestly porous, biopolitics with its
understanding of sovereignty as control over the biological functioning of the humannonhuman-animal, modern animal ethics discourse arguing for nonhuman welfare or

1

rights, and eco-feminism with its critical attention to the imbricated forms of violence on
women and animals. How artists choose to deal with these discourses is largely
dependent on their chosen form and medium, which offers both opportunities and
constraints—from indexical images in which nonhumans appear with a modicum of
autonomy (photography and film), to the use of animal bodies in object-making (the
animal readymade), to installation and site-specific works in which nonhuman agency is
creatively harnessed, to human performances that model themselves on animality, or
directly collaborate with nonhuman participants.1
0.2 WHY POSTHUMANIST?
Steve Baker’s The Postmodern Animal is one of the first art historical studies to
examine the role of animals in contemporary Western art practices.2 He analyzes what he
calls the “postmodern animal” in art, which he places within a historical context of the
nineties and onward in Europe and the U.S. Baker distinguishes between two types of
uses of this postmodern animal. One lineage is “animal-sceptical art,” exemplified by the
U.S. artist Mark Dion. In this mode, the artist tries to estrange the animal by laying bare,
often through the distancing effect of irony, its cultural construction as a sign. By doing
so, the postmodern animal is shown to be an illusory simulacrum. The other lineage is
“animal-endorsing art,” represented by the British artists Olly and Suzi. In this mode, the
artist heads straight into the wild for a direct interaction with the animal as an index of
the real. Rather than dwelling on cultural constructs, this strategy represents a meeting
place between artist and nature. Baker models his postmodern history of the animal after
the stages of contemporary art as theorized by Hal Foster: a first phase in the seventies
1

These are the most recurring forms in this study, though not the only ones. Moreover, they are not discrete
approaches as certain media may very well be mixed in certain artistic practices discussed.
2
Steve Baker, The Postmodern Animal (London: Reaktion, 2000).
2

and eighties preoccupied with semiotics and simulacra, and a second phase in the nineties
involving a “return to the real.”3
Baker’s account hinges on the premise that while postmodernity was newly able
to deal with the animal, modernism, on the other hand, could not: “The animal is the very
first thing to be ruled out of modernism’s bounds…there was no modern animal, no
‘modernist’ animal.”4 In other words, animals are beings of pre-modernity, and in the
canon of art historical modernism, they are occluded. While initially persuasive, this
overly broad premise contains certain problems. For one, it presumes that modernism and
avant-gardism were one and the same.5 A corrective is needed here: of the historical
avant-gardes Der Blaue Reiter, Dada, Fauvism and Surrealism all represent disparate
engagements with animals and animality.6 Even Futurism, the movement that most
embraced techno-modernity, had its share of nonhuman inputs; Marinetti’s 1909 “The
Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” alone reveals a surprisingly recurrent recourse to
animals and animistic energies. In the more restrictive legacy of Greenberg’s theory of
modernism as abstraction and pure opticality, represented animals are predictably absent,
as is all mimetic figuration. Yet even in certain corners of formalist painting a sublimated
(or desublimated) animality can be found: for instance, in Rosalind Krauss’s reading of

3

Baker cites Hal Foster, The Return of The Real: The Avant-Garde at The End of The Century (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), 165. Baker’s bifurcation of the postmodern animal leads to a theoretical
knot that has more recently come into focus in Continental thought, which can be distilled thusly: while the
poststructuralist legacy of textuality and the nexus of power-knowledge has a problem accessing or making
claims about real (an objectivist or non-correlationist reality), returns to the real risk re-entering into a naïve
positivism that does not consider the way reality itself is constructed and conditioned.
4
Baker, 20.
5
There is a slippage in Baker’s text between ‘modern,’ ‘avant-garde,’ and ‘modernist criticism.’ While it is
true that formalist art critics were not interested in animals, it does not follow that animals disappeared
completely from the historical avant-gardes (or even formalist abstraction). Ibid., 20-1.
6
Baker does mentions John Heartfield’s photomontages as possible counter-examples to his argument. He
also describes Surrealism as “proto-postmodern,” which only serves to pluck the avant-garde out of
modernity in a circular affirmation of his postmodernist thesis.
3

Jackson Pollock’s drip paintings and their horizontal points of departure that allude to a
primordial moment of hominization before vertical uprightness—in other words, as
painterly restitutions of human animality.7
Beyond art historical questions over the animal’s presence or absence in avantgardism and modernism, it can be argued there was (and continues to be) a modern
animal within a wider political economy (a comprehensive history of factory farming in
the US and Europe still waits to be written). I do not doubt that animals were increasingly
depopulated from both canvas and countryside over the course of the twentieth century.8
Nevertheless, they did not disappear altogether. The modern animal is a return of the
repressed, coming back in packaged pieces and reappearing in dissimulated form inside
the advertising imaginaries of commodity culture. I argue that the modern animal is the
readymade animal—controlled, commodified, and techno-domesticated in limitless
reproduction. In other words, the animal is turned into a cultural and technological object
(though never purely so, as even the most domesticated animals stubbornly remain
hybrids). Within this political economy, the pre-modern, agrarian animal largely
disappeared, only to reappear as resolutely disposable and reified on a scale that has reconceptualized (certain) nonhuman animals as readymade objects like any other. While
its reappearance in society invariably came repackaged with advertising fantasies of the
bucolic and natural, this fundamentally altered material history of the animal in

7

Krauss opens a way to such an analysis of the drip paintings via Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and its
Discontents (1930), which famously posits the becoming of “man” in his evolutionary assumption of
vertical uprightness. If Pollock’s paintings reorient the viewer back to a horizontal vantage point on all
fours, then they demonstrate that the animal in art need not appear figuratively to be present. Rosalind E.
Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993), 247.
8
There is arguably a cultural connection between the heights of painterly abstraction and the advent of the
modern factory farm in the 1950s. After all, both abstract from the natural world in their own material ways.
4

developed societies could not be completely ignored for long. The increased interest in
animals in art and culture since the 1970s is symptomatic of this return.
The modern animal is thus stuck in an unsublatable impasse between tradition and
modernity. Certain traditions are no longer possible in the face of mass culture and
industry, while the industrial protocols that replace these traditions do not represent
unequivocal progress (far from it, as they can be ethically and environmentally
pernicious). As the French social anthropologist Noëlie Vialles has documented in her
remarkable ethnographic study of modern French abattoirs, the move from traditional
slaughtering by skilled craftsmen to modern and mindless assembly line killing was all
but complete by the mid-eighties.9 An analogy can be made with this political economy
of animal bodies and art history, since the advent of industrial hyper-domestication,
which increasingly rendered bodies out of sight, posed a parallel challenge to
traditionally skillful renderings of animalier, natural history, or landscape artists. If
Marcel Duchamp’s celebrated humbling in front of a propeller at the 1912 Salon de la
Locomotion Aérienne, for him, called into question painting’s relevance in the early
twentieth century, the factory farm poses a similar challenge to any bucolic or “natural”
representations of animals whose subjects have themselves been propelled into an
industrial efficiency of serialization on a scale heretofore unimaginable. So, if traditional
relations with the animal have largely given way to modern forms of anti-relation, and if
returning to the former amounts to escapist nostalgia (or as inherently micro-level
critiques of a barbaric modernity), what is the alternative?
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Clearly this question exceeds the parameters of an art historical study.
Nevertheless, I argue that the way out of the binary dead ends of tradition-modernity can
be provided by tracing the vectors of posthumanism in certain artistic practices and
exhibitions from the seventies onward—vectors that may be both latent and manifest in
practice or display. What both tradition and modernity have in common is a humanistic
relation to the animal (and to nature in general). It is founded in human need, which
increasingly becomes demand over the course of Western history, and dictates both premodern and modern uses of the animal. By contrast, a posthumanist relationship to the
animal, which would be newly aware of the various needs, demands, and capacities of
nonhuman life, would point to an escape from the undialectible tension of tradition and
modernity.
In What is Posthumanism? (2008) the philosopher Cary Wolfe offers the most
advanced articulation of posthumanism, one to which this dissertation is manifestly
indebted. The term is often understood as having application for a diverse set of
discourses—a plasticity that may render the posthumanities overly broad and pliable.10
Since there are a number of ways of unbecoming discretely human (or of demonstrating
how we have never been human, in Donna Haraway’s appropriation of Bruno Latour),
perhaps a wide application of the term is only fitting.11 Nonetheless, Wolfe supplies a
helpful genealogy of posthumanist thought in order to disarticulate it from simple
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antihumanism (misanthropy) or transhumanism (the bio-techno dream of escaping the
fleshy finitude of the embodied human altogether).
“Posthumanism” was first used in the humanities and social sciences in the 1990s,
but its theoretical roots can be found in a longer, dual intellectual trajectory.12 In one
lineage beginning in the 1950s, cybernetics and first-order systems theory (including
Gregory Bateson and Norbert Wiener) scrutinized the centrality of “man” as sole maker
of meaning. Information, communication, and cognition could no longer be deemed
anthroproprietary. In another lineage, beginning in the 1960s, poststructuralist theorists
like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, not only displaced “man” from epistemic
centrality, but also its contours as a transcendental subject (which was dissolved into so
many “ends”—of man, of philosophy, of history).13 In both systems theory and
poststructuralism, ahuman and nonhuman processes began to throw into question the
dogmatic pretensions of humanist purity.
Wolfe finds a splintered field in more recent lines of thought stemming from this
dual lineage: some thinkers have taken the end of humanism as challenge for overcoming
animality altogether through the cyborgian ambitions of “transhumanism.” Somewhat
confusingly, this transhumanism is also concomitant with the “posthuman: a futurological
human subject who has synthetically and digitally unfettered itself from the dictates of
nerve-ended finitude.14 This is not the line of thinking that interests Wolfe, however, nor
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my study (for the most part). Largely in opposition to transhumanism, the driving force of
posthumanist critique reveals the many ways humans are inextricably bound to animality,
how the human species co-evolved with nonhuman species of all sorts, and that we share
existential capacities for being-in-the-world: emotion, communication, adaptability, and
finitude. In the broadest sense, posthumanist theory demonstrates that the nonhuman is
always already in the human, and that transcendental humanism (and transhumanism, for
that matter) is a forgetting or disavowal our nonhumanity. These insights allow for a
reconsideration of animals and animality, not only in difference with us humans, but also
in affinity. Terms such as “theriocentric,” “humanimal,” and “more-than-human world”
are all manifestations of a posthumanist de-anthropocentricization of knowledge and
existence and reflect nonhuman inclusiveness.
From this brief synopsis of posthumanism it should be evident how it relates to
animal studies. This relatively new academic field has galvanized across humanities and
social sciences disciplines over the last two decades. Animal studies (like posthumanism)
has its foundations in those philosophers who became newly attentive to questions of
nonhuman animality (especially Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben), though its roots
can also be found in literary criticism, history, anthropology, sociology, animal ethics,
and media studies.15 Only recently has animal studies entered critical art writing, though
this literature is focused by-and-large on contemporary practices and neglects deeper
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historical questions, which this dissertation begins to fill out.16 Matthew Calarco’s recent
introduction to critical animal studies—which is often described as more activist in its
ambitions than the more academically neutral tone of human-animal studies—presents a
useful three-tiered categorization of approaches in the field: an “identity” approach
wherein human and nonhuman animals are given equal consideration or rights when
pertaining to shared existential capacities, such as personhood or sentience; a “difference”
approach wherein the nonhuman is understood in contradistinction to the human,
resulting in a method that is attentive to alterity and singularity; and an “indistinction”
approach that underscores the ways in which homo sapiens fail to meet the criteria of
humanist ideals, just as nonhuman species do, thereby deemphasizing human
superiority17 Alongside a historical method that finds the figure of the animal to be
operative in art, my method employs a mix of all three of these approaches, when
appropriate.
Over the course of this study I argue for and attempt to uncover a fledgling
posthumanist impulse that produces (or, more modestly, is conjoined with) a historical
shift in the understanding of the animal across the 1970s and 1980s. By-and-large I focus
my attention on French and Belgian practices.18 In part, this is for logistical reasons of
manageability; a comparative study of the animal in Europe exceeds the ambitions of a
dissertation (for this one would certainly mention the advent of modern animal rights in
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Anglo discourse, notably Peter Singer and Tom Regan). Yet limiting the scope to
Francophone practices is not an arbitrary whim. Since both posthumanist theory and
animal studies developed in large part from the seismic shifts in French thought vis-à-vis
humanism beginning in the 1950s, the artist practices I examine run in tandem with this
philosophical trajectory, and, in many cases, are prescient of (and contribute towards) an
articulation of posthumanism and the animal several decades later.
In its simplest terms, this cultural shift qua the animal can be described as
follows: traditional forms of representation based on iconography and symbolism, which
subordinate and dissimulate the animal behind human demands and projections,
gradually began to change in favor of a politics of representation, including living selfrepresentation, which presents the animal in its own existence and for its own interests.
The latter also critiques the servitude of the animal as image (in tradition) and as a
commodified material resource (in modernity), often dissimulating and justifying its
violence via the former. This critique is necessarily posthumanist. In this sense, I hold an
affinity with Baker’s analysis of the animal as a simulacral construct, though unlike his
analysis, I reposition the discussion away from the surface level meanings to focus on the
material impact these constructs have on animal bodies. This should not be confused with
a simple re-engagement with the real animal in affirmative or shocking relations with its
body. All too often, these strategies fall into either patronizing relationships or end up
relegating the animal once more to some type of totemic object in artistic performance.
Rather, I focus on artists who, through their practices, manifest what human and
nonhuman animals share epistemologically and ontologically: what makes them both
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posthumanist.19 It is important to note that what conjoins them are not only certain
internal capacities but also space and the world itself. It is for this reason that ecology, the
study of eco-systems and the environment, is such an important discipline for this
dissertation. Arguably, once environmental crises developed on a planetary scale
beginning in the seventies, the projective needs and desires of “man” began to be
redirected towards that of ecology. In the rising ecological consciousness of the seventies,
the human became one node, albeit an important one, in a much larger environmental
setup. So, in its own way, ecology is arguably itself posthumanist.
0.3 ANIMALS HAVE A HISTORY
The more rarified confines of art history were not immune to this shift from a
human to nonhuman animal. In 1955, Marcel Brion wrote one of the first book-length
studies of the animal in art called Les animaux, un grand thème de l'art (translated into
English as simply Animals in Art). Brion was an essayist and historian whose long career
begins in the late twenties and spans a prodigious number of topics within art history and
literature. His survey begins with Prehistoric cave paintings and moves chronologically
through history to Pablo Picasso, covering all the major eras in Western art in between. In
keeping with the structuralist climate of French thought in the fifties, Brion’s methods
cull from anthropology. The animal is presented as one of the central myths that
structured not only early pictorial production, but also the very basis of social
organization: “What is certain is that at the very root and origin of art, springing perhaps
from the chance graffiti in which man found that he could imitate the shape of an animal,
and from that dance which was, we think, the first form of imitation, there was a belief
19
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that in imitating a creature man could, by following a specified ritual, gain power over
that creature.”20 Not only is the animal credited with being the impetus for artful imitation,
but the practice itself converges with “man’s” relationship to his environment, which,
until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was predominately determined by natural
forces outside his control. In many ways, Brion’s interpretation of the animal in history
has an affinity with the German art historian Wilhelm Worringer’s well-known method
analyzing empathy and abstraction.21 In both cases, what determines cultural production
is any one civilization’s rapport with, and understanding of, its natural environment – a
method that is structural, if not ecological, in its framing of art.
The fact Brion turned his attention to the animal at this point in art history also
signals the newfound fascination with Paleolithic art beginning in the late forties in
postwar Europe. The cave paintings in Lascaux were discovered in 1940, and the rogue
Surrealist Georges Bataille would lavish great attention on these cave paintings and the
animal in his later writings.22 In advanced art, as well, a return to the origins of
civilization became a place to start from scratch after the devastation of World War II.
This return to origins sought to recover the latent “primitive” energies inhibited by the
long historical veneer of European sophistication and culture. From artists associated
with Cobra to the informel painting of Wols or Jean Fautrier to the art brut of Jean
Dubuffet, the utter collapse of history and culture encouraged a return to prehistory, and,
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in part, a return to the importance of the animal (albeit often a naïve and dogmatic
conception of animality).
This zero degree of the immediate post war situation led to a revaluation of
aesthetic principles. A notable example is Dubuffet’s essay, published in his 1946
“Mirobolus” exhibition catalog, which inaugurates his project of reassessing Western
notions of beauty that he traces back to its Greek foundations: “In the name of what –
except perhaps the coefficient of rarity – does man adorn himself with necklaces of shells
and not spiders’ webs, with fox fur and not fox innards?”23 The fact that Dubuffet
implicates the animal is significant because this revaluation represents nothing less than a
wholesale excavation of the human, an archeological project that can only bring to light
what has been excluded from the historical narrative of liberal humanism: the nonwestern,
children, the mentally ill, and the nonhuman.
In this regard, Dubuffet’s remarkable speech “Anticultural Positions” from 1951
anticipates posthumanist sensibility in the twentieth century by stepping outside of the
Western humanist tradition in order to critique it. Dubuffet begins by stating with
confidence: “I have the impression that a complete liquidation of all the ways of thinking,
whose sum constituted what has been called humanism and has been fundamental for our
culture since the Renaissance, is now taking place, or, at least, going to take place soon.”
24

He continues by describing this humanist dissolution as predicated on a changing

understanding of nature. Already with a nod to a posthumanist ecology (wherein the
human is simply one node within a wide network of environments and eco-systems),
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Dubuffet laments Western man as having contempt for nature and a drive for its
domination. Purportedly “primitive” cultures, by contrast, understand themselves to be in
a fluid continuum with nature: “Those primitive societies have surely much more respect
than Western man for every being of the world; they have a feeling that the man is not the
owner of beings, but only one of them among the others.”25 One might read this statement
as the timeworn primitivization of the nonwestern as holistically closer to nature and
animality. Yet Dubuffet’s line of thought may also be credited with turning primitivism
on its head: perhaps all along it has been the ecological sensibilities of nonwestern
cultures that have been more advanced, and the only truly barbaric relation to the morethan-human world has been undertaken by the steely humanist subject of Western
modernity (demonstrating that what is modern and what is advanced can also part
ways).26 The further we enter into environmental crisis from the 1970s onwards—which
in large part has resulted from the instrumentalization of nonhumans—the more this
primitivist reversal is intuitively compelling. In short, the Western subject now has to
admit certain lessons learned from her nonwestern other, a reconsideration reflected in
(though not restricted to) recent studies in cultural anthropology.27
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Dubuffet goes on to critique the Western illusion of autonomy from nature, its
over fondness for reason and analysis, and its excess of confidence in language,
especially written language.28 He decries the scientific method of analyzing phenomena
in the world out of its context: “If there is a tree in the country, I don’t bring it into my
laboratory to look at it under my microscope, because I think the wind which blows
through its leaves is absolutely necessary for the knowledge of the tree and cannot be
separated from it. Also the birds which are in the branches, and even the song of these
birds.”29 There is a striking coincidence here between Dubuffet’s holism and the
contemporaneous emergence of ethology, which called for studying animals in their
native habits rather than in the lab or on the dissection table.30 In more theoretical terms,
Dubuffet also points towards the most damning critique of humanist presumptions,
namely, that human consciousness is a sovereign mirror of the world: “Western man
believes that the things he thinks exist outside exactly in the same way he thinks of them.
He is convinced that the shape of the world is the same shape as his reason.”31 Here, as
Dubuffet points out, human reason eats its own tail and according to its own rules falls
into circular reasoning: just because human consciousness correlates with the world does
not mean that this is the only way the world can be correlated.
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This short detour into Dubuffet’s critique of humanism shows a convergence
between advanced art in postwar France and a relatively more conservative art
historiography. In both cases, the human began to relinquish its pride of place at the
center of meaning and history. Granted, Brion’s early study of the animal’s role in
cultural production remains thoroughly subordinate to human needs and projections.
Nevertheless, like Dubuffet’s speech, the very gesture of devoting time and energy to the
animal within art history opens onto the question of the animal in its own right. By the
seventies and eighties, the number of texts dealing with the animal in art history
undergoes a conspicuous increase. In a similar vein as Brion’s early study, the art
historians Kenneth Clark and Jacques Millet both published histories centered on the
animal, respectively in 1977 and 1984.32 In both cases, the animal becomes a subject of
interest, yet remains within the iconographic parameters of projective signs and symbols.
In keeping with the postwar trend of a return to animal origins, this period also sees a
proliferation of historical exhibitions with its central theme as the animal in art, most
notably, L'animal de Lascaux à Picasso in 1976 and Bestiaire contemporaine à Paris in
1985.33 This is also the moment where one finds textual studies in pure history devoted to
the animal—notably, Robert Delort’s Les animaux ont une histoire (1984), an ambitious
pan cultural iconographic study of animals in art and visual culture, and Maurice
Agulhon’s “Le sang des bêtes: le problème de la protection des animaux en France au
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XIXème siècle” (1981), a foundational essay on the history of animal protection laws in
France.34
A watershed moment in the literature was John Berger’s essay “Why Look at
Animals?” from 1977. Dedicated to Gilles Aillaud, and illustrated by the French artist’s
zoological paintings, Berger’s text is the one of the first to critique the subordination of
the animal within Western cultural production. His account is in keeping with a tradition
of Marxist materialism, which has not generally been sympathetic to the animal’s
perspective. Berger’s central argument is that because of industrial capitalism beginning
in the nineteenth century, the animal has disappeared from view. The traditions that used
to bind humanity and nature together have been broken. Man’s rationalistic viewpoint
dominates and excludes nonhuman life, and increasingly self-immunizes himself from
the environments outside him that have nevertheless always sustained him. As such, the
animal has been relegated to a mere commodity for consumption.
Berger’s relatively short essay spans a long history and range of ideas, from
Aristotle and Descartes (occluding the Middle Ages), to the eighteenth century naturalist
Buffon, Grandville’s human-animal caricatures, and Walt Disney cartoons. Like Brion,
Clarke, and Millet, Berger stresses the anthropological importance of the animal in both
material and cultural history. Along with providing food, clothing, and utility, the animal
was the earliest subject in art, the first medium of paint (blood), and the original
metaphor.35 What separates Berger’s account from previous studies of the animal in
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culture is his repositioning of the discussion from the point of view of “man” to that of
the animal. This repositioning is sensitive to and finds meaning in the animal’s gaze,
which is simultaneously knowable and unknowable to humans. It holds our attention and
seems familiar; yet it also entails secrecy in its purported muteness and lack of language.
It is this capacity to look back, or, as Derrida will later elaborate, the capacity to respond
that has been forgotten and disavowed over the course of the past two centuries.36 As
Berger puts it: “The fact that they can observe us has lost all significance.”37 This loss has
had far-reaching and often tragic implications.
“Why Look at Animals?” ends with an analysis of zoos. For Berger, the zoo
stands for the melancholic reappearance of the animal in culture. For different reasons,
the zoo is a recurring motif in this dissertation—not only as a physical place, but also as a
biopolitical typology of containment that tends to implicate art objects, as well as humans
and nonhumans.38 Although they represent two distinct art historical discourses, Berger’s
analysis of zoos can readily be analogized with Peter Bürger’s analysis of the culture
industry and the avant-garde from 1974.39 Berger describes the origin of zoos along the
lines of the public museum: “[L]ike every other nineteenth century public institution, the
zoo, however supportive of the ideology of imperialism, had to claim an independent
civic function,” i.e. public enlightenment.40 Thus, if the institutionalization of the animal
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rips it out of its life world, then the ostensibly living politics of the historical avant-gardes
for which Bürger is nostalgic have been deadened and domestication within modern
cultural institutions in much the same way. Bürger’s argument can be distilled to a
process of domestication and taming. In both cases there is an institutional decontextualization of something living that was once immersed in a much larger ecosystem of meaning and importance – and in both cases their reappearance in the 1960s
serves as a compensatory gesture for a history that is either lost or compromised by the
economic pressures of the present. These histories are connected, and, as I argue more
fully below, the turn to animals in the seventies and eighties is not a coincidence: if the
bridging of art and life so central to the historical avant-gardes was no longer possible in
the form previously took, then turning to the animal and ecological concerns was a way
of reintroducing life into art without simply repeating history as farce.
Berger’s essay is germinal for animal studies. The fact that he has, for the most
part, been marginalized within art history is telling. One of the reasons art history resists
querying the animal is that the discipline remains deeply humanist. People make history,
and critics and artists are the hermeneutical keys to the art. Art history also continues to
be haunted by connoisseurship and matters of taste. There is a demand for politics in art,
and sometimes ethics, but all-too often these must remain subservient to formal interests
and the social distinction of having the qualifications to identify them. Since the sixties—
and likely since its inception in the nineteenth century—art history has been implicated in
a cultural market predicated on taste and autonomous pleasures, while also
professionalized in an academic market that sets limits on proper or improper subjects for
research. This is why art history has remained largely inadequate in coming to terms with
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the animal and posthumanist themes, which, as I demonstrate in this study, increased
exponentially from the seventies and eighties up to today’s ubiquitous use of animals in
artistic practices in ways both critical and uncritical.
0.4 CHAPTER BREAKDOWNS
Chapter one traces Chris Marker’s commitment to ethology and environmental
politics in polemical works calling for nonviolence and recognition of animal sentience
and interiority. Marker offers a theory of animality that is not only attuned to ecological
crises, but also to the ways in which animality is foundational for human culture; as such,
he augurs today’s ethological and philosophical considerations of nonlinguistic forms of
communication and culture. Chapter two is a comparative study of three exhibitions in
the mid-80s that challenge the humanist subject. These displays posit two ways of
reappraising the human—either through transhumanism, whereby the human is overcome
by bio-technological enhancements, or through posthumanism, whereby the human is
shown to be inextricably entangled with animality. In both cases, it is a nonhuman that
destabilizes the security and dominance of the humanist subject—and by proxy the longheld delimitation of the human-nonhuman line. Chapter three is a case study of Marcel
Broodthaer’s mythoclastic use of animals in his work—including his many allusions to
zoology, natural history, and the animal fables of La Fontaine. Ultimately, his work calls
for an analogy between the Duchampian readymade and the animal: both are shown to be
contingent on the power of naming, the subject formation that this power gives rise to,
and the ability to be industrially reproduced. However, unlike the readymade art object,
Broodthaers’s work reveals that when it comes to reducing the animal to a readymade,
there is always a surplus and singular form of being that exceeds its nomination and
objectification in mass production. Finally, chapter four locates eco-feminist impulses in
20

the works of Louis Bourgeois, Annette Messager, and VALIE EXPORT. These impulses
arrive in two modes: either as a strategy of identification with animality, in which the
artist self-identifies with a nonhuman position in order to escape or resist androcentric
power, or as a strategy of overidentification, in which the artist embraces a pejorative
association of woman-as-animal to such parodic degrees that she travesties and calls for a
revaluation of this androcentric power. Bringing attention to these disparate issues
involved in artistic practices from the 1970s and 80s, my dissertation contextualizes
recent disciplinary advances in the posthumanities and animal studies within art historical
research, and offers a much-needed genealogy for the prolific use of animals in
contemporary art today.
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CHAPTER ONE – POSTHUMANIST INTERIORITY: CHRIS MARKER’S ETHOLOGICAL WORK OF
THE 1970S AND 80S

1.1 INTRODUCTION: POST-HISTORICAL ANIMALS
A morbid, apocalyptic echo can be traced between the last lines of Chris Marker’s
most celebrated film, La Jetée, 1962, to the last lines of Vive la baleine!, 1972, one of his
lesser-known works. By now the finale of La Jetée is well-known: the dénouement of the
film centers around a protagonist haunted by a memory from childhood, which at film’s
end is revealed to be the paradoxically future image-memory of “the moment of his own
death.”1 A decade later in his aesthetico-multicultural history of whale hunting Vive la
baleine!, Marker leaves the viewer with parallel dread: “each whale who dies leaves us
like a prophecy with an image of our own death.”2 This echo suggests a comparison of
two films that at first blush seem like an unusual pairing. Yet the more these works are
placed side-by-side the more affinities coalesce: both La jetée and Vive la baleine! are
concerned with issues of human-animal entanglement and apocalyptic planetary
scenarios—the former as a Cold War cautionary tale of nuclear fall-out (whereupon
nearly all animals become figures of ancestrality and loss), the latter as a warning of
impending environmental catastrophe (implicating humans and nonhumans). Both La
Jetée and Vive la baleine! underscore the complicit role of human activity in ecological
depletion—one by mutual destruction in war, the other by mutual destruction in ravaging
earth as a limited resource. In this way, a formal and thematic symmetry exists between
these two short films that typify Marker’s ciné-roman style of moving-still images.
Remaining true to the etymology of apocalypse as disclosure, both films reveal a terrible
1

Chris Marker, La Jetée (Irvington, NY: Criterion Collection). [17:50]
Chris Marker and Mario Ruspoli, Three Cheers for the Whale (New York, N.Y.: First Run/Icarus Films).
[14:40]
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truth about humanity’s self-perceived omniscience and the impact it has on both the
human and more-than-human world.
These sobering themes are in keeping with an apocalyptic tone in culture,
especially in France, which from the mid-1960s to the 1980s became increasingly
preoccupied with a number of “ends”: of “philosophy,” of “man,” and of “history.”3 The
genealogy of this discourse, which resurfaces in post-Cold War garb in the 1990s, should
be traced back to the immediate postwar period. The concept of “posthistory”
specifically—commonly taken as accounting for the hegemonic success of liberal market
capitalism following WWII and the totalitarian collapse of really existing socialisms—
dates back to at least the 1940s and ‘50s.4 Positioning Hegel at the philosophical
beginnings of the end of history, Alexandre Kojève’s lectures on the Phenomenology of
Spirit catalyzed this posthistorical questioning.5 As a young philosophy student in 1930s
Paris during Kojève’s fame—possibly as a student of Jean-Paul Sartre, though Marker’s
pre-war activities remain largely unknown6—Marker would have been familiar with the
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For example, see the 1961 L’Apocalypse exhibition at the Musée d’art moderne de la ville de Paris, which
was originally scheduled to run from March 15 to April 15, but its popularity led to a one-month extension.
"L'Apocalypse ", ed. Musée d'art moderne de la ville de Paris (Paris: Joseph Foret, 1961). In philosophy,
these themes are most prominently found in the writings of Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida, and Michel
Foucault. Examples include: Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster = (L'ecriture du désastre)
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986); Jacques Derrida, "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently
Adopted in Philosophy," Oxford Lit Review Oxford Literary Review 6, no. 2 (1984). Jacques Derrida, "The
Ends of Man," in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Michel Foucault,
The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).
4
In Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida emphasizes this repetition of the posthistorical discourse, citing
Maurice Blanchot’s essay “The Ends of Philosophy” from 1959 as a prominent example (a work that
documents a number of books in the 1950s already reflecting on the end of history). Jacques Derrida,
Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning, and The New International, trans., Peggy
Kamuf (New York; London: Routledge, 2010), 16.
5
While Kojève’s lectures were given in the 1930s, the publication of his notes was in 1947. For a history of
postwar French thought through the lens of Hegel and the end of history, see Vincent Descombes, Modern
French Philosophy, trans., L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1980).
6
“Lore has it that Marker was a student of Sartre’s in the 1930s when the former studied at the Lycée
Pasteur, located in the upper-middle-class Neuilly-sure-Seine suburb of Paris.” Nora M. Alter, Chris
Marker (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 3.
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concept of posthistory. Just after the war, he contributed an essay for a special issue of
Esprit on apocalypticism and the atomic age.7
The role the animal in this discourse of posthistory is the subject of this chapter. I
claim Marker’s understanding of animals in his work can be taken, in part, as an oblique
response to Kojève’s understanding of posthistory, which itself relies on animal-being for
its theoretical foundations (Kojève’s reading of Hegel is anthropological, which first and
foremost differentiates the desiring human with the merely surviving animal). As such, it
is first necessary to offer a brief history of “animality” in the discourse surrounding the
end of history in Kojève, but also in the writings of Giorgio Agamben and Jacques
Derrida, two thinkers who are central to the rethinking of animality in philosophy. From
these theories, I turn to Marker’s quite different understanding of the posthistorical
animal in Vive la baleine! and other works during this period, most especially, his Si
j’avais quatres dromadaires from 1967 (though only released in 1974).
Kojève’s concept of the posthistorical animal is found in two elliptical footnotes
in his courses on Hegel’s Phenomenology from 1938-39. The first footnote was inserted
for the 1946 edition. In his unorthodox reading of Hegel, Kojève describes the end of
history as necessarily coinciding with the end of “man” proper. He claims, however, that
this end should not be deemed a “catastrophe.” In fact, this end of history is man’s happy
sublation into harmony with nature (which “remains what it has been from all eternity”):
“Man remains alive as animal in harmony with Nature and given Being.” What this end
entails is not only the end of man, but also of “Action,” of the patient work of dialectical

7

Chris Marker, "Till The End of Time," Esprit Nouvelle série, 129, no. 1 (1947). See also Emmanuel
Mourner’s “Pour un temps d’Apocalypse” from the same issue.
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philosophy, and of the violent struggle for recognition. What remains is only what makes
man happy: “art, love, play, etc.”8
The second footnote, in which Kojève rightly deems the first to have been
“ambiguous,” appears in an addendum to the first footnote on the occasion of the second
edition in 1968. Therein he elaborates on man’s happiness in “art, love, play, etc.”
Kojève reappraises the term “happy” as still too human, and he revises the word in favor
of “content.” The birds that build their nests, the spiders that spin their webs, and the
sounds of frogs and cicadas do not make them happy per se, but it does make them
content. Similarly, “[o]ne would have to say that posthistorical animals of the species
Homo sapiens (which will live amidst abundance and complete security) will be content
as a result of their artistic, erotic and playful behavior, inasmuch as, by definition, they
will be contented with it.”9 Not only does contentment reign as the posthistorical
sentiment for man-turned-animal, it even makes “wisdom” and “discourse” obsolete: in
posthistory “the species Homo sapiens would react by conditioned reflexes to vocal
signals or sign “language,” and thus their so-called “discourses” would be akin to the
language of “bees.”10 This vision of posthistory (which Vilém Flusser takes up in similar
fashion in the seventies) refashions man into a pre-programmed, instinctual form of life.11
In other words, posthistorical man-turned-animal is predicated on an understanding of the
animal as pure, reactive immanence (like Kojève’s student Georges Bataille’s definition
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Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the reading of Hegel, trans., Nichols James H. (Ithaca; London:
Cornell University Press, 1996), 158-9.
9
Ibid., 159.
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Ibid., 160.
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See Vilém Flusser, Post-history, trans., Novaes Rodrigo Maltez (Minneapolis, MN: Univocal, 2013).
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of the animal as “water in water”).12 It is this conception of the animal that serves as a
model for the postwar consumer subject as happy and dumb in eternal presentness.13
These enigmatic footnotes have been much commented on. Recently, Giorgio
Agamben takes them up in The Open (2002). In his chapter titled “Acephalus,” which
discusses the debate between Kojève and Bataille on posthistorical man-animality,
Agamben shifts the discussion towards his own conception of posthistory as man reduced
to bare life. He cites a 1939 declaration by the Collège de Sociologie denouncing a war in
which men are turned into “conscious sheep resigned to the slaughterhouse.”14 Agamben
thus moves the debate away from the eternally present contentment of man-turned-animal
towards a post-historicity that turns humans into mere objects of extermination and
domination: “[t]hough in a sense different from the one Kojève had in mind, men had
now truly become animals again.”15 While Kojève’s original footnotes on posthistorical
animality should be read in an ironic register, from which they assume a critique of
postwar consumer life, Agamben’s return to Kojève gives the latter a darker, more
biopolitical—or better, thanatopolitical—reading, even though both Kojève and
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See Georges Bataille, "Animality," in Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought, ed.
Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco(London; New York: Continuum, 2004).
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Most surprisingly in this second footnote, Kojève maintains that this posthistorical future had already
happened in the United States and Japan. Kojève recalls initially concluding that the “American way of life”
had most actualized this “eternal present” condition of human-animal contentment. Subsequently, Kojève
changed his mind after visiting Japan. He concludes that it is the Japanese who have gone furthest down
this posthistorical path. In contrast to the peoples of the United States, however, the Japanese had mitigated
a complete collapse into animality with recourse to what Kojève calls their cultural “snobbery.” Since “no
animal can be a snob,” Japanese posthistorical man thus maintains a certain remnant of being-human, or of
being-superior to animals. It is tempting to understand Marker as agreeing here, to some degree, as he was
so often fascinated by Japanese ceremonies and cultural practices – the whale hunt in Vive la baleine! being
the salient example for this chapter. See Kojève, 161.
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Quoted in Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans., Kevin Attell (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 2004), 8.
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Agamben understand this historical process as one of mass de-politicization.16 If for
Kojève the animal can only be thought of as a form of dumb immanence, for Agamben,
the “animal” and “animalization” similarly point in one vertical direction, though with
more dire consequences: downwards towards debasement and violence.
In Specters of Marx (1993), Jacques Derrida has also discussed this posthistorical
turn to animality in Kojève via his critical assessment of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of
History and the Last Man (1992), a text beholden to Kojève’s reading of Hegel. One of
Derrida’s central criticisms directed at Fukuyama’s thesis is its reliance on a
metaphysical, trans-historical conception of man, which is simply presupposed as an
unproblematic, natural given: “To define this supposedly natural entity, this man as Man
whom he talks about so blithely, Fukuyama claims to come back to what he calls “the
first man,” that is, to “natural man.”17 Derrida shows how this figure of “natural man” has
already been thoroughly problematized by the very thinkers Fukuyama relies on for his
argument: Marx, Stirner, Husserl, Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Hegel himself. In order to
move beyond such a metaphysically constrained concept of history or the end of history,
Derrida calls for putting “to work in a more demanding fashion the two moments of the
Kojèvian postscript on posthistory and posthistorical animals.”18
Derrida’s main claim against what he calls Fukuyama’s “gospel” or “good news”
is that this purported arrival of liberal democracy as posthistorical fulfillment, predicated
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In a subsequent section from The Open, titled “Animalization,” Agamben describes the conjunction
between animality and depoliticization in clear Foucauldian terms: “…man has now reached his historical
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on a dubious conception of “man as man,” has nevertheless brought about violence and
misery on a scale that matches that of the totalitarian regimes of Communism:
For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize
in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as
the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine,
and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of
the earth and humanity.19
Derrida continues this bold caution against lionizing the progresses of liberal market
capitalism by including a parenthetical emphasis on nonhuman animals in this purported
posthistorical juncture:
[N]ever have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or
exterminated on earth (And provisionally, but with regret, we must leave aside
here the nevertheless indissociable question of what is becoming of so-called
“animal” life, the life and existence of “animals” in this history. This question has
always been a serious one, but it will become massively unavoidable.)20
Derrida does not undertake a thorough analysis of the question of “so-called” animal life,
but his later philosophical work on the animal can be understood as a belated though
robust response to this initial call in Specters of Marx.21 Nevertheless, already here
special attention should be paid to what this brief parenthetical entails: it splits the
“animal” in two. The ‘so-called animal’ life Derrida alludes to here is not the same as the
19

Ibid., 106.
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Kojèvian animal (or Bataille’s obliviously immanent animal, or even Agamben’s zoeanimal as mere biological existence). If the ‘animal’ is ‘so-called,’ then it denotes a
nonhuman form of life that eludes the totalizing effects the term ‘animal,’ especially in its
pejorative connotations.22 To understand the animal as pure presentness, as these other
thinkers do – as limited to having desires that simply fulfill organic needs, or as mindless,
apolitical life – is to be in direct conflict with the ethological findings that contradict such
a limited notion of the animal. What Derrida points to in this passage is the life of the
animal as implicated by history, as a potential recipient of violence, and as increasingly
unavoidable. This is to say that Derrida points to the “really-existing” animal beyond the
“so-called” animal.
It follows that this doubling of the animal gives rise to two different ways of
understanding posthistory as it pertains to animality. The first is a posthistory predicated
on the animal as a stand-in for eternal presentness, dumb contentment, or exploitable bare
life; this first version of posthistory remains humanist, since it is founded on a pejorative
misrecognition of the animal as a differential myth supporting human supremacy, which
again—through ethics and cognitive ethology—we today understand is not life as pure,
immanent contentment.23 By contrast, the second version of posthistory, which reflects a
profound epistemological shift, becomes attentive to the many ethological advancements
since the 1970s that reveal animal-being and situatedness in the world in its greater
complexity. This would be a posthumanist version of posthistory, which shows the
22

To emphasize the force of language on the multitude of nonhuman animal lives, Derrida coins the term
animot to highlight the constructed nature of the word “animals.” Derrida’s neologism is a homonym for
animaux (or the plural “animals”) and—since animot contains the French word for “word” (mot)—it also
underscores its textual condition as a far too broad textual umbrella. Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I
Am, 41.
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In other words, in this humanist posthistory the animal remains a fable and a metaphor. This does not
mean, however, that this metaphor does not have material effects when exploited by institutional powers
that take recourse to it for the reification and extermination of life, both human and animal.
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animal to be anything but dumb and content. In this version of posthistorical animality,
the animal becomes (and, in fact, always already was) the basis for understanding what
made being human possible in the first place i.e. communication, joy, pain, sociability,
and culture. The human has always been and always will be an animal, albeit one with
high cognitive abilities, and in a posthumanist posthistory this is no longer a bad thing,
but provides the very basis for what makes living, breathing, and thinking
theriocentrically unique to human and (many) nonhuman animals.24 In this second
version of post-historicity, it is not history that comes to an end, but a specific version of
history that remains irremediably humanist, anthropocentric, and supported by pejorative
associations of “animality” as a semantic, epistemological pivot for justifying violence
and entitlement.25
The central claim of this chapter is that Marker’s work points towards such a
posthumanist posthistory as an eco-politics of anthrozoological cooperation and mutual
well-being. As I argue, Marker understands the animal to be a sentient agent with the
capacity to make claims on a human viewer i.e., that nonhumans are demonstrably
entangled with human history, culture, and environmental well-being. Moreover, the
ethological dimensions of Marker’s œuvre open the way for an understanding of the
animal as properly posthumanist and political. Since my analysis of Marker’s work
24

Admittedly, understanding the animal in this way is difficult, since it goes against the long-held humanist
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light of dignity and differential capacity, can no longer serve as a tenable semantic placeholder for
exploitability. Agamben, 77.
30

demonstrates that the animal has its own capacity for culture and for making claims on
the world (in the domains of communication, solidarity, protection, joy, expression,
aggression, and so on), it poses a significant challenge to humanist history as both unique
and sovereign in these domains. In this way, the developments I trace necessitate a rethinking of history itself, towards a posthistory that now includes nonhuman sentience
and agency. It is in this sense of posthistorical that Marker’s work presented in this
chapter should be understood as posthumanist and why his concern with nonhuman
animal interiority is so historically important and novel.
1.2 BESTIARES VIDEOS AND MARKER’S ETHOLOGICAL IMPULSE
From the mid-80s to the early 90s, Marker made a number of brief video works
that can be described as ethological in their single-minded focus on animal behavior.
There are his three Bestiaries videos—Chat écoutant la musique, An Owl Is an Owl is an
Owl, and Zoo Piece (1985-90), as well as the stand alone Slon Tango (1993), and
Bullfight/Okinawa (1994).26 Each of these brief video works attest to different affective
states of animality—comfort, lethargy, play, and in the case of Bullfight/Okinawa,
aggression through human provocation. Zoo piece shows animals in various states of
boredom in zoological confinement completely displaced from their eco-systems in the
wild.27 A listless gorilla, a languorous cheetah, kangaroos, curious emus, pacing wolf, and
any number of poking snouts and peering eyes look out imploringly behind cage bars. [ill.
1.1] The video is an innocent experience if the viewer is ignorant of animal sentience and
cognitive abilities; for the viewer who, like Marker, is not unaware of the psychosomatic
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While not original intended as a series, these five works are sometimes shown together as Bestiaire and
the dates often vary slightly for each piece.
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A sick or sleeping rhinoceros, laying down in a cement and tiled holding cell, uncannily recalls Gilles
Aillaud’s zoological paintings of the 1970s.
31

complications of nonhuman confinement it is excruciating. In this regard, the music
Marker chooses for Zoo piece—a bluesy instrumental rendition of “My Funny
Valentine”—lends an affectionate yet melancholic air to the work. This walk through a
zoo may very well blur the lines between the affective states of various animals (whose
interiorities really experience and emote these states) and the affective states of the
human viewers that are triggered as an emotive surplus by the moving music and image
(which may reside solely in the viewer and displaced onto the zoological denizens). In
other words, the dividing line between theoricentricity and anthropocentricity is
complicated and perhaps undecidable.
If Zoo piece evokes nonhuman despondency and boredom, Slon Tango documents
the performance of a large, dancing elephant in his pen in a more playful key. [ill. 1.2]
The video was shot on one of Marker’s trips to Russia, ‘slon’ being Russian for
‘elephant.’ Like Zoo piece, Marker’s use of music underscores the mood, in this case
through Igor Stravinsky’s fittingly plodding yet jocular Tango (1940). While housed in a
large pen that nonetheless precludes the peripatetic distances normally covered by
pachyderms, the large mammal executes what appears to be a dancing pattern that is well
accounted for in its species behavior: rhythmic intervals of stepping forwards and
backwards, wagging tail and flapping ears, complete with intermittent curtsies of both
front and hind legs and the occasional tossing of dirt into the air with trunk. The capacity
for nonhuman play, such as dance, becomes a central concern for Marker, especially in
his extended consideration of animals in Dromadaires, as it was for the dancer Simone
Forti, whose visits to the Rome zoo and its confined animals in the sixties served as an
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affective model for her choreography, notably her Sleepwalkers, 1968 as inspired by this
exact elephant dance.28
In An owl is an owl is an owl, Marker comically alludes to the Cartesian
understanding of the animal as a mindless automaton. The short video shows close-ups of
an array of different owl species, each turning their heads and blinking their eyes in ways
that seem robotic. The swiveling of their feathered heads and necks are impossibly well
oiled and smooth, while their eyelids close from the sides rather than from top and
bottom. [ill. 1.3] An owl is an owl is an owl uses robotic speech-sounds throughout—
repeating the work’s title over and over, nearly indecipherably—as if the viewer is
witnessing strange beings of alien life or artificial intelligence (this owl-as-machine finds
a contemporaneous companion in Ridley Scott’s film Blade Runner, 1982 and its ‘fake’
owl, played in the film by a ‘real’ owl). It is equally important to note that Marker’s title,
originally in English, alludes to owls as having pure equivalent exchange value, as if the
animal could be a readymade commodity (that an owl is an owl is an owl, ad infinitum).
The varieties of owls shown on screen belie this conception of animal equivalency, and
ultimately this brief video serves as a critique of the economic flattening of animal life.
Perhaps the most celebrated of the Bestiaire videos is Chat écoutant la musique
featuring Guillaume-en-Égypte, Marker’s beloved cat. Shot in Marker’s home studio, the
gray, striped tabby is sprawled on two synthesizer keyboards while a calm and serene
piano plays over large speakers (Federico Mompou’s “Pajaro Triste,” from “Impresiones
Intimas,” 1911). Matching the music’s tranquil mood, the cat embodies a liminal state
between sleep and wakefulness, intermittently stretching his front paws (seemingly
28
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pressing down on some of the keys), eyes opening and closing, and pricking his ears in
sync with certain impressionistic accents in the music. The languid cat breaks his
peaceful spell only twice: at the end, when he turns his body around only to lie back
down, and in the middle, when something just behind and off camera suddenly grabs his
wide-eyed attention. [ill. 1.4]
Initially, this three-minute video seems nothing more than a curiosity (as do
perhaps all of Marker’s short animal videos, though this view hinges on the belief that
animals are nothing more than curiosities). However, there is an important embodied
relay to account for in Chat ecoutant la musique, which sets up a relationship of shared
interiority between the nonhuman subject and the human viewer in an affective overlap
through Mompou’s piano piece. The music provides a mediating extra-lingual thread that
ties together the inaccessible interior life of the cat and the equally inaccessible interior
life of the viewer. In both cases, what is manifest are only the inferences or traces of
interiority, which can never be communicated directly from feline to human.29 Marker
intermittently turns the camera to the digital equalizer on the sound equipment, which
lights up in sync with the dynamics of the music. In addition, the camera repeatedly
focuses in close-up on the cat’s ears. Both these recurrent details emphasize that the
music is diegetically present in the studio with Guillaume-en-Égypte. The result is a
quasi-secret relation between hearing, perception, and affective response to music by
nonhuman and human faculties and receptors. In other words, Marker’s work allows for a
transversal sharing of auditory capacity between (at least) two sets of ears: the cat’s and
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the viewer’s. While the quality of this shared affect remains largely indeterminate, it is
reasonable to think that the contemplative and calming tonality of the piece resonates
similarly in both feline and human embodiment.30 The mediating music thus thematizes a
spatio-temporal envelope inhabited by a multi-species audience with the capacity to be
immersed in a shared reception of sounds, however unable to fully communicate this
experience and affect to each other.
1.3 TOUS LES CHIENS TOUS LES CHATS (1970), AND L’ANIMAL EN QUESTION (1970)
By the time of his Bestiaries videos in the mid-late 1980s, the sixty-plus year-old
Marker had already made numerous works that offer multi-faceted meditations on a
whole array of animals—giraffes, wolves, gorillas, mammoths, ducks, raccoons, reindeer,
and whales, to name a few. In fact, Sans Soleil (1983), often considered one of the
filmmaker’s most important works along with La Jetée, dwells on the nonhuman animal
as much as its human counterpart. Nevertheless, there has been very little serious
discussion of the various roles animals play in this film or others by Marker. This is
understandable, as he represents a chameleonic figure of prodigious scope. Marker was a
writer, filmmaker, and visual artist working in photography, the moving image, and new
media with a range of themes of more obvious interest to disciplines like art history and
film studies: political history, science fiction, sociology, ethnography, and
documentarianism. When the literature on Marker does treat his interest in animals—
usually his love of cats and owls—it serves as an opportunity to fill out a notoriously
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incomplete biography. More often than not, the animal functions as a surrogate or alter
ego for the filmmaker himself.31 By contrast, I propose to take very seriously what
Marker says about the animal and how animals appear across the whole of his work,
where one finds remarkable nonhuman cameos from beginning to end.
In this regard, the early seventies are especially crucial for Marker, when he
undertakes various projects dealing directly with the animal. Although this was a preexisting interest dating back at least to Marker’s writings in the journal Esprit in the late
forties and fifties the early seventies consolidate the animal as a central concern and
theme in his work. Under pseudonym Boris Villeneuve, Marker translated Konrad
Lorenz’s So kam dem Mensch auf den Hund from 1949 for its first appears in French in
1970.32 Marker translated this early text of popular ethology not as Comment l’homme a
rencontré le chien, as would be expected in French, but as Tous les chiens, tous les chats.
[ill. 1.5] While other translations remained faithful to the original German title (e.g. Man
Meets Dog or E l'uomo incontrò il cane) Marker took creative license by making titular
room for his beloved felines. While Lorenz’s text does include discussions of cats
31

See the two major studies of Marker’s oeuvre in English for this form of feline biographism: Alter;
Catherine Lupton, Chris Marker: Memories of the Future (London: Reaktion Books, 2005). One essay in a
recent French anthology devoted to the role of the gaze in his work represents a rare instance of dealing
directly with the nonhuman animal, if not the nonhuman’s own capacity for gazing back. See Barbara
Laborde, "Du mémorial au mémoriel: hommages et tombeaux dans l'œuvre de Chris Marker," in Chris
Marker et l'imprimerie du regard, ed. André Habib et Viva Paci(Paris: Harmattan, 2008). The only study
thus far to consider the animal gaze seriously in the Marker literature is Kieran Argent Horner recent essay
in the journal Film-Philosophy, and is generally symptomatic of the incorporation of animal studies into the
field: Kierran Argent Horner, "The Equality of the Gaze: The Animal Stares Back in Chris Marker's
Films," Film-Philosophy 20, no. 2-3 (2016).
32
“Chris Marker” itself being a pseudonym, “Boris Villeneuve” is a partial reference to his birth name
“Christian François Bouche-Villeneuve.” Konrad Lorenz, Tous les chiens, tous les chats, trans., Villeneuve
Boris (Paris: Flammarion, 1970). Lorenz is not an unproblematic figure in history. His ethological theories
lent themselves to notorious National Socialist ideologies of race and species difference. Like Jakob von
Uexhüll, another important figure of incipient ethology and the study of animal behavior, Lorenz became
willingly involved with the Nazi regime. At the same time, Lorenz remains widely considered as a
progenitor of modern ethology and animal behaviorism (who, alongside Nikolaas Tinbergen and Karl von
Frisch, jointly won the 1973 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his work on the animal). See
Burkhardt.
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(mainly to differentiate their less than fully domesticated status within human spheres of
evolutionary development), on the whole, it is a study of canine behavior and a
speculative mediation on the origins and evolution of their domestication within human
societies. As translator, Marker became well acquainted with these emerging theories of
animal cognition, the animal’s evolutionary role in hominization, and above all, the
challenge nonhuman agency poses for a simple dichotomy of nature/culture
(domestication being only the most obvious instance of such overlap). Above all, this
work on Lorenz opens up for Marker the possibility of thinking of nonhuman agency as
having a place in history. Moreover, if history has been pushed along not only by human
agency, but by nonhuman agency as well, then this more complex notion of history
should be understood as posthumanist (and even as a form of posthistory, if by history
one still speaks of the process as driven solely by human action). This theme of
nonhuman agency is central to Marker’s incorporation of animals in his work.
While translating Lorenz, Marker also worked on a documentary film dedicated to
the Surrealist poet Jacques Prévert called L’Animal en question (1970), a collaboration
between Marker and the publisher and writer André Pozner. Interspersed with
straightforward interviews between Pozner and Prévert, along with the poet’s
photographer friend Robert Doisneau, Marker inserts footage of a roaming raccoon
against a neutral blue backdrop. It becomes clear that the “animal in question” is not only
Marker’s mute, restless raccoon before the camera, but the poet himself. In the final
scene of L’Animal en question, we find Prévert outdoors coming face-to-face with a
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living, caged raccoon.33 [ill. 1.6] The poet enters into dialogue with the animal. This
melancholic moment does not come across as irreverent but as a sincere inter-species
meeting:
What are we made of, the two of us? Well! Tell me what you’re thinking, raccoon.
What you think of cages, what you think of a lot of things. What do you think of
the bomb? What do you think of the war in Vietnam, raccoon, you who’s in a
cage? What do you think of all the prisons?...You don’t seem very happy, raccoon.
Are you looking for freedom? You know what it is, but you don’t have the words
to explain. Man explains it, and imprisons you.”34
These final words of L’Animal en question encapsulate many of themes important to
Marker’s work in this chapter: an emphasis on a non-linguistic form of interiority, a
shared affect between human and nonhuman, and a critique of anthropocentric power
over the animal (‘You know what [freedom] is, but you don’t have the words to explain.
Man explains it, and imprisons you’). Prévert treats the animal as an instance of living
interiority that can know freedom by experiencing it, along with its opposite, namely,
imprisonment. While a distant war and nuclear power is meaningless for the raccoon, this
animal may have something to communicate about prisons in her ability to not only react,
but also respond to the situation. Prévert leaves this possibility open by discerning a
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On of the reasons why this meeting is arranged, which also explains the film’s title, is that one of Prévert
most celebrated poems involves a raccoon: See “Inventaire” in Jacques Prévert, Paroles (Paris: Gallimard,
1972), 208-10.
34
“De quoi on est faits, tous les deux? Hé! Dis-moi ce que tu penses, raton laveur. Ce que tu penses des
cages, ce qu tu pense d’un tas de choses. Qu’est-ce que tu penses de la bombe? Qu’est-ce que tu penses de
la guerre du Viêtnam, raton laveur, tui qui es en cage? Qu’est-ce que tu penses de toute les prisons?...T’as
pas l’air heureux, raton laveur. Tu cherches la liberté? Tu sais ce que c’est, mais tu n’as pas de mots pour
l’expliquer. Les hommes l’expliquent, et t’enferment.” Jacques Prévert and André Pozner,
Hebdromadaires (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), 184-5. Here and elsewhere, translations from the French are
mine, unless otherwise noted.
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thinking and gesturing embodiment that points to indifference, listlessness, and
dolefulness behind the bars: ‘You don’t seem very happy, raccoon.’
Judging from the poet’s prodigious oeuvre, which preoccupies itself so often with
animals, if there is a posthumanist poet avant la lettre it is certainly Prévert. Throughout
his poetry and interviews, Prévert often insists on a certain continuity between human and
nonhuman animals.35 Hebdromadaires (1982), a book of interviews resulting from
Pozner and Marker’s film L’Animal en question, substantiates this form of continuist
thinking between human and nonhuman animals. In one interview, Prévert challenges the
notion of humanist forms of thought directly, using language that unequivocally points to
the circular reasoning involved in the autopoietic formation of the human: “The word
human is itself human! I understood only recently what this Humanism entails. Because
in the end, Humanism, like human sacrifices, is human, and why should I give a damn?”36
The poet describes Humanism as tautological by definition. In his proto-posthumanist
mindset, Prévert mirrors his current intellectual moment in France preoccupied with the
“ends of man,” which developed out of structuralist and poststructuralist philosophy
through the late sixties and early seventies in France.37 It is Michel Foucault’s work that

35

Poems like “Les Animaux onts des ennuis” from his collected Histoires (1964) or his long prose poem in
Des bêtes… (1950), a collaborative photobook with the popular animal photographer Ylla, attest to
Prévert’s interest in animals as not simply character types for poetic fables, but as having certain capacities
and interests in common with humans. See Jacques Prévert, "Les animaux onts des ennuis," in Histoires
(Paris: Gallimard, 1963), 131-2. Jacques Prévert and Ylla, Des bêtes... (Paris: Gallimard, 1950). In the
latter, Prévert notes at the outset that the human is the animal that calls itself human. Throughout this long
text (which I do not have space to analyze here), Prévert’s discourse is a preliminary uncovering of the
animal behind fabulist representation and one that seems to incorporate ethological insights about animal
behavior at variance with their historical use. Ylla’s zoological photographs and animal portraiture work in
tandem with the text as a sentimental yet frank representation of the various animals discussed in Prévert’s
accompanying prose poem.
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“Le mot humain est humain! Un humanisme, j’ai appris très tard ce que c’était. Parce qu’au fond,
l’humanisme, comme les sacrifices humains, c’est humain, et qu’est-ce que vous voulez que ça me foute?”
Prévert and Pozner, 78.
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This posthumanist and anti-anthropological intellectual moment can be accounted for in Derrida’s lecture
on “The Ends of Man.” After describing the immediate postwar situation of Existentialism as essentially
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hangs most heavily on this intellectual moment, notably his surprise 1966 bestseller The
Order of Things and its archeology of ‘man’ as an epistemic construction nearing its
end.38 Prévert’s emphatic declaration that “Humanism” is itself a human concept and
invention is thus in keeping with the current discourse troubling the once a priori
understanding of “man” as a given concept, rather than as one formed by an auto
referential humanist history. Evacuating the human subject from unquestioned historical
self-evidence opens onto a different understanding of the human, which becomes
unmoored from its former metaphysical distinction and security—not unlike Derrida’s
deconstruction of Fukuyama’s conception of ‘man.’
1.4 VIVE LA BALIENE (1972)
Two years after translating Tous les chiens, tous les chats and co-directing
l’Animal en question, Marker offered one of his most sustained works on the nonhuman
animal in Vive la baleine! (1972). On the surface, this short film – which is almost totally
ignored in the critical literature on Marker – is a history of international whale hunting.39
Yet embedded within its scope is an examination of the animal in relation to a number of
wider themes. Following an analysis of the film’s structure and strategies, I open up the
discussion towards two wider themes, namely: the way the animal functions in relation to
death and to ecology. In this subsequent section (1.5) I examine other moments in his
work involving the animal in order to form a more complete picture of how Marker
moves the paradigm of animal representation away from humanist presuppositions.
humanist, Derrida relates the present moment of the late 1960s as preoccupied with a “critique of
humanism and anthropologism,” which reflects “one of the dominant and guiding motifs of current French
thought.” This text was first given as a lecture in 1968 and subsequently published in Marges de la
philosophie (1972). Derrida, "The Ends of Man," 118-19.
38
Emphasizing Foucault’s importance, Derrida uses an epigram from The Order of Things in his “The Ends
of Man.” Ibid., 111.
39
In the three major studies on Markers work (Lupton, Alter, and Cooper) there is only passing mention of
Vive la baleine!.
40

Titled Three Cheers for the Whale in English, Vive la baleine! represents a second
collaboration between Marker and the documentary filmmaker Mario Ruspoli. Sixteen
years prior, Ruspoli and Marker had worked together on Ruspoli’s film Les Hommes de
la baleine (1956). On this first outing, Ruspoli is credited as director and Marker as
commentator (under the pseudonym Jacopo Berenzi).40 Ruspoli’s ethnological interest in
whaling focuses on the human side of this history and the social traditions surrounding
the hunt. The documentary film centers on a small whaling village in the Azores, which
the film describes as one of the few places in the world at the time that continued to
whale according to the earliest traditions (it is claimed due to necessity, in what may be
reactionary pastoralism, as whaling represents the Azoreans only means of providing for
themselves economically). Les Hommes de la baleine’s narrative account of the quotidian
existence of these Azorean villagers culminates in a dramatic first-hand account of a hunt
aboard one of their small whaling vessels. The last half of the film documents the specific
techniques, dangers, and maneuvers involved on the high seas in a hunt that can lasts for
upwards of seven hours before the last blows of the harpoon bleed the whale enough for
the whalers to place their flag atop its body.
Marker’s commentary in this first film hints at a denunciation of the daily
massacres involved in the modern industrial history of whaling, which by the time of Les
Hommes de la baleine had already overwhelmed the traditional techniques still
implemented in the Azores. Although never shown on screen, the exploding harpoon gun
is mentioned as leading to the greed of large-scale industrial whaling. Marker’s
commentary also cites Prévert and the human-animal affinities between the hunter and
40

Marker’s commentary was eventually published seven years later. See Chris Marker, "Les hommes de la
baleine," Avant-scène cinéma 24, no. March (1963): 46-51.
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the hunted: on the eve of the whale hunt, Ruspoli’s camera shows the villagers coming
together to play music and card games. Marker’s commentary suggests that “both man
and sperm whale…live their lives in parallel,” whereby they nurse their young, follow
similar kinship units, and even “play games in their own fashion.”41 These sentiments,
already present in Les Hommes de la baleine, are developed more fully in Vive la
baleine!, though in far darker tones.
While Ruspoli’s Les Hommes de la baleine is a straightforward documentary, the
same cannot be said of Marker’s Vive la baleine!, which is at once more eco-politically
charged and technically adventurous. Despite both films being collaborations, it is clear
that the first film belongs more to Ruspoli, and the latter more to Marker. With a running
time of just under seventeen minutes, the film’s structure is four-fold: 1) the opening
credits; 2) a narrative duel between a male voice and a female voice over taxonomic
representations of marine life; 3) a nation-by-nation genealogical history of whaling; and
4) a condemnation of the modern technologies involved with the whale hunt as it
becomes industrialized in the present day. The film uses narration, still and moving
images, and disparate media (drawings, prints, paintings, photographs, and film).
From the opening credits, the viewer is presented with a formal disjunction, one
that is operative throughout Vive la baleine!: on screen a cartoon whale—drawn with
eyes closed, a wide smile, and a heart shape emerging from its blow hole—appears as a
fabulist, childlike representation. [ill. 1.7] This is the first of a number of drawn whales
shown during the opening credits by the French animator Timour Lam (son of the
surrealist painter Wilfredo Lam). Meanwhile, the audio submerges the viewer in a
41

“En attendant le moment de leur rencontre, man and whale…mènent des vies sensiblement
parallèles…[p]eut-être les cachalots jouent-ils, à leur façon.” Ibid., 50.
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nebulous underwater world – a deep rumbling with layers of creaking noise, as if a ship is
docked just above among buoys that mark nautical space. Composed by Lalan (who also
scored Marker’s Dromadaires), this otherworldly audio drones persistently throughout
the film with its electronic effects and what sounds like a Cagean prepared piano.
Between the visual and the audial, then, the disjunction is set between two versions of
being-whale: on the one hand, a fantastic, simulacral representation that disembodies the
whale as image; on the other, an immersion into nonhuman affect and embodiment that
approximates being-whale itself.
Immediately following the credits, this disjunction between exteriority and
interiority is echoed by two voices—one male, one female—in a narrative duel of which
only the female voice is all knowing. The male speaker goes first by launching into a
lecture on cetaceans. The tone and booming reverberation of his voice brings to mind an
authoritative speaker in a university lecture hall or natural history museum (in the credits,
he is described as the voix magistrale or “master voice”). As visual accompaniment,
Marker’s camera roves slowly over a book of taxonomic representations of various
species of whale and marine life (panning slowly right and left, up and down the pages of
the book). [ill. 1.8] From the Sei Whale, to the Narwhal Whale, the Gray Whale, the
Sperm Whale, and the Giant Squid, each marine species is shown in suspended animation
and in full profile illustrating the male narrator’s largely dispassionate lecture recounting
the dwindling population of whales, the technologies that are formed around the hunt,
along with the likelihood of extinction of certain species. As if sitting back all the while,
the female voice suddenly intrudes overlapping with the male voice, with no reverb
whatsoever. The effect is one of proximity and intimacy (in the credits, she is described
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as the voix intérieure or “interior voice”). This female voice, whose whisperings register
as surreptitious asides to the viewer-turned-fellow student in a lecture hall, undercuts the
authorial and didactic male voice. She continually chides the oblivious male speaker with
wordplay and irony, engendering a clear contrast between the dry, disaffected voice of
the humanist marine naturalist, and an emotive, affective voice of inter-species
recognition.42
The female narrator’s first aside are not Marker’s words but rather lines from
Prévert’s “La pêche à la baleine” (“The Whale Hunt”): “a beautiful whale with blue eyes,
not your everyday beast…”43 This poem tells the story of Prosper, a son who refuses to
go whale hunting with his father, and who represents an unsuccessful pacific critique of
needless violence (Prévert’s tale was written expressly for the avant-garde theatre group
Octobre’s anti-fascist performances in the 1930s, cautioning against the auto-destruction
of war through a missed empathic encounter between human and nonhuman).44 Despite
Prosper’s protestations that whales never bothered him and should be left alone, a species
war ensues between father and whale, whose respective blue eyes are noted as uncannily
similar, leading to mutual harm (the father is killed; the whale is haunted by imminent
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The narrator chides the detached discussion of marine populations and demographics: “Population!
Imagine a city of whales. They go to work, they visit each other, park in parking lots…” She hints at the
impending violence on the animal body: “Guess how this one got its hump.” In the original French, she
wordplays between “la jubarte,” the humpback whale, and the philosopher “Roland Barthes.” And, through
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"Hats, Hotels, Mayhem and Marx: Film, Theatre and the Cinematic Collaborations of the Groupe Octobre,
1932-1936," Modern & Contemporary France 18, no. 3 (2010).
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retaliation). While not entirely outside the tradition of fabulist morality tales from Aesop
to La Fontaine, “La pêche à la baleine” does thematize the interaction between human
and nonhuman species in their shared capacity to suffer, as well as the theme of mutual
destruction, auguring Vive la baleine!’s finale and its attention to environmental crisis.
If in Prévert’s poem, only the son Prosper sees the eye color that both father and
whale share, then in Vive la baleine!, only the female narrator sees the ways in which
humans connected to nonhumans—not only in certain existential capacities, but on a
shared ecological scale: “Because you’re fading out, whales, like big lamps; and if you’re
no longer there to light our way, you and the other animals, do you think we’ll see in the
dark?”45 Thus from the beginning, the narrator stresses the way in which human agency is
contingent on and imbricated with nonhuman agency (and not only the whale, but also
“other animals”). This is an important theme running throughout this film and Marker’s
œuvre. After the male narrator declares that for centuries man and whale fought without
questioning nature’s equilibrium, and begins to account for the various iconographies that
developed in art history, his voice drops out, never to return. It is as if both the “natural”
equilibrium and the symbolic impositions on the animal he speaks of have been
interrupted – a historical intervention the film proceeds to undertake, now solely through
the female voice once this narrative duel, lasting just over one and a half minutes, comes
to a close.
The following section of Vive la baleine! is a genealogy of the economic history
of whaling, which at over eight minutes is the longest. The narrator tells a nation-bynation account of its evolution, from its beginnings among the Basques and the Inuit to
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Marker and Ruspoli. [1:48]
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the gradual industrialization of the practice – most notably by Japan, Holland, and the
United States. Accompanying this history are disparate representations of whaling across
cultures: ethnographic documentary photographs of Eskimo hunts, Japanese woodblock
prints, Dutch and American paintings of romantic seascapes and hunting adventures.
Marker’s multi-cultural, multi-national archive of art and visual culture can, in part, be
found in a now rare agenda—a diaristic calendar—produced by Ruspoli in association
with La Compagnie maritime des chargeurs réunis and La Compagnie fabre. Like Vive la
baleine!, the calendar’s year is 1972.46 [ill. 1.9] Part story book part diaristic calander,
Ruspoli supplied the imagery and text for that year’s theme of “ la chasse à la baleine.”47
The images include photographs and film stills culled from the aforemention film Les
Hommes de la baleine (1956), along with drawings, prints, and paintings sourced from
whaling museum collections and library archives in the United States and Europe.48
While not limited to images from this calendar’s archive, Vive la baleine!’s imagery
overlaps a great deal with Ruspoli’s “agenda” in its appropriative visual culture.49
Making use of this visual inventory in its genealogy of whaling economies, Vive
la baleine! offers a protean history moving from the use-value of the animal body (a near
immediately usable good for food, clothing, etc.) to pure exchange-value (the valorization
of a natural material towards ends beyond immediate use-value). The narrator recounts
46

Paris Compagnie maritime des chargeurs reunis et al., La Compagnie maritime des chargeurs réunis et la
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Each page of the personal calendar shows an art work or photograph associated with whaling and offers
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Naturelle, Paris; National Scheepvaartmuseum, Anver; The Museum of City of New York, New York; and
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that the animal was initially harvested simply for consumption and out of necessity for
human survival among the Basque and the Inuit: “Kill you, eat you. You were not yet a
natural resource, you were vitamins and protein. Is it much less gratifying for self-pride
to be a protein than to be a natural resource?”50 The answer implied by her sardonic tone
is that whatever reason there might be for the whale hunt, it makes little difference to the
nonhuman mammal involved who is being addressed directly. The photographs
accompanying this sequence bear witness to this one-sidedness: ethnographic visual
documentation that predominately shows the hunters – sharpening tools, rowing canoes,
pulling in their catch onto the shore – rather than the hunted, who simply appear dead and
floating ready for use. [ill. 1.10-11]
The narrator’s quip of “not yet a natural resource” moves the narrative history of
whaling down its industrial path from use-value in pre-modern economies to the
expanded processes of exchange-value, laying the foundation for modern, capitalist
economies. In this regard, the narrator first turns her attention to Japan. Endlessly
fascinated by the Japanese throughout his work, Marker credits the nation with
industriousness vis-à-vis the whale hunt. He does so, however, with similar critical irony
audible in the narrator’s intonation: “They got out of you what they could, minus
transistors…[w]hat they found in you is unbelievable. You were food. You became
industry. Like film. No big deal for you either.”51 Her words point to a perversion of
industrial efficiency, which like the film industry drains its products for all it can. In this
way, with the example of the Japanese, the whale hunt moves from a “natural” or “simple”
50

This rhetorical irony comes through in both the French and English film commentary. In the English
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ecological relation of hunter/hunted to an additional economic relation of
producer/object; from a source of nutrition and environmental human supplement, to a
value-added national resource for industry and profit.
Providing this incipient industrial shift, Marker’s camera dwells on three different
woodblock prints depicting the early traditions of the Japanese whale hunt. Based on a
Japanese picture scroll from 1773, these color prints come from a set of five images by
the Taiyo Fishing Company given as gifts to delegates from the International Whaling
Commission in 1954.52 This relay of imagery – from a pre-modern to a modern period, in
both form and content – is an important historical displacement to keep in mind, since a
central ambition of Vive la baleine! is to uncover the dissimulation of violence behind
historical imagery and heritage. Marker chose to show the second, fourth, and fifth prints
in the series— “Killing,” “Flensing,” and “Oil Factory”.53
“Killing” shows eight speeding “beater boats,” or small and streamlined vessels
traditionally manned with two standing harpooners in the front and eight rowers in the
back.54 [ill. 1.12] The boats surround a whale whose massive head has been trapped by a
net. The whale’s body, bloodied and pierced by a number of hand harpoons, breaks the
surface of the water with its head and tail, creates decorative foam waves (in keeping
with the Japanese woodcut style) and shoots out a pneumatic stream of water and air
from its blowhole. The following print, “Flensing,” so named after the technical practice
of stripping away of whale blubber with various implements, finds the hunters having
returned to shore with their catch resting dead on the beach next to two other recently
52
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caught specimen. [ill. 1.13] Workers man turnstiles installed on the beach, coiling the
wires necessary to hoist the marine bodies in place. As for the whales, they are at various
stages of being flensed: one in the middle has only begun to be processed and remains
largely intact on the water’s edge; one on the left has had its dorsal and pectoral fins
shaved and half of its body flayed open; and one on the right barely resemble a whale
anymore, appearing as an abstracted red mass with nary a stitch of skin or fat. In each
case, the dark skin is peeled away like a large fruit by men standing atop the massive
carcasses.
Towards the top of the “Flensing” print are buildings in which the workers carry
the totality of parts from the disassembled whales. The last print shown in the sequence,
“Oil Factory,” is a look inside these buildings. [ill. 1.14] Traditionally, each part of the
animal was used for goods, and each building would be responsible for the production of
one of these goods – as the narrator lists sardonically: “food products, printing ink, dyes,
fats, perfumes, souvenirs from Tokyo.”55 What is striking about this scene is that it
already points towards the efficient organization of an industrial Fordist assembly line.56
It is not by accident that Marker wryly alludes to “transistors” as the only product not
pulled out of the whale. The camera initially shows the print portion by portion: first, the
long line of seated workers processing the cuts of whale fat into wooden barrels; second,
the refining of this fat atop wood-burning fires; and third, the initial job of slicing off the
whale skin from its fatty flesh, with massive piles of cubed whale pieces looking more
like coconut sections with their hard black exteriors and a clean white interiors. These
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flaps of flesh will return for the very final shot of Vive la baleine!, but already here they
point to the animal as a potential readymade object—as a life form wholly abstracted and
dispossessed from its singular, bodily integrity turned into an interchangeable
commodity.57
Following this attention given to the early history of Japanese whaling, Vive la
baleine! turns to the role played by the European colonial powers beginning in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Like Japan, Holland whaled for oil. The female
narrator underscores how its nautical endeavors involved a value-added show of cultural
capital, distinction, and “glory” in the form of paintings:
Do you know that the rich ship owners brought painters on to their boats to
capture live the hunting scenes that would later decorate their living rooms? There
your image survives, whales, in the unchanging light of the emerging bourgeoisie;
this eternal light they invented as the tangible sign of eternity they took for
granted.58
Before the mobility of photography and its indexical capacity for representation, the
whale hunt was first inscribed by drawing and painting via Western norms of pictorial
representation: seascapes, maritime naturalism, above all an aesthetics of the sublime.
The film shows a number of examples. [ill. 1.15] Invariably in this genre, massive ships
are stationed in cold northern waters as icebergs float by. With Dutch national flags
flying atop each mast, these large-scale whaling ships symbolize control over the
elements, which are depicted as sublime yet demonstrably navigable. Unlike the Japanese
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visual examples, the whales are diminutive in comparison to the scale of human marine
activity. The mother ships dwarf the animal, who is outnumbered and often seen floating
in a pool of its own blood with two perfectly geometric arcs of air and water streaming
upward from its blowholes. The more examples Marker shows onscreen, the more these
painterly tropes coalesce into an eco-colonialist vision of the whale and its environment.
What these Dutch examples all serve to show is that the original moment of
depicting whaling was already coupled with (and mediated by) certain ways of seeing the
outside, the natural, and the animal (not only the whale, but also polar bears or seals in
various states of capture). The pictorial “truth” of these scenes was also mediated from
the start by a desire to bring images home, to savor their ‘glory,’ and to consolidate the
whale’s value-added cultural capital in the form of paintings. It is by adorning the homes
of the ‘emerging bourgeoisie,’ the female narrative affirms, that the whales survive in the
form of an image. Home is brought to the ocean and the ocean is brought back home. In
Peter Sloterdijk’s history of the “terrestrial globalization” of capitalism, in which
seafaring exploration plays the pivotal role of world discovery, the German philosopher
underscores this becoming-home of the ship as human container. He writes that the figure
of the ship “balances out the diametrically opposing strivings towards habitation and
adventure. It makes symbiotic relationships possible – and yet it can be experienced like
a projectile striking the unheard-of.”59 This explains the need for sublime imagery that
nevertheless cohabits with human navigability and safety in striking distance.60 In a
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similar way, Vive la baleine! chronicles this projection onto the high seas striking a
balance between adventure and danger on one side, with control and domestication (in
the doubled sense of taming and making-home) on the other.61
Marker’s emphasis on the “unchanging light” of this whale-as-image harkens to
an ideology of the whale as a “tangible sign of eternity” and permanence. His narrator
draws attention to an encoding process of timelessness at work (and thus naturalization)
in such cultural forms of bourgeois representation. This encoding process also
dissimulates other historical possibilities in relation to the whale, and inculcates an
unquestioned domination of nature as a space of human sovereignty. It performs this in
three related ways: in the normalization of the hunt and its necessary role in the economic
well-being of the nation; in the naturalness of the whale’s subordinate role in these
human affairs – most especially, in the visual inuring of its watery death and suffering as
only natural; and, in the broadest sense, in the understanding of nature and the outside as
a space to be had, consumed, and conquered as a quasi-right of human history and
progress. Emphasizing the painting’s work of making timeless, the narrator describes a
feedback loop engendered by images showing the naturalized intersection between nature
and economy: “These boats floated forever, this big beached whale was beached forever,
and the reign of the merchant bourgeoisie, whether it traded in money or whales, was
there forever.”62
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Vive la baleine!‘s economic history of whaling then takes a multi-national turn.
Be it Great Britain, Germany, or Russia, each empire “exacted from the whale people a
corresponding portion of its power.”63 In quick succession, the camera displays
photographs, paintings, and prints focused on these imperial oceanic industries: ports
lined up with whaling vessels, docks stacked with a sea of oil barrels, and workers
loading the barrels while taking stock and inventory. [ill. 1.16] The focus quickly turns to
the Unites States, which the narrator describes as the most imperialist of all (in keeping
with Marker’s consistently critical stance towards US foreign policy). For all these
nations, the whale is both an object of violence, capture, and death, while also a symbol
of power, glory, and bourgeois progress. The animal is physically debased yet
conceptually valorized. It is with the whaling industries of the United States in the
nineteenth century; however, that this contradictions treatment of the animal is most fully
consolidated. Maintaining direct communication with the whales, the narrator stresses
this point: “while the Americans reduced you to the status of a commodity on the Stock
Exchange, it was an American who would celebrate you as no one had ever before:
Herman Melville.”64 The whale became a pure, readymade commodity to be traded and
invested, yet it also became the subject of one of the great works of U.S. literature, Moby
Dick; or, the Whale (1851). This example uncovers a paradoxical and perverse
relationship between the human and nonhuman animal—the latter as object of
exploitation and subject of fascination for the former. More generally, this co-existence
of literary lionization and commodity reduction reveals an incipient schizoid conflict that
increases exponentially in late capitalism and its commodification of animal life—a
63
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pathological condition Sloterdijk already finds to be operative in an earlier age of
European exploration: “Every ship on the open sea embodies a psychosis that has set sail,
and each is also a real floating capital.”65
Vive la baleine! turns to its final section of present day whaling technology, and
this moment is signaled by a shift in representational medium. For the first time, a filmic
moving image is introduced, ripping through the two-dimensional pictorial world hitherto.
The moving image is a brief glimpse of a long pectoral fin breaking the surface of the
ocean. [ill. 1.17] Up to this point, the film uses only various static media—photography,
printmaking, drawing, and painting—but now the visual inventory becomes time based,
which serves as a jolt to the viewer. Accompanying this visual jolt is another first: the
sound of the whale itself. To the human ear it is a forlorn moaning. One might
characterize this description as anthropomorphizing, i.e. lending human qualities to a
nonhuman entity. However, once certain ethological advances are taken into account, it
can be maintained that a marine mammal also emotes vibrations that link back to an
interior forlorn affect, even if the whale does not have ability to speak the experience
through the word “forlorn” (like Prévert’s caged raccoon who cannot speak ‘confinement’
but can know it experientially). After all, it is during the late 1960s that cognitive
ethology begins to account for marine intelligence, and specifically, whale forms of
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communication and singing.66 We can therefore speak of posthumanist affect and the
ability to emote bodily interiority in a theriocentric conception of affective states. Vive la
baleine! offers a reassessment of facile charges of anthropomorphization for any interior
state other than the human animal, since emotions like forlornment have never been
anthroproprietary.
Another way to describe this crucial moment of the moving image’s sudden
intrusion within the static, pictorial archive of Vive la baleine! is to say that the film
moves from the imaginary (images mediated by the imagination) and the symbolic
(narratives mediated by discursive constraints) to the register of the real (for Lacan, that
which resides beyond imaginary and symbolic structures mediating the human experience
of the world). It performs this both visually and audibly. In terms of the visual, the move
is from iconic and mimetic forms of representation coded by human history, knowledge,
and desire, to indexical-photographic forms of representation that allow for a (partly) uncoded subject to emerge from the depths of the surface of the image. The pectoral fin
both manifests and represents itself as it slices through the water, which is then
manifested and registered on the filmic apparatus. Unlike painting or drawing, indexical
film touches the real in a relationship that echoes the exterior-interior relation of sentient
consciousness to its environment—including other forms of sentient life (the real is never
represented directly, only its effects/affects). In terms of the audible, the move is
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similarly from a score that mimics and represents the nebulous sounds of the ocean
through electronics and prepared pianos, to the indexical registration of the actual sounds
of the ocean and its inhabitants on magnetic tape. It is not coincidental that this move is
also from non-diegetic to diegetic sound i.e. from exterior sounds that come outside of
the image to interior sounds that emanate from what is imaged. In short, when Marker
introduces moving indexical images for the first time in the film, the animal arrives with
the capacity to represent itself rather than simply being represented in symbolic and
imaginary registers across human visual and discursive media.
Here Derrida’s powerful critique of the Cartesian ego as having the proprietary
ability to manifest an interior state of speech by saying “I” should enter the discussion.
With specific reference to another form of marine animal life, namely, an ink-producing
octopod, Derrida posits a nonhuman subject as a gestural and pre-lingual arché-cogito,
which is more fundamental than the human speaking Cartesian ego:
I have the impression that I am myself trying to gain – as though wrestling,
fishing, or hunting – a sufficient expert of knowledgeable purchase [prise] on
what might touch the nervous system of a single animal body. A little like
someone who would claim to know which way to take hold of a cuttlefish or
octopus, without hurting it too much, and especially without killing it, keeping it
at a distance long enough to let it expel its ink. In order to displace its powers
without doing anybody too much harm. Its ink or power would here be the “I,”
not necessarily the power to say “I” but the ipseity of being able to be or able to
do “I,” even before any auto referential utterance in language.67
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This crucial moment of the whale as the ripping forth of the real—in embodiment and
voice—is another example of an animal having the power to show its “I” or to do “I” as
the more fundamental existential mode of existing and making exterior impressions
through an interior nervous system. Marker’s use of the indexical image as a non-violent
form of capture (which he theorized explicitly in Dromadaires, discussed below) is such
an example of holding an animal at a distance without killing or harming it, yet allowing
it to displace its powers and manifest its nonhuman being through an embodied interior
“I.” In this sense, every indexical image of the whale in Vive la baleine! holds the
potential for communicating and manifesting this subjective power via the apparatus of
film/photography.
Vive la baleine! then turns to the most traumatic moment in its technical whaling
history, which, with the introduction of the exploding grenade harpoon, can now be
properly called modern. Devoid of irony, the narrator describes this decisive moment:
It was a gun that morphed the small-scale fishing into industrial extermination
aboard factory ships. The exploding harpoon gun was invented in 1860 by the
Norwegian Svend Foyn. Intending to humanize the war against whales, he created
their atomic bomb.68
This technological innovation no longer made it necessary to venture out on small beater
boats, thereby risking human lives by getting close to the whale, as necessitated by
traditional hand harpoons. With the advent of the exploding harpoon gun, which becomes
a fixed staple atop massive “floating factory” ships, the killing of the whale becomes
mediated by safe distances—in short, the hunt had become fully asymmetric in favor of
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humans.69 [ill. 1.18] Foyn’s impulse for human immunity (protecting the hunter in order
to “humanize the war against whales”) turns into a form of autoimmunity when his
invention leads to the “extermination” of a number of species of whale and ultimately an
environmental crisis of shared eco-systems (or the start of the sixth extinction with
anthropos as its cause).
Once Vive la baleine! introduces Foyn’s invention, the film leaves behind all
media other than the moving image—no prints, drawings, or paintings—for the simple
reason that the desire to inscribe these moments of chase and death becomes historically
moot. The efficiency, scale, and removal of any real existential meeting place between
man and whale leave no room for “glory” and the usual sublime aesthetics of awe faceto-face with natural forces. All that remains is technological and industrial officiousness.
Painting heroic scenes within such a modern context could only be ironic; instead,
documentation of industrial whaling practices is culled from eco-activist forms of
witnessing and uncovering, or internal company archival footage, and Marker turns to
both in these final scenes of Vive la baleine!. This archival footage shows massive
factory ships many times larger than the earth’s largest animals who are harpooned and
towed into the hull through an open door like a great maw. [ill. 1.19] After twisting about
in the water and emitting a prodigious amount of blood, the whales slide directly into the
factory ship, whereupon they are ready for immediate processing aboard the ship in order
to make room for the next. There are no streaming jets of air and water, no beautiful
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waves, no peeling away of skin cleanly like fruit, only the living animal represented
indexically on film laying waste to these pictorial conventions—and on a scale that
dwarfs the traditional hunt documented in Les Hommes de la baleine.
The Taiyo Fishing Company makes a tacit reappearance in this archival footage.
Recall its corporate gifts to the International Whaling Commission of the Japanese prints
in 1954. Now Marker shows the extent to which these prints depicting pre-modern
Japanese hunting amount to mystification. The company’s identity is given away by
name of the factory ship onscreen: the Nisshin Maru. [ill. 1.20] This factory ship was part
of the industrial fleet run by the Taiyo Fishing Company, which the historian Richard
Ellis has described as the largest and most “insatiable” corporate entity in the modern
whaling business.70 The story of this factory ship, and modern Japanese whaling in
general, is tied to US intervention. Immediately following WWII and the total destruction
of their pre-war whaling factory ships as a result of the war, General Douglas MacArthur
assisted and encouraged Japan to accelerate commercial whaling in order to feed its
people and economy. As Ellis points out, however, “[t]his arrangement was not as
altruistic as it appears on its face; while the Japanese got the meat, the Americans were to
get the whale oil.”71
With the introduction of these factory ships and the exploding harpoon, Vive la
baleine! offers its second rip through the real. If the first was indexical through image and
sound (a pectoral fin breaking the surface of the water, accompanied whale vocalizations),
70
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then the second is a material interruption of the representational apparatus of the film
itself. Synchronized with the moving image of a sailor firing Foyn’s exploding harpoon at
a whale, the film’s non-diegetic sound screeches to a halt. The effect is akin to the sound
of a needle scratching the surface of a vinyl record, or a short burst of film stock being
rewound. In both cases, the material intrusion interrupts the capacity to emit any mimetic
sound. As a direct causal link to the exploding harpoon piercing skin off in the water, a
whale scream breaks through from this momentary representational caesura.72 Far less
ambiguous in its directness than the forlorn moaning emitted before, the scream
represents another instance of an animal having the power to show its “I” or to do “I” in
affective response to its outside surroundings and circumstances. The scream is an
indexical trace of embodiment, ambulation, and neuronal function—an affective capacity
shared by human viewer and nonhuman viewed via the former’s firsthand knowledge of
the fragility of having a body, skin, and nerve endings. As such, the wound not only
opens up flesh and blood on screen; it also opens up shared interiority from one mammal
to another—albeit through a filmic delay that creates an alliance between a past moment
of suffering in the real with a transcoded yet linked real of the moving image.
Immediately following this second irruption of the real, the narrator makes her
final, most prophetic statement with industrial scenes of carnage as backdrop. This
statement at once deconstructs the opposition of nature and culture, while also auguring
theories of the Anthropocene as a geological first in which humanity has become an agent
on al planetary scale:
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For centuries men and whales belonged to two enemy camps that confronted one
another on neutral ground – nature. Today nature is no longer neutral. The borders
have changed. The confrontation occurs between those defending themselves by
defending nature and those who, destroying it, destroy themselves. This time, men
and whales are in the same camp, and each whale who dies leaves us like a
prophecy with an image of our own death.73
These final lines of the film describe a prior conception of “nature” as an eco-Hobbesian
meeting place between species, which heretofore have been kept separate from each other
on “neutral ground.” Today this natural meeting place has lost its neutrality. It is not
simply that one of the species (the human) has over-immunized itself from nature through
technological advancements, i.e. that “men” have availed themselves of natural resources
for their own ecologically imbalanced human advantage. The reason Marker gives is
more posthumanist than this, for as this final prophetic statement makes clear the
opposition of nature/culture has become blurred (or revealed as never having been
separate). No longer do men and whales face each other discretely on the open seas (as so
much of the film’s traditional visual culture would have it). Instead, this postnatural
relationship is between “those” who defend themselves/nature and “those” who would
destroy others/nature. From the way this final sentence is structured, it is clear that these
two “those” do not point to the same kind of subject position. The latter “those” who
destroy can only be human(ist), specifically, those on screen committing acts of violence
and those off-screen who are complicit. By contrast, the former “those” who defend
points to both human and nonhuman subject positions—to those eco-politically-aware
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humans “who defend nature” and to the whales who do the same by “protecting
themselves.” This second “those” is posthumanist, since it allows for both human and
nonhuman animal agency to co-inhabit in solidarity and shared struggle—or in what
Vinciane Despret has called agencement or “interagency.”74 This is the full implication of
what it means for “men and whales [to be] in the same camp” in shared obligation,
suffering, death, and being-in-the-world.
With all non-diegetic sounds falling away, the very last images of Vive la baleine!
transmit only the voices of the whale as images of their massive bodies are hoisted inside
the front maw of the factory ship (like large warheads being put into place on a military
freighter, whose Cold War implications I analyze momentarily). In the very last shot, two
Japanese workers shovel a flap of whale skin down a black hole from the deck,
presumably into a material stockpile below. [ill. 1.21] This is no clean coconut half, but a
quivering piece of detached skin that momentarily hangs at the mouth of the hole in the
tensed vibration of its only remaining fibrous and cellular integrity. It is pure abstraction
– even a form of abstract art in the original sense of the term, i.e. reducing an impression
of the world to its essential quality independent from its original context or natural
attachments. It is here where the modern animal is truly found, which in contrast to the
ample examples of animals in traditional visual practices—fabulist or naturalist—that are
often considered to be simply absent in modernism.75 This also means that the modern
animal is necessarily a reified and readymade object: if the Duchampian strategy of the
readymade in art is a retaliatory outcome of economic and institutional developments in
art and culture (for example, as the technological advancement of a propeller is seen to
74
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lay waste to traditional media no longer available to the artist, as Duchamp famously
quipped to Brancusi at the Salon de la Locomotion Aérienne in Paris in 1912), then Vive
la baleine! analogously traces the economic and institutional developments that lay waste
not only to traditional forms of media, but also to the living animal subjects of these
traditional representations now reducible to manipulable objects.76
The historical backdrop to Vive la baleine! concerns a number of ecological
advances of the period. In 1968, a seminal publishing event in France was Rachel
Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) which became a bestseller as Printemp silencieux, an
influential work on the industrial pollution of eco-systems. Following this, 1972 saw two
additional major events in environmental politics: first, the appearance of the Club of
Rome’s commissioned study The Limits to Growth, which offered an early and important
diagnostic environmental model positing the earth as a finite resource. The study
cautioned that economic activities will inevitably have to confront ecological
constraints.77 The second and more far-reaching event of 1972 was the United Nations
Conference on the Environment, convening in Stockholm, which lead to the creation of
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). This conference was the first
international meeting to address environmental issues on a global scale. While the multinational dialogue of the Stockholm Conference focused on a host of issues—from raising
awareness and fighting pollution to the more contentious debate of developing countries
having to abide by newfound environmental economic constraints—the well-being of
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wildlife played a considerable role in the proceedings’ mandate. This is especially true
for the whale, which was one of the conference’s success stories in calling for a 10-year
hunting moratorium. 78 This proposed moratorium would be the first of many to go
unheeded, as the updated English version of Vive la baleine! in 2007 confirms,
referencing the subsequent 1986 IWC moratorium: “Enthusiastically endorsed by
Switzerland and Bolivia, this resolution was clearly ignored by the countries
monopolizing industrial fishing, particularly Norway and Japan.”79 Nevertheless, the
international “Save the Whale” movement remains one of the most successful outcomes
of this moment of animal activism.80 A pertinent example is the founding of the French
branch of Friends of the Earth—Les Amis de la Terre—in 1971 by the political activist
Brice Lalonde; it began publishing the eco-activist journal La Baleine in 1972.81
Following these seminal events in environmental thought, in 1978, The Universal
Declaration of Animal Rights was proclaimed in Paris at the UNESCO headquarters.82
All these examples serve to show a steady confluence of ecological issues concerning
animals, which account for Marker’s polemical Vive la baleine! in 1972, along with the
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industrial changes that had taken place since the earlier, less eco-politically charged Les
Hommes de la baleine from 1956.
The less historically calculable conjunction between Vive la baleine! and
environmental thought is its prescience in relation to the Anthropocene. Though
originating as early as the 1980s, the term was first officially proposed in 2000 and has
been debated ever since.83 When Marker describes nature as a “neutral ground” on which
“men and whales belonged to two enemy camps,” he describes the epoch of the Holocene,
a geological epoch of relative calm and stability providing a backdrop for the flourishing
of ecosystems on one side, and human societies on the other. When he then proclaims
that today “nature is no longer neutral”—that now the two camps are represented by
“those [who defend] themselves by defending nature and those who, destroying it,
destroy themselves”—Marker posits to an understanding of nature as now affected by
human agency with the capacity to harm the environment (and themselves in the process).
This loss of nature as a neutral meeting place is also the end of the classical definition of
“culture,” which is commonly defined as the stepping forth from nature/animality
through manipulation and technics. Now culture is contingent on and embedded within a
nature that subsumes, monitors, and is thoroughly imbricated with culture. This is the
outcome of today’s discourse on the Anthropocene, which Marker presciently points out
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in 1972. Living in the Anthropocene also means that, in turn, ecological constraints affect
human activity, not to mention nonhuman activity, in an environmental feedback loop.
Nature is no longer on the other side of culture and human history, but is inserted at the
heart of culture itself as its very supplement and foundation. More recently, the term
“Capitalocene” has been offered as a nominal corrective to the Anthropocene; rather than
positing the collective hubris of all humanity as a detrimental geological force, the
Capitalocene discourse homes in specifically on those involved in the rapacious resource
grabs of capitalism.84 Since Vive la baleine! is, in part, a history of capital on the high
seas, describing the film as an indictment of the Capitalocene is equally fitting.
If “each whale who dies leaves us like a prophecy with an image of our own
death,” then the whale can be seen as a biostratigraphic signal of the Anthropocene/
Capitalocene in which the technological and industrial immunitary supplements of man
harnessed in relation to the world has taken a turn for the autoimmune. These final lines
serve to show that today the ecological entanglements and complicities between human
and nonhuman species can lead to a form of auto-destruction in which destroying the
other is tantamount to destroying oneself. This entanglement of wellbeing also maps onto
the Cold War logic of mutually assured destruction. Recall in Vive la baleine! that Foyn’s
exploding grenade harpoon is described as the whales’ very own “atomic bomb.” Recall
as well the massive whale bodies being hoisted inside the front maw of the factory ships,
which give them the uncanny appearance of large warheads being held in place on a
military freighter. [ill. 1.22] As a figure of mutual destruction, the whale-turned-warhead
would both metaphorically harbor Cold War doom, while also metonymically point to
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ecological catastrophe as a really existing irreplaceable body in eco-system wellbeing. It
is here that Vive la baleine! should be understood as a companion piece to Marker’s Le
Jetée. The setting of La Jetée is a post-apocalyptic Earth that has become unlivable after
nuclear fallout. 85 Beneath the Louvre, German scientists use prisoners as guinea pigs for
a time travel experiment that, it is hoped, will allow communication with a superior race
of humans in the future for assistance. During the time travels of the protagonist (the only
prisoner to survive the stress of these experiments), living animals recur as
biostratigraphic signals of ecological health of an idyllic past, as do the preserved animals
in the extended scenes in the natural history museum. [ill. 1.23] While these pre-historical
animals are privileged figures of ancestrality from a pre-apocalyptic era in La Jetée, the
whales in Vive la baleine! are privileged figures of an impending post-apocalyptic
ecological scenario, whereby they will become (along with humans who share planetary
space) figures of ancestrality themselves.
Albeit from different directions, La Jetée and Vive la baleine! both end with the
harbinger “images of our own death” and ultimately raise the question of what can only
be the darkest version of posthistory—namely, a future of mass planetary extinction. This
returns us to the discussion of posthistory that began this chapter. In relation to Vive la
baleine!, both versions of posthistory I discussed at the head of this chapter are at work.
If a humanist posthistory describes man-animal as simply content in perpetual art, love,
and play, this figure stands in for the oblivious, happy consumer of postwar society. Far
from reaching harmony with nature, the social history of this figure is the very basis for
the endless consumption of a finite planet. He turns out to be the detrivore of the
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Anthropocene/Capitalocene. On the other hand, a posthumanist posthistory entails a
social landscape of human and nonhuman animals in mutual ethical and ecological
recognition, wherein the humanist conception of the debased animal is relegated to the
dustbin of ideas. In Vive la baleine!, the humanist lineage of posthistory is reflected in the
technological efficiency of the whale hunt and the human agent as insatiable consumer of
marine life. The whale is relegated to a mere object within industrial and economic forms
of thought limited to material and causal concerns. As Vive la baleine!’s whaling history
moves forward in time, the preoccupation is how man captures and reifies the whale
through industry, rather than the more fundamental why and its implications for the whale
and the environment. In its tracing of a technical history, the hunt becomes increasingly
pre-programmed, in the sense that little is left to chance. By the time of the floating
factory ships, their only inhibitions come from international laws and moratoriums,
which are often ignored, or from quotas that are settled by the ecological preprogramming of natural resources.
It is also helpful to return once more to Sloterdijk’s history of terrestrial
globalization. The history and eventual posthistory traced by Vive la baleine! is a perfect
example of the process of the globalization of capitalism, which began with the oceanic
age of exploration and represents the historical progression of a “crime that can only be
committed once.”86 Sloterdijk’s view of posthistory is that terrestrial globalization is a
historical event that comes to an end once all geographic powers have settled into their
modern formations; once this happens, following the two world wars, Sloterdijk
describes a move towards a subsequent temporality as the “added time” of posthistory.
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All that remains is a de-politicized economic landscape of regulation and protectionism,
and the posthistorical “turn of the world system towards authoritarian capitalism.”87 In
short, all that remains is the efficiency of economic considerations, which in the case of
Vive la baleine! usurp all posthistorical urgings of moratoriums, quotas, and divergence
from paths not already pre-programmed in the world system of marine exploitation. This
is why modern industrial forms of whaling have no need for conventional media and art
making; they hold neither glory, discovery, nor progress, but only the efficient execution
of a pre-existing system that exploits through a conception of the animal as endlessly
commodifiable.
1.5 NONHUMAN MORTALITY AND THE INDEXICAL IMAGE
Mortality hangs over Vive la baleine! The precarious life and existence of the
whale at the hands of advanced industrial techniques is explored in relation to the animal
qua animal (in its capacity to scream, feel pain, and experience dying) but also in relation
to the animal qua ecology (as an environmental marker in which humanist autodestruction is complicit). This preoccupation with animal death is not limited to Vive la
baleine!, even if this film is without a doubt Marker’s most directly eco-political work. In
fact, scenes of dying animals recur throughout Marker’s œuvre. Below, I briefly discuss
three of the more notable instances of animal death in his work, and their relationship to
Marker’s theory of the photographic and indexical image, which is itself colored by
hunting and death.
In one of Marker’s earliest films, Les Statues meurent aussi (1952), co-directed
with Alain Resnais as a critical denunciation of French colonialism and its Afrophile
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tendencies, the camera shows the moment of death of a large gorilla. Visibly
disemboweled, the primate falls flat on its back and hits the ground in a lifeless heap with
lower organs exposed. [ill. 1.24] The inclusion of this scene in Les Statues meurent aussi
inspects the role of death in African visual culture, but also goes deeper by integrating the
experience of animal death as access to death itself. Historically, from Descartes to
Heidegger, death has been understood as something inaccessible to animals; at most,
nonhuman life can only perish or expire. Here, however, the animal is presented directly
as dying. The film unequivocally shows the affinities between the human and nonhuman
animal entailed by this scene: following the gorilla’s lifeless collapse, the camera zooms
in on a human hand prying open the dead primate’s hand. [ill. 1.25] This meeting of
human and nonhuman hands shows the morphological similarities between the two –
fingers, nails, palms, and creases in skin. Over this shot, the narrator declares: “Here is
the death of an animal. Where did the energy that once inhabited this hand go? It is now
free, it roams, it will torment the living until we gather it in its ancient appearance.”88 The
death of this gorilla is thus understood as offering an example of the passing away of an
interior force. Following this declaration, the film montage shifts quickly from the image
of the dead gorilla’s face to the image of a gorilla face sculpted in stone. This is the
“ancient appearance” that provides distance and dissimulation from reality. It is as if, to
deal with the trauma of death (which here can only be understood as a shared passage for
human and nonhuman life), the animal has to be reified, distantiated, and encased in a
medium. In the literature on Marker, his critique of the impulse for distance through
image making and the cultural death of African objects via Western museum display has
88
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been well accounted for.89 What I want to underscore here is the privileged moment of
animal death as a point of access to death itself, which offers the human a glimpse of her
own fate through the fate of a nonhuman animal other.
In Sans Soleil (1983), Marker uses a similar tactic of stark contrasts in what is
possibly his most violent scene of animal death. In one of its many observations of
Japanese society, the film documents a ceremony of mourning at the Ueno Zoo for all the
animals that died that year. Like Vive la baleine!, the film’s narrator is female; in this
instance she reads the travel letters by one Sandor Krasna, a pseudonym of Marker
himself. When describing this ceremony, Krasna is “pleased that the same
chrysanthemums appeared in funerals for men and for animals.” She notes the Japanese
mentality towards death differs from that of the West (in this same scene, we are told that
the recent death of a Panda is more widely mourned than the concurrent death of the
prime minister). In accounting for this difference, Krasna quotes an unnamed Japanese
source: “The partition that separates life from death does not appear so thick to us as it
does to a Westerner.” As with Vive la baleine!’s preoccupation with blurred
human/animal boundaries, here Marker focuses on the social process of mourning as
blurring the lines between human and nonhuman death. Over moving images of children
laying out flowers during the ceremony, Marker finds their disposition towards death as
one of simple curiosity, “as if they were trying – in order to understand the death of the
animal – to stare through the partition” separating life from death.90 As with the gorilla in
Les Statues meurent aussi, Marker presents animal death as the point of access for trying
to understand death itself.
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Immediately following this scene at the Ueno zoo, as if to lift this partition, or at
least make it less “thick,” Sans Soleil turns to moving images of a giraffe being hunted
down in the African wild. The animal is shot multiple times as it attempts to flee. [ill.
1.26] Still standing but mortally wounded by bullets through its long neck, vivid jets of
red blood spew from either side. Eventually no longer able to stand, its tall and slender
body falls into the grass. The camera moves close and pans out from the giraffe’s face
lying still and motionless; although it appears that the animal is finally dead, the giraffe
suddenly jerks once more in futile resistance. From close range, we see the hunter unload
one last bullet into the giraffe’s brain. Buzzards follow and circle down to make their
own work of the body, pecking out its large black eyes first. This scene is easily one of
the most graphic moments in Marker’s work. It is important to note that unlike the
preceding scene of mourning at the Ueno zoo, the giraffe’s death is presented devoid of
narration. To a certain degree, there is a snuff-film quality in witnessing this moment of
death—one from which Marker almost certainly sought to distance himself by not
speaking over it through narration. The silence during this sequence also underscores the
shocking disparity between this violent moment and the more serene and ceremonial
mood of animal mourning just moments before in the Ueno Zoo. The chrysanthemums
that serve to mourn a dead panda reappear just after the safari kill sequence, to further
emphasize the cognitively dissonant treatment of one species as opposed to another.
Another key moment of animal death in Marker’s work comes at the end of his
extended film on the global demise of leftist politics in the 1970s, Le fond de l’air est
rouge (1977). Marker gives the animal a privileged place in this film as the last body in
motion: the final scene shows wolves being shot down in an open field from a helicopter.
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[ill. 1.27] Both bullets and footage are shot from this vehicle, and the latter derives from a
military exercise testing out new weaponry on a living, moving target. In mid-stride on
their death runs, the wolves look up at the helicopters. These are moments of recognition:
the barking wolf coming face-to-face with a flying object that seems to threaten her
bodily integrity. In a split second, the wolves’ four-legged velocity is abruptly interrupted
in a plume of smoke as they splay out on the ground in death spasms. Like the giraffe in
Sans Soleil, these ballistic scenes of animal death are graphic. Moreover, considering the
film’s exhaustive documentation of the enervation of leftist global politics in the 1970s,
the death of the wolves at the end of Le fond de l’air est rouge takes on a certain
symbolic function (though as I explain in a moment, they are never simply symbolic). In
the sense in which Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari articulate “becoming-animal” three
years later in Milles Plateaux (1980), the wolf serves as a figurative surrogate for the
revolutionary pack that striates the normative socio-political climate, which now bears
down on it with full military force. As is often the case in Deleuze and Guattari’s
understanding of “becoming-animal,” the dog represents servile domesticity, while the
wolf represents wild revolutionary transgression.91
While it is certainly true that these wolves function symbolically, if one is
attentive to Marker’s ethological impulses, it would be interpretatively premature to leave
it at that. This final scene in Le fond de l’air est rouge interests Marker not only for its
symbolism, but also for the potential of empathy between a human viewer and a
nonhuman subject onscreen (like Guillaume-en-Égypte, the whales, the gorilla, the
giraffe, and many more besides). In this sense, there are two distinct deaths involved
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here: a symbolic death (of leftist politics through the figure of the dying wolf) and a
really existing death (of this very wolf indexically captured dying on screen). In her
discussion of the gorilla in Les Statues meurent aussi, the film scholar Nora Alter points
out a similar couplet in death, namely, between the figurative death of the animal-turnedimage (like the painted or drawn whales in Vive la baleine!) and the literal death of the
really-existing animal captured by the index: “To film the slaying of an animal doubles
the mortification process. On the one hand there is the aesthetic and symbolic death that
occurs when life is fixed in filmic images, and on the other there is the literal death
captured, replayed, and relived filmically.”92
In addition to Alter’s couplet, an additional symbolic death might be introduced,
namely, the symbolic death of the animal when it becomes a figurative surrogate for a
human position. Or, in other words, of the animal being lost in a parable of “becominghuman.” In general terms, this symbolic death can extend to any animal that is employed
as a metaphor, parable, or fable for human qualities as a humanist character or invention.
It should be stressed, however, that the animal-as-parable is always secretly facilitated by
a steadfast partition between the symbolic animal and the literal animal, albeit one that is
never steadfast enough. Why? Because the animal can function only as a symbolic
surrogate when it already literally shares certain overlapping human qualities (and vice
versa): the ability to be aware of its surroundings, to flee from power, to be tracked down,
to have its flesh penetrated and body compromised, to stop breathing and to die. All of
these affective states are shared by a majority of both human and nonhuman subject
positions, and supplement any analogies made between them. In the present case, the
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wolf can symbolically stand in for the human revolutionary only because there is an
embodied overlap in simply being what one is in relation to an outside force – be it in the
body of a wolf or a leftist revolutionary. In this way, symbolic and metaphoric
projections onto the animal are always predicated on a literal understanding of the human
and nonhuman in their shared abilities (for instance, the crow’s cunning as akin to human
cunning, the pig’s digestive system as stand-in for human gluttony, the eagle’s
surveillance high above as symbol of political control, the sheep’s trusting personality as
the long-held metaphor for the docile body, and so on). Possibly all figurative uses of the
animal in art history and visual culture are predicated on this disavowed affinity.
Along with the extended scenes of whale death in Vive la baleine!, these three
examples of the gorilla, the giraffe, and the wolves serve to show Marker’s attention to
animal suffering and death. In each instance, there is a co-existence of two key factors:
the blurring of human-animal capacity for suffering and response, and the indexical
image as a means of communicating this shared moment of death. Marker’s
understanding of the indexical image has a positive dimension. As a melancholic antidote
to these actual deaths, the indexical image offers a way for these animals to continue
emoting and to eventually make certain claims on subsequent viewers. To elaborate this
redemptive understanding of indexical imagery, one must to turn to Si J’avais quatre
dromadaires (1966), Marker’s most extended ruminations on the medium of photography.
The film is an international photo-travel log narrated by three different voices—one
female (Catherine Le Couey) and two male (Pierre Vanek and Nicolas Yumatov)—over
photographs taken in various countries: the Soviet Union, Cuba, Chile, Korea, to name a
few. The film begins with a quote from Apollinaire’s Le Bestiaire ou Cortège d’Orphée
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(1911) – specifically, the lines from his poem “Le Dromadaire,” from which the film gets
its title: “With his four dromedaries, Don Pedro d’Alfaroubeira travels the world in
admiration. He does what I would like to do, if I had four dromadaries.”93 Following
Apollinaire’s bestiary poem, the film begins by offering its definition of photography,
which (in lieu of having four dromedaries) becomes the means of transport to distant
places: “Photography is the hunt, it is the instinct of the hunt without the urge to kill. It is
the hunt of angles. We track down, we aim, we fire and – bang! Instead of killing, we
make an immortal.”94 Marker’s theory of the photographic and indexical image is thus
understood as a non-violent form of intervention and capture.
This theory of the indexical image as a form of non-violent capture, which
nevertheless entails the temporal capacity to transmit a past subject into an “eternal”
present, precedes by fourteen years Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida (1980). Barthes’
well-known understanding of photography as an image of living-death is also a nonviolent perpetual touching of apparatus and referent:
It is as if the Photography always carries its referent with itself, both affected by
the same amorous or funereal immobility, at the very heart of the moving world:
they are glued together, limb by limb, like the condemned man and the corpse in
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certain tortures; or even like those pairs of fish (sharks, I think, according to
Michelet) which navigate in convoy, as though united by eternal coitus.95
It is not coincidental that Barthes’s sexualized and amorous analogy incorporates both
mammalian and ichthyic metaphors, since they provide both symbolic and literal
capacities for touching and contact. Moreover, if “[e]very photograph is a certificate of
presence,” then this indexical presence not only has the capacity to stay alive in death,
but it can also make certain claims on its viewer.96 Marker and Barthes are equally
fascinated by the insistent demands of the photographic gaze and its ability to stare back.
This theme of the returned gaze recurs throughout the photo-travels in Dromadaires, as it
does at the beginning of Camera Lucida, when Barthes, while looking a photograph of
Napoleon’s younger brother, is astonished to see the very “eyes that looked at the
Emperor.”97
These theories of indexical absent-presence are the ontological basis for the
theorist Ariella Azoulay’s study The Civil Contract of Photography (2008). Azoulay’s
argument—which could equally describe Marker’s in Dromadaires—is that the
circulation of indexical imagery participates in the circulation of human rights discourse
through its inherent ability to make claims on other humans: “When and where the
subject of the photograph is a person who has suffered some form of injury, a viewing of
the photograph that reconstructs the photographic situation and allows a reading of the
injury inflicted on others becomes a civic skill…”98 In the preceding instances of animal
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injury and death, Marker’s work begs for a retroactive expansion of Azoulay’s theory
(which remains humanist limiting its concerns to human injuries); we can also extend this
ability to make eco-civic claims across the photographic apparatus on behalf of
nonhuman bodies as well (even if unknowingly).
In returning to the closing lines of Vive la baleine!, it can now be acknowledged
that it is precisely through the photographic image that the whale makes a claim on the
viewer—a claim that is entangled with the viewer’s own well-being: “ ...each whale who
dies leaves us like a prophecy with an image of our own death.”99 The film’s reallyexisting whale as a body ripping through representation allows for a (partially) un-coded
subject to emerge from the depths of the surface of the image. As I have argued, this
photographic registration allows the animal to represent herself (if only obliquely and in
temporal delay), even if this capacity is unknown to the animal (since, for the most part,
animals cannot know their being “I” or doing “I” is being fixed in film): the claims it
makes in situ by delimitating its own movements, sounds, and interiority in relation to the
outside world, can be communicated post hoc for a civic understanding of photography.
This civic mode of photography would thus be posthumanist, in that it considers both
human and nonhuman agents in the shared capacity to have harm or injury done to them,
and the shared ability to communicate this harm or injury via indexical representation.
1.6 SI J’AVAIS QUATRE DROMADAIRES AND ANIMALITY AS ARCHÉ-CULTURE
Si J’avais quatre dromadaires reflects a theory of photography predicated on
nonviolence. It also argues for the animal to be understood as the fundamental
precondition for culture, communication, and empathy. At the beginning of the film’s
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second act, the three photo-traveling narrators – Catherine, Pierre, and Nicolas – make
their way to Russia. An elephant appears on screen and we are told the photograph is of
“Dourov’s corner” in Moscow. As Marker’s online archive Immemory recounts, this
“little oasis of animal peace in sixties Moscow” was “founded in the early part of this
century by V.I. Dourov, a clown by trade, and the inventor of a gentle method of training
that won him the gratitude of cats, elephants, and raccoons.”100 Pierre calls Dourov a
“genius who discovered that the bond between species can be had through trust.”101 The
image shown on screen is that between a young girl and raccoon in a cage together
gaining each other’s confidence (not unlike Prévert’s encounter with his raccoon in
L’Animal en question, though here from inside the bars). [ill. 1.28] Catherine presumes
that the raccoon’s ability to trust humans will allow the animal to enter into the young
girl’s family, but Pierre explains instead that their bond only leads to entertainment and
spectacle. Immediately following this image is another photograph of a raccoon (or
possibly the same raccoon) performing its French namesake on stage for human
consumption: standing on hind legs holding a wet piece of clothing over a wash basin, the
raton laver (“washing rat”) has learned to wash laundry on stage. [ill. 1.29] This is more
complicated than it might seem. The raccoon is learning to perform the misrecognition
inscribed in the human etymology of its name. Essentially, it is the “really-existing”
animal performing the humanist misunderstanding of the “so-called” animal, while also
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ironically showing its capacity for learned intelligence. Here, once more, Marker
emphasizes a certain amount of human betrayal vis-à-vis the animals around him.102
In what at first blush could serve as a reference to Kojève’s conception of
posthistorical animality, this performing raccoon as worker-player leads Pierre to claim
that “work has become another form of play.”103 Over his claim, images of various
animals in states of amusement appear onscreen: next to a hobby horse a cat lies on its
back; a young horse and then a seal do the same, followed by photographs of human
children playing basketball and soccer. [ill. 1.30-1] These examples do not, however,
represent the immanent and content figure of animality in a Kojèvian conception of
posthistory. Marker is not making a parallel between work and play in order to critique
the postwar consumer society of eternal presentness and pleasure. In these scenes, he is
genuinely fascinated by the human and nonhuman capacity for play. These photographs
may more plausibly serve as a reference to Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens (1944), which
by this period had already directly influenced the Surrealist Andre Breton and the
Situationists Guy Debord and Constant.104 Much like the early ethological work of
Lorenz, Huizinga’s research uncovers the surprising shared capacities of nonhuman
agency in human history. The opening lines of Homo Ludens make this clear by giving
priority to animal play in the formation of human culture:
Play is older than culture, for culture, however inadequately defined, always
presupposes human society, and animals have not waited for man to teach them
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their playing. We can safely assert, even, that human civilization has added no
essential feature to the general idea of play. Animals play just like Men.105
There are two important features to stress here: The first is Huizinga’s emphasis
on animal “play” as preceding culture, forming one of its bases.106 If culture can be
rudimentarily defined as action that “transcends the immediate needs of life and imparts
meaning to the action,” as Huizinga does, then animal proclivity for play is always
already culture – if not yet human culture. This reading is reinforced by Huizinga’s
caveat that culture is always “inadequately defined” as presupposing “human society.” It
thus also follows that animal agency can never simply be thought of as purely instinctual
or reactively immanent, as the Kojèvian lineage would have it (I return to this below).
Huizinga makes this evident by defining the animal as somewhere between “instinct” and
“will”: “If we call the active principle that makes up the essence of play, “instinct”, we
explain nothing; if we call it mind or “will” we say too much.”107 In this way, the animal
is posited as a liminal figure that is neither pure reactive impulse nor pure responsive
mind.108 These observations lead to the second important feature: the entanglement of
human-animal. Animals and men converge in their capacity as playful beings – “Animals
play just like Men”—and therefore the two cannot be kept in strict separation from each
other.
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If Marker intersperses both human and nonhuman animals at play in Dromadaires,
he similarly argues for human-animal convergence in play. However, Marker goes
further than Huizinga. Pierre makes certain parallels between the “dressage” or “training”
of animals and the development of human children and their socialization. While
shuffling through photographs of mothers and children, and in response to Pierre’s
discussion of children, animals, and training, Catherine tries to sum up his view in the
following way: “So if I understand you correctly, you are for the gentle training of
children? You think that through trust we can succeed in forming model washer-citizens
[citoyens laveurs] as refined as baby rats [ratons]?”109 In doing so, she herself plays on
the French word ratons laveur by comparing the trusting raccoon who learns to perform
on stage with the formation of the model human citizen.
This approach could be a dangerous one: a cursory reading of this passage might
very well find Marker simply endorsing the “total humanization of the animal [that]
coincides with a total animalization of man,” as Agamben cautioned. After all, this is an
eventuality that Marker had already warned against; towards the end of Les Statues
meurent aussi, he and Resnais make a clear visual parallel between laboratory mice in
various glass jars and the biopolitical power relation between colonizer and colonized.110
Above all, the danger in this “animalization of man” lies in unwittingly promoting the
most extreme forms of violence and the traumas that result in order to justify confinement
and extermination, which Resnais and Marker document with such directness and force
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“Donc si je te suis bien, tu es pour le dressage des enfants en douceur? Tu penses que par la confiance on
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During this sequence in Les Statues meurent aussi, Marker claims in critical irony that “Africa is a
marvelous laboratory where the good white man dreams up and patiently concocts the good negro, even if a
few of the latter get bloody.” “L’Afrique est un merveilleux laboratoire où ce préfabrique patiemment, en
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in Night and Fog (1955). In fact, this parallel between human subject formation and
breeding, training, and domestication continues to be disturbing today (see the
controversy and media fallout surrounding Sloterdijk’s “Human Zoo” essay in 2009).111
However, Marker does not use the figure of the animal as a trope of debasement
in Dromadaires. Instead, he disturbs this humanist trope all together. In order to do so, he
employs an oppositional set of laws that are operative throughout the film: the laws of le
Chateau and those of le Jardin (the “Castle” and the “Garden”). The very structure of the
film operates through this binary, with the “castle” as its first act and the “garden” as its
second. It is crucial to understand how Marker defines these terms, and ultimately how
they side step the humanist separation of both culture and nature, and man and animal.
Nora Alter defines this binary as follows: “The [castle] stands for those structures of
power that exclude the disenfranchised poor; the [garden] represents the utopian space
where various possibilities of social justice can be imagined.”112 Marker’s choice of
“castle” is probably a reference to Franz Kafka’s 1926 novel of the same name, the
literary epitome of indiscriminate power over the less powerful. In the final moments of
Dromadaires’s first act, Catherine offers a description of this blind and silent political
force over photographs of children of various nationalities and ethnicities in the street:
“We live in the castle. There is worse than tyranny, there is silence. The distance between
those who have power and those who do not. The impossibility of communication. The
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only boundary separating species. This is the castle. The poor live under its shadow.”113 It
is important to note here that nothing about her description of the castle limits it to
relations of human power or social inequality.114 A number of moments in the film make
it clear that animals are also implicated by this indiscriminate power precluding any
communication with it, which serves as the “only boundary separating species.”115
In contrast to the incommunicative, indiscriminate, and confining power of the
“castle,” the “garden” represents the opening of communication between the more and
less powerful, which admits relations between humans and animals (as the many
examples at the beginning of the second act serve to attest). In one of the few instances of
a film scholar underscoring the human-animal entanglement implied here, Sarah Cooper
defines this side of Marker’s binary as a model place of anthrozoological conviviality, “in
which animals and humans, especially children, build a relation of trust with each
other.116 It is crucial to note that in the discussion above over the issue of dressage or
“training” in animals and children, with its ratons laveur as model citizen, the narrators
113
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only agree by taking recourse to this terminology of the castle and garden. In response to
Catherine’s query “if I understand you correctly, you are for the gentle training of
children?,” Pierre promptly changes the terms of the discussion. He frames the issue
according to these more fundamental laws of the castle/garden, which always already
implicate both humans and animals: “I think we saw our own legs off with the law of the
Jungle, and that there is also a law of the Garden. The Jungle is the Castle of the animals,
but their garden…” Here his words cut off, as Catherine interrupts him in order to
complete his sentence in agreement: “…could equally serve us as a model, right?”117 In
this way, the harmonious relations between humans, animals, and children are the natural
outcome of the garden. This is Marker at his most utopian: In opposition to the
indiscriminate violence and power of the castle (for humans) or of the jungle (for
animals), there is the political and cultural space of the garden that supplies them both
with immunity and protection from their respective domains of violence and power.
Recalling Huizinga’s definition of culture as action that “transcends the
immediate needs of life and imparts meaning to the action,” here the opposition of nature
and culture is completely scrambled, for human and nonhuman animals are implicated on
both sides of the equation: they are entangled in the violent laws of the castle/jungle as
well as the shared, ameliorative laws of the garden. Therefore, inherent to this conception
of culture-as-garden, the terms of the debate shift to include all earthlings on both sides
(much like the entangled ecological scenario emphasized at the end of Vive la baleine!).
In other words, this garden, which is described as a space that can serve as a “model” and
as something to be discovered, necessarily admits the posthumanist animal. If the
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“Je pense qu’on nous scie les peids avec le loi de la Jungle, et qu’il y a aussi la loi du Jardin. La Jungle
est le Chateaus des bêtes, mais leur jardin……pourrait également nous servier de modèle, c’est ça?”
Marker, Commentaires 2, 139.
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posthumanist modality of posthistory understands culture as not intrinsically human, but
as a process of immunization from the precariousness of existence that both human and
nonhuman agents participate, then Dromadaires, just like Vive la baleine!, argues for a
definition of culture as a potential space of protection from the harmful forces that
entangle human well-being with nonhuman animal well-being.
The visual dimension of the film makes the possibility of a posthumanist garden
clear. Over this discussion of the castle/jungle/garden, the film toggles back and forth
between photographs of children smiling directly at the camera and photographs of
animals in various states of rest or play, themselves often addressing the camera.118
Included among these images of children and animals are photographs of advertisements
dealing with the integration of animals within human society and signage that already
makes room for them in an urban setting: a billboard for the Provence town of Marnas as
the “First village for bêtes heureuse (or “happy animals”), a sign for the “Ligue Française
pour la protection des oiseaux – Refuge pour les oiseaux – Loi du 3 Mai 1844,” which
offers legal protection to bird nests, and a street advertisement for veterinary services in
Havana, Cuba. [ill. 1.32-4] Here the emphasize is on the garden as something that, in part,
may have already arrived.
Through these photographs of human and animal play, along with the preliminary
integration of the nonhuman into human law and cultural refuge, Marker demonstrates
what the human always already shares with his other in animal. As I have argued, this
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These include: a seal bobbing in the water, a lioness on her back looking through cage bars, two
groundhogs standing on their hind legs, a weasel cleaning herself, two squirrels perched on opposite sides
of a tree trunk, a muzzled German Shepherd, a rabbit being fed food or medicine from a dropper, two
ponies and then a reindeer being pet by young girls, a white companion cat in the arms of a child and lastly,
a boy dragging his now dead cat on a string through the street (as if to emphasize that the garden is still yet
to come).
86

proposes a conception of the posthumanist animal newly attentive to its really-existing
situatedness, moving beyond the humanist animal as metaphor for stupidity or
degradation. And again, in a posthistory where the posthumanist animal comes to be
revealed, the “animal” or “animality” is no longer automatically a bad thing, but provides
the very basis for what makes living, breathing, thinking – and in this case, the cultural
inclination for play and learning—theriocentrically unique to human and (many)
nonhuman animals.
This posthumanist scenario in which both human and nonhuman animals share
cultured well-being-in-the-world runs even deeper in the Dromadaires’s three-minute
coda. In a sense, Marker concludes this work with what could be described as the archéanimal form of communication and culture.119 The coda begins with an indecipherable
mix of people talking. Different languages softly collide in either murmurs or quotidian
volumes in confusion and non-sense. Their overlap and mixing largely negates our ability
to understand their meanings. One of these voices then begins to lower in pitch and speed,
as if the audio track is being manipulated into lower frequencies; this voice, which
happens to be male, eventually comes to a slurring halt. From the subsiding mix of this
speech, a new voice begins to roil – namely, that of a primate, possibly a chimpanzee.
Gradually, this non-human voice gets more and more agitated. What begins as a few
cautious sounds develops into full-blown yelling and screaming. Although the urgency in
this nonhuman voice makes it possibly more affective than the mélange of human voices
(the chimpanzee could equally be overjoyed at something or in the throes of pain),
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theorization of arché-writing and the trace as pertinent to the former’s treatment of arché-communication in
Dromadaires. Both go beyond logos-as-full-speech reducible and limited to human consciousness.
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neither the confusion of speech nor the emotive cries of the animal give the viewer any
secure sense or meaning. They both attest to a living interiority, but discerning its
qualities proves difficult.
Over this succession of human and nonhuman voices, Marker shows various
views of Parisian streets and visual culture. In rhythm with the chimp’s exclamations, the
film lingers on various pasted paper advertisements from commodity culture or political
propaganda. In one case, a suited portrait of what appears to be President De Gaulle has
his face violently scratched out. In another, a tear rips the image of Muhammad Ali up his
right cheek and through his nose. In these instances, it is difficult to locate exactly the
anonymous décollagist’s specific intentions. In certain other instances, however, the
pasted paper is defaced in ways that seem more purposeful: in one example, an
advertisement showing the torso of a female model has been torn away to reveal the
words au profit (“for profit”) underneath; in another, a similar model’s face is defaced
revealing the words l’agression Américaine, Agissons dans l’union (“American
aggression, let us react in unity”); in yet another, which is for a travel agency or vacation
destination, a smiling woman’s eyes have been carved out, ironically altering the
meaning below the image in the advertisement urging the public to voir et connaitre (“see
and know”). [ill. 1.35-7] In these instances, the anonymous intention (or Marker’s
noticing of their coincidental meanings, should they be chance) is more or less clear.
They are a public send up of political power and commodity culture, which the Nouveaux
Realiste décollagistes, such as Raymond Hains and Jacques Villeglé, had begun
appropriating a decade beforehand.120
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Marker wants the viewer to remain attentive to the difference between the voice
on the one hand, human or nonhuman, and the indexical traces of an anonymous public,
on the other. While the superimposed voices only lead to confusion, the visual traces that
intervene in commodity or political culture seem to betray more secure intentions. It is as
if Marker is arguing that the trace is more secure in meaning than the voice, even though,
in contrast to the voice, the trace is inherently predicated on an absent conscious
embodiment (much like the photographic and indexical image). The trace is also
underscored in Marker’s choice of including city walls defaced by writing itself in the
very next sequence of images. These are Brassaï-like photographs of graffiti with
innumerable scratches, and two scrawled walls in particular that grab the attention of the
photo-travelers: On one wall is written simply and despondently, j’aime personne (“I
love no one”). On another, one or more anonymous multi-lingual writers have written la
vie est moche (“life is ugly”) in French, German, and Swedish. In noticing these somber
scrawls, Nicolas bemoans that “we are now a bit far from the garden.” In response, Pierre
reassures him that “what is important is not that it is far away, but that it exists. And that
it exists along the most irrefutable part of ourselves, our animal side.”121
Over this assertion that the “most irrefutable part of ourselves” is our animality,
the film shifts from its urban visual culture to idyllic photographs of human and
nonhuman animals in various states of conviviality: a man and his large white dog
companion in a field, a young horse nursing, another image of a horse’s head and mane in
mid-stride, two smiling monkeys leaning on each other through a wire cage, a field of
sheep, and then two ground hogs embracing each other. Interspersed with these images
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are photographs of humans holding hands, arms over shoulders, or being equally tender
and affectionate towards each other. From these images of shared conviviality, Pierre
suggests that this irrefutable part of ourselves as shared animality amounts to the zerodegree gesture of communication and empathy that can develop in the garden: “It is
undeniable that the Law of the Garden exists, and it expresses itself in very simple
gestures, in the most simple of gestures.”122 Be it gestures of human or nonhuman
affection, they are the “most irrefutable” and the most simple, which encompass all forms
of life with the capacity to perform them. In this way, Marker points to an interiority of
camaraderie and empathy that is shared between human and nonhuman animals.
Following Pierre’s claim of irrefutably simple gestures, Dromadaires ends with
the observation of an even more entangled scenario between humans and animals. This is
similar to Vive la baleine!’s closing claim of human-animal bonds. In this instance,
however, it is not an image of shared ecological well-being, but animality as the archéculture and gestural life that is always already within the human:
It is true, when we look around, there is horror, there is madness, there are
monsters…but there is always already…within us, beside ourselves, thanks to us,
when we have…grace…[grace] that announces the survival of the most loved, for
who knows how long?123
This “survival of the most loved,” which can only be obtained through the laws of the
garden, has been established as both human and nonhuman. Additionally, it is presented
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here as a moment of grace that serves to protect those from “horror” and “madness.” This
shared moment of grace as the survival the “most loved” could be yet another definition
for culture itself, entailing a life-saving set of gestures that transcend “the immediate
needs of life.” In paraphrasing Huizinga, through these closing scenes of Dromadaires,
Marker may very well be saying: animals have not waited for man to teach them their
affections. Such a rewording of Huizinga is made more likely by the very final image of
Dromadaires, which leaves the viewer with a photograph of an adult monkey caressing
the head of a younger monkey in her lap, presumably in kinship, along with a sundry of
animal voices off in the distance. [ill. 1.38]
1.7 CONCLUSION
How do we reconcile these final scenes of Dromadaires, which bring together the
seemingly disparate examples of décollage and textual wall graffiti with Marker’s
understanding of arché-culture as fundamentally based on human-animal gestures? The
answer may be found in realizing that all these examples are predicated on the law of the
trace: décollage, graffiti, and human-animal gestures are all indexical signs that point to
interior intentional states. This conception of interiority has been operative throughout
this chapter—from Marker’s video bestiary to the whales in Vive la baleine! to these final
scenes of Dromadaires. It should also be clear that this interiority is never a pure
interiority. As any trace structure, it is conditioned by liminality, a porousness of inside to
outside, and a form of agency that is always an inter-agency whose possibilities are
delimited by intrinsic and extrinsic openings and closures. Here is where Marker is most
timely as an ethological artist. Not only do the 1970s represent a paradigmatic shift in
ethology—from theories of aggression to a more expansive recognition of emotive
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range—but this is also the moment when, largely through Tinbergen’s work, the
discipline moved beyond its reductive assumptions of pure behavioral instinct towards an
attentiveness to ecological variations that take into account the ways nonhumans adapt in
super-instinctual ways; or, as Massumi has brilliantly analyzed, how nonhumans can
never adaptive through instinct alone, but must necessarily rely on a creative and
improvisational mode of “supernormality” in relation to environmental comfort or
stress.124 In other words, interiority is always a situated form of mark making, to various
degrees and effects.
While dated 1966, Dromadaires was only released in 1974, two years after Vive
la baleine!. In both, Marker formulates a posthumanist animal being-in-the-world that
forms the very basis for culture, communication, ethics, and ecology. Vive la baleine!’s
strategies show the really existing whale as having the power to show its “I” or to do “I,”
as the more fundamental existential mode of existing and making exterior impressions
through an interior nervous system. Marker’s use of the indexical image as a non-violent
form of capture allows the whale to displace its powers and manifest its nonhuman
ipseity through an embodied interior “I.” Thus, the indexical image holds the potential for
communicating a nonhuman subjective power via the apparatus of the work and its
viewers. Similarly, all the photographed animals in Dromadaires make claims through
the indexical apparatus of photography and film. In their capacity for play, trust, and
communication, these animals attest to an arché form of communication through the
simplest gestures that signal a complex interiority shared by human and nonhuman alike.
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CHAPTER TWO—POSTHUMANIST EXHIBITIONS: FROM ECOLOGY TO BIOPOLITICS
1.1 THE INHUMANS
Guillaume Apollinaire’s 1913 essay “Pure Painting” contains a line that would
have a long life. It runs as follows: “More than anything, artists are men who want to
become inhuman.”1 When this passage is read in its original context, one sees that
Apollinaire pits becoming “inhuman” against “the merely animal,” as a potential state of
human creativity and transcendence. This transformation into the inhuman is an
overcoming of animality that leads to a form of becoming “found nowhere in nature.”2
The inhuman is a superhuman state divorced from the dictates of naturalness and
animality, which augurs the transhumanist position, i.e. that futurological conception of
the posthuman as overcoming the essential frailty and finitude of the human animal.
Oddly enough (unbeknownst to Apollinaire), his concept of the “inhuman” could serve
equally well to define Western humanism’s human tout court, since it too is metaphysical
subject position built above and beyond animality – or what Giorgio Agamben has
theorized as a historical procession of the “anthropological machine” relentlessly
separating human wheat from animal chaff.3 This slippage demonstrates that there is a
certain continuity between the humanist and transhumanist subject.
In Apollinaire’s 1911 collection Le Bestiaire ou Cortège d’Orphée, the “inhuman”
makes an earlier appearance, though in a way quite different from “Pure Painting.” Le
Bestiaire ou Cortège d’Orphée comprises of a number of poems accompanied by
woodcut plates by Raoul Dufy, each poem titled after and featuring a different animal. In
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these poems, Apollinaire’s first conjuring of the inhuman takes the form of an octopus [ill.
2.1]:
Throwing its ink towards the heavens,
Sucking the blood of those it loves
And finding it delicious
This inhuman monster, is none other than myself. 4
This meaning of this earlier appearance of the inhuman seems diametrically
opposed to its subsequent articulation in 1913. Rather than overcoming animality, this
inhuman is a radical embrace of animality as a form that always-already embodies the
poet—and, by extension, the human. It is the realization that the animal clings to the
human, complicating any immunological transhumanist (or humanist) pretensions to
transcend animality. This is the posthumanist version of the inhuman, which does not
seek to shed animality like some historico-evolutionary booster rocket, but instead
challenges the long history of anthropocentric exceptionalism by demonstrating how
human and nonhuman animal beings are inextricably bound. Admittedly, in Apollinaire’s
poetic bestiary, this re-internalization of animality remains largely symbolic (in this
instance, the bloodthirsty cephalopod becomes a symbol for destructive libidinal
energies). Nevertheless, in excavating the ambiguities in Apollinaire’s initial uses of the
term—one in 1911, the other in 1913—I point towards the multi-faceted features of the
inhuman.
Jean-François Lyotard’s more fully-fledged theory of the inhuman, especially in
The Inhuman: Reflections on Time (1988), also addresses a split conception of the
4

“Jetant son encre vers les cieux/Suçant le sang de ce qu’il aime/Et le trouvant délicieux/Ce monstre
inhumain, c’est moi-même.” Guillaume Apollinaire and Raoul Dufy, Le Bestiaire ou Cortège d'Orphée
(Paris: Deplanche, 1911), np
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inhuman.5 The art historian Kiff Bamford analyses Lyotard’s “two inhumans”: on the one
hand, the inhuman is found in “technoscience where the flesh is replaced,” while on the
other, the inhuman is a transgressive state prior to humanist “education and other means
of subjectivization.”6 In other words, the inhuman takes the form of invasive
biotechnological supports, which are resisted by that other inhuman, namely, the
ontologically pre-human stage of what Lyotard calls the infans (sounding like enfant or
“infant” in French) whose perceptual wonder has something to teach us subsequent to our
initiation within humanist culture and history.7 Although Lyotard would not have
employed these terms, one can readily map the transhumanist and posthumanist subject
onto this split concept of his inhuman.
Recently, the philosopher Cary Wolfe has more fully theorized the difference
between transhumanist and posthumanist thought in order to further disarticulate one
from the other. For Wolfe, the human in transhumanism “is achieved by escaping or
repressing not just its animal origins in nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but
more generally by transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether.”8
The purported outcome of the transhumanist position is transferable cognition, which can
be supported by various material platforms, transcending the death and perishability
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through bio-technical channels. In contrast to this transhumanist subject, the human in
posthumanism
forces us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of human experience, including
the normal perceptual modes and affective states of Homo sapiens itself, by
recontextualizing them in terms of the entire sensorium of other living beings and
their own autopoietic ways of ‘bringing forth a world’—ways that are, since we
ourselves are human animals, part of the evolutionary history and behavioral and
psychological repertoire of the human itself.9
In other words, while transhumanism reinforces a sovereign position well-trodden by
humanist histories, a position of control and mastery over nonhumans, posthumanism
relinquishes this anthropropriety power. Instead of disavowing what the human shares
with the nonhuman animal—from language (which since Derrida cannot be understood
as reducible to phonetic speech), to empathy, sociability, community, and the nerveended delimitation of life worlds—posthumanism embraces the ontological overlaps
produced by evolutionary immanence.
If I begin with this serpentine genealogy of the inhuman from Apollinaire to
Lyotard, it is not only to contextualize transhumanist and posthumanist thematics as they
pertain to the human. I also introduce this history to emphasize the concept’s far-reaching
implications for nonhuman animals. After all, the epistemological formation of animality
is itself constructed by a humanist history of projections both mythical and scientific (the
obsolescence of this humanist history vis-à-vis animals points towards the postanimal,
something Animal Studies and cognitive ethology is forcing us to address). This
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humanist history treats nonhuman animals as both consumable—symbolically and
literally—as well as increasingly technical modes of instrumentalization. It is also
understood that the anthropological history of hominization—which can be understood as
the earliest stage of the human animal distinguishing itself from species peers, as if the
inhuman can already be found and overcome here—was unthinkable without nonhuman
help of all kinds. This all points to the fact that nonhuman animals are not passive in this
history of the human, inhuman, transhumanism, and posthumanism.10
This interlacing of humans, inhumans, and nonhumans is of manifest concern in
three exhibitions during the mid-1980s: De L’animal et du végétal dans l’art Belge
contemporain (1985) at Atelier 340 in Brussels, Les Immatériaux (1985) at the Centre
Pompidou in Paris, and Animal Art (1987) at Steirischer Herbst in Graz.11 These three
exhibitions augur today’s discourse on transhumanism and posthumanism (in both their
possibilities and limitations for art practices). De l’animal in Brussels evinces a fledgling
posthumanist space where ecological issues are privileged and the humanist subject is decentered from its sovereign position in both nature and culture.12 In the case of Les
Immatériaux in Paris, I argue that the exhibition’s transhumanist dimensions posit a
biopolitical collapse of the human and nonhuman animal, from which only two futures
remain: either an embracing of transhumanism (Lyotard’s bad inhuman of biotechnical
invasiveness) or its contestation through posthumanism (Lyotard’s good inhuman as
10
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infans resistance, which, I propose, necessitates a reconsideration of animality as much as
puerility). Animal Art in Graz, which can be called the first major exhibition dealing
specifically with nonhuman animals in advanced art, reflects a synthesis of De l’Animal’s
posthumanist sensibilities and Les Immatériaux’s transhumanist thematics: on the one
hand, situated on the cusp of scientific breakthroughs in gene technology and cloning,
Animal Art lays claim to a transhumanist fascination with manipulating animal life,
whereby the essential make-up of organic life is decoded and purportedly mastered
through bio-technical innovations (an eventuality with lasting influences on
contemporary bio artists, as well as the broader understanding of human biology as
therefore malleable). On the other hand, the exhibition’s prolific instances of installations
featuring nonhuman animal performances, processes, capacities for creativity, culture,
and community, as well as occasional considerations of animal ethics, Animal Art is
overwhelmingly posthumanist in its ambitions and scope. That this exhibition is a mix of
transhumanism and posthumanism ultimately demonstrates that these sensibilities, while
largely oppositional are nevertheless, conjoined.
A preliminary note concerning my methodological approach to these exhibition
case studies should be made clear from the start: while I discuss certain aspects of
curatorial and exhibition strategies, I privilege the catalogs as telling statements
concerning the inclusion of animal life in art during this period. Accordingly, I place
greater emphasis on the textual afterlife of these exhibitions and key works, rather than
issues of presentation or curatorial decision-making. Additionally, while my
understanding of “biopolitics” will be defined over the course of this chapter, I situate my
understanding of ecology at the outset: by “ecological” I mean something more than

98

simply environmentalism, i.e. a preoccupation with the health of natural eco-systems.
Rather, I follow Isabelle Stengers’s understanding of ecology as “the science of
multiplicities, disparate causalities, and unintentional creations of meaning” that exceed
environmentalism per se to include the cultural, political, and scientific.13 Stengers also
emphasizes the role of “relation” in ecological thought, including the fundamental
entanglements between human and nonhuman beings: “[T]here is hardly an ecological
situation on Earth where the values attributed by humans to different ‘products’ of nature
haven’t already contributed to the construction of relationships among nonhuman living
beings.”14 This “ecological situation” becomes more and more manifest across the 1970s
and 80s (as does the concept of relationality). This chapter thus offers a genealogical
history of the changes and creations of new meanings vis-à-vis animal life in politics and
culture as a biohistory that continues to inform the present.15
This biohistory is not a clear-cut narrative of progressive enlightenment towards
animals. Nor do artists and curators in the 1970s and ‘80s come to incorporate animal life
unambiguously, with critical care, and in such a way that addresses ethical or ecological
issues with clear effectiveness. In short, the emphasis on human/nonhuman relationality
and ecological thought in the 1970s does not give rise to conditions or results that are
automatically favorable. It is for this reason that my title’s subheading alludes to a space
between ecology and biopolitics: on the one hand, the incorporation of animals in art can
elicit environmental care, ethical relatedness, and a positive collaboration between human
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and nonhumans (ultimately, the posthumanist position). On the other, the animal can
equally be reduced to a readymade, manipulable object from which the artist or curator
becomes the biopolitical agent of control over his nonhuman other (or in the case of Les
Immatériaux, over the human museum-goer). Both sides of this biopolitical/ecological
coin manifest themselves throughout this chapter, and this imbrication of ecology and
biopolitics is distilled in three exhibitions of the 1980s.
2.2 DE L’ANIMAL ET DU VÉGÉTAL DANS L’ART BELGE CONTEMPORIAN
I begin with the exhibition De L’animal et du végétal dans l’art Belge
contemporain at Atelier 340 in Brussels in 1985.16 This large group exhibition of some
forty artists was a survey of Belgian practices reflecting a newfound interest in
environmental issues from the late 1960s onwards. The exhibition also represented one of
the first displays of advanced contemporary art whose theme, in part, focused explicitly
on the animal. De L’animal is thus symptomatic of a fledgling posthumanist history:
animals are accorded a pride of place in advanced art practices, nonhuman biology
becomes a key issue for artists working through an environmental lens, and a space is
opened for the artistic avowal of the more-than-human world.
De l’animal was organized by the Belgian curators Wodek Majewski and Marc
Renwart. Focusing mainly on materiality and form, they grouped the artists and their
work into seven sections according to morphology and material: “Use of animal and
vegetal elements,” “Use of animal elements,” “Assemblage with animal elements,”
“Assemblage with mixed elements,” “Assemblage with vegetal elements,” “Plants,” and
“Animals.” With an ambition to survey the recent trends of incorporating various organic
16
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materials in recent Belgian art practices, this organization makes sense. Its limitations,
however, are clear—most notably its inability to explain why such a trend was underway.
As will also become apparent, the curatorial approach falls into the trap of fetishizing
“nature,” leaving the exhibition largely unable to analyze how the nonhuman world has
never been discretely on the other side of culture (nor how the “natural” is an
anthropocentric construction and dreamscape of untrammeled wildness, which by the
1980s smacks as environmentally naïve). In what follows, I reorganize this exhibition
according to specific themes and cultural registers that go beyond mere morphology and
material. This restructuring of an exhibition with little to no afterlife lends it a certain
amount of relevance for the near-history of animality in art—not only in the ways in
which the exhibition succeeds in making nascent posthumanist sensibilities visible, but
also in the ways in which some of its artists fail to adequately meet the demands of the
exhibition’s ambitious scope. The catalog is a crucial resource here: since the organizers
asked each artist to supply a text explaining their rationale for using animal and/or
vegetal materials, the various responses offer an archival testament to their understanding
of nonhuman life at this moment. All but five contributors to De l’Animal responded.
As Renwart’s “Note Historique” in the catalog listing all possible twentieth
century influences on Belgian art clarifies, the Surrealist legacy is a prominent precursor
to the work in the exhibition (a legacy that lingers especially in the older generation of
artists in De l’Animal).17 Andre Breton, Andre Masson, Joan Miro, Salvador Dalí, Meret
Oppenheim are all mentioned with a brief description of how they involve materials, as
well as a discussion of the 1936 “Surrealist Exhibition of Objects" at the Galerie Charles
17
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Ratton, Paris and the 1938 “International Exhibition of Surrealism” at the Galerie BeauxArts, Paris (that Magritte is absent from this long list of influences shows the emphasis to
be on the direct incorporation of biological material in art rather than its representation).18
However, the catalog also goes beyond the confines of Surrealism in its taxonomy of
historical influences. Duchamp is a key figure for his readymades, as is Cubism for being
the first to introduce everyday objects into art.19 More recent influences are
acknowledged as well: Fluxus, Robert Rauschenberg’s combines, Joseph Beuys, Vienna
Aktionism, Arte Povera, Hans Haacke, and Marcel Broodthaers. This wide-netted
collapse of avant-garde and neo-avant-garde practices incorporating living or dead
biological materials is certainly over deterministic as a set of influences on the 1980s.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of this “Note Historique” demonstrates that the exhibition
organizers were aware of this historical genealogy and acknowledged their contemporary
situation as extending it towards different, largely environmental ends (more in keeping
with Beuys, Haacke, and Arte Povera, whose influences are most apparent on the Belgian
artists in the exhibition).
Majewski’s brief introductory essay to the catalog explains the exhibition’s theme
as arising out of recent developments in Belgian art – specifically, the inclusion of
unadulterated, organic materials into object-making and installations. He describes the
exhibition’s concept as having had originated with “land art,” but ultimately moving
away from monumental earthwork strategies of manipulating nature towards an aesthetics
18
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of naturalité, or “wildness,” in the sense of using unadulterated elements from the
environment; the emphasis was no longer on fabrication, but on the integration of natural
materials for their own intrinsic qualities and creative processes (which truthfully can
only be a quasi-wildness). From this, Majewski asserts, the “insertion of the animal” was
a “natural” outcome in Belgian art practice.20 This allusion to “open air” points towards
the environmental inflection of many of the artists involved. In keeping with the
exhibition’s emphasis on organic matter and its aesthetics of minimal fabrication,
Majewski additionally emphasizes a sense of ethical responsibility elicited by this
engagement with organic matter. He underscores the ecological entanglements imposed
on humanity as a form of material obligation: “[Matter] teaches and astonishes us in its
historical constructions, by its process of becoming and the perpetual confrontations it
forces upon us.”21 The importance of ecological relationality and care is evident, even if
Majewski’s epistemological collapse of natural, vegetal, and animal matter leads to a
flattened ontology largely unable to account for the differences involved between
nonhuman animals and other forms of organic life and processes.22
The Surrealist interest in the informe and hybrid objects that lingers in De
l’animal is often due to the older generation of Belgian artists, though not always. One of
Marcel Marien’s contributions, Le Chant de la forêt (Forest Song) 1972, is simply a deer
antler protruding like a flower from a clay pot. The work plays with the morphological
similarities between animal and plant matter (at first glance, the antler looks like dry
20
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wood). Pierre Alechinsky’s Jésus-lapin (Jesus-Rabbit) 1950, the bones of a rabbit laid out
in the form of crucifixion, with a clamshell for a head, is more disquieting. The hybridity
here is between the mineral, animal, and human—as well as the carnal and the sacred.
Michel Jamsin’s Le lampadaire cruel (The Cruel Floor Lamp) 1985 is a taxidermied
falcon with a large electrical light bulb replacing its head, as if the organic life force of
the bird of prey might transfer its current to the inorganic filament of electricity. [ill. 2.2]
In his response to the curatorial question as to why he is interested in animals, Jasmin
describes his memory of wandering alone at the Brussels World Fair in 1958 and being
struck by its exotic shows; in particular, coming upon a caged panther-woman whose legs
were covered with animal-like spots. In language that seems more apt to the 1930s than
the 1980s, Jasmin chronicles this experience: “Was it then that I began to love such
places where wax mannequins, prehistoric skeletons, and mummies are heaped together,
and where human-animal monstrosities are moulded?”23 The uncanny and the monstrous:
all these tropes come straight from the Surrealist canon, and demonstrate the lingering
influence of international expositions and fairs.
Simon Lacour’s series of objects titled Een nieuwe optiek (A New Optic) 1985,
are just as nostalgic for Surrealism. One is an egg sitting on a cup with an unblinking
human eye staring out the top of its shell, while the other (also an egg in its shell) has
fully-grown chicken’s feet shooting out a cracked side. [ill. 2.3-4] Like Marien’s,
Alechinsky’s, and Jasmin’s contributions, any one of these objects could find a home in
Bataille’s repertoire of the informe in their ontological undecidability, or alongside any
number of Surrealist objets trouvées from the 1930s. Yet while Lacour’s work is
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particularly derivative of Surrealist precedents, his response in the catalog reflects the
ecological turn of the 1970s and 80s: “You ask me why I work as I do. The sight of
God’s oeuvre dying brings me an unconscious expression of deep nostalgia.”24 Lacour’s
somewhat flimsy response evinces a theologically inflected understanding of nature,
leading him towards a nostalgia not only for Surrealist forms, but also for at time before
environmental crises.
Aside from Jasmin (b. 1941), Marien, Alechinsky, and Lacour were all born in the
twenties (1920, 1927, 1926, respectively). For this generation, organic materials were
objects of interest in the service of striking juxtapositions. For the majority of the
younger artists (born during or after the World War II) who implemented equally
unsettling, even abject, combinations of organic and inorganic life, their disquieting
objects turned towards a more explicit critique of environmental degradation. The work
of Camiel van Breedam (b. 1936), in the lineage of collage and papier collé, is
paradigmatic. His Voortvarende (Dynamic), 1982, is a small diptych on paper. [ill. 2.5]
The supports of the collage elements are, on the left-hand side, a yellowing page torn
from a piano score, and on the right-hand side, a sheet of plain white paper.
Superimposed atop both the score and the white paper is a fish carcass outlined with
brown watercolor and pencil; the animal seems to break the law of the diptych by passing
through the partition to straddle both sides. Its head is still draped in its now desiccated
skin, and the artist has placed a red feather in its mouth. By contrast, its body has been
picked clean, leaving behind only fish bones and fins resting flush on the piano score. In
his response, van Breedam is explicit about his environmental concerns: “every year
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nature—or what remains of it—brings forth plants and animals. Each year a great of
these die and perish.”25 This lamentable scenario nevertheless leads him to see an
opportunity, namely, that this perishing offers “a nearly unlimited arsenal of collage and
assemblage material.”26 This recognition of organic matter as proliferating material for art
is a recurrent theme in many of the artists’ responses for De l’animal, and it produces a
paradoxical and melancholic situation: the more the natural world degrades, the more raw
materials it offers for inclusion and reflection in object-making—including nonhuman
bodies supplied by species die-off. I refer to this feedback loop between environmental
ruin and art practices using the material results of this natural ruination as “negative
ecology.” This scenario reflects a key flaw in De l’animal’s thematization of animals and
the environment, since many of its artists betray an uncritical understanding of art making
as a relentless accumulation of animal life and organic matter.
In the catalog’s “Postface,” Renwart does not notice this paradoxical situation.
Instead, he celebrates the infinite possibilities of a “whole universe” now available for
artistic expression and liberty. Not only does his deregulated conception of art expand to
include any and all of the world’s “natural” materials, but also to the incorporation of
these into any [artistic] style.27 This ecological expansion of the readymade is reflected in
the bodies, skin, bones, skulls, feathers, shells, and panoply of other organic materials
littering the exhibition as pictorial elements, assemblage materials, or found objects.
When deployed in the service of environmental concerns, these repetitions of avant-garde
techniques—collage, readymade, objet trouvé, assemblage—raise important questions:
does the use of dead animal bodies in art redouble environmental crises in a melancholic
25
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echo of ecological crisis? Or, instead, does this reintegration of organic material represent
a form of recycling and thus a gesture of sustainability (though if that is the case, how can
a work of art be a form of recycling or sustainability, since whatever is sourced will
inherently stick and stop with the object)? Do repeating these timeworn strategies of the
historical avant-garde within a context of ecological questioning hold any promise for
addressing environmental problems, in the sense of jostling a public to meet the demands
of environmental crisis? Or, do they amount to a mere spectacularization of natural
elements?
By and large, many of these artists in De l’animal (and subsequent contemporary
practices today) do, in fact, redouble ecological violence by using dead animals.28 They
remain predicated on a humanist conception of the animal as a manipulable object
towards human ends, often resulting in an aesthetics of negative ecology and morbidity.
Many of the decaying and object-heavy works in the exhibition seem to be either
contradictory (using materials from the more-than-human world the artist is hoping to
protect or advocate) or, in hindsight, ineffectively focused on natural materials limited to
issues of form and artistic liberty (as Renwart’s text for the catalog demonstrates). For
these reasons, the few art practices (all by the younger generation of artists) in the
exhibition that incorporate living animal life in more process based and participatory
modes—which do not dead-end in simple object-making—appear to be more successful
instances of ecological thought in action.
2.2.2 ECOLOGY AND “RELATIONALITY”
28
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With its incorporation of bones, teeth, and skin, Jacques Lennep’s contribution to
de l’Animal, Le Talus, 1978, remains within a mode of negative ecology. [ill. 2.6] It is a
mixed media work in two parts: a vitrine comprising a number of objects displayed in a
taxonomic aesthetic of natural history and a kitschy oil painting of a forest landscape with
a walled-in stream of water in the foreground. In his response for the catalog, Lennep
lists some of the objects from Le Talus’s vitrine: “rabbit’s skin, an acorn, a rubber pipe, a
bike reflector, barbed wire, a cuttlefish’s bone, a sheep’s tooth, a jay’s feather…”29 This
enigmatic gathering of materials comes from his practice of excursions in nature: “I
gathered shells on the seashore, I made off with some birds’ eggs from a nest, I skinned a
hare, I picked up a frog flattened under a tyre, I looked for snails. Then, methodically like
an entomologist, I brought these remains of natural history face to face with our daily life
and its old photos and anecdotes. And I painted in memorial.”30 Since atavistic huntinggathering is coupled with the modernity of road kill, there is a hint of absurdity or
incongruence to this list. It is also presented as scientific field research, as if Lennep is
studying and assembling the natural history of a littered forest, in both its natural flora
and fauna along with the remnants of human, manufactured objects. In short, it is a
hybrid ecology of natural and techno-cultural objects in which naturalité has become
impossible to find.
This preoccupation with human imposition on nature and pollution is a defining
feature of Belgian artists in the 1970s and 80s who, like Lennep, became increasingly
occupied with environmental questions. As the art historian Johan Pas points out, a
number of Belgian artists and collectives in the 1970s and 80s began interrogating the
29
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destructive effects of the urban industrial landscape on the environment. Pas offers a
number of examples: Roger Raveel’s outdoor happenings and performances, including
riding on a raft with fake geese along the canals of Bruges; the plan put forth by the
Vrijie Aktie Groep Antwerpen (VAGA) to cease all car circulation in Antwerp and set up
greenery instead; Mass Moving’s collective work (which I discuss below); Luc Deleu’s
Orbaniste Manifesto from 1980, which envisions a form of architecture more in tune with
ecology and sustainability (which often includes projects for nonhuman animal life in
urban spaces); and, in general, the rise of readymade and assemblage techniques (so
evident in de l’Animal) as forms of recycling.31
Pas also mentions Lennep’s group exhibition of French and Belgian artists from
1977 titled Le Jardin. Lectures et Relations and the founding of his own Group CAP
(Cercle d’Art Prospectif) in 1972 (a collective that includes the artists Pierre Cortois,
Pierre Hubert, and Jacques Lizène, who all appear in de l’Animal) as important
precedents. In 1981, Lennep and Group CAP published a collection of essays stemming
from these activities—with contributions from artists, scientists, philosophers, and
specialists in various fields—all focusing on the concept of relationality: Relation and
relation: a contribution to the idea and attitude of the relational.32 This collection of texts
precedes the curator Nicholas Bourriaud’s well-known theorizing of relational aesthetics
in the nineties, who himself credits the ecosophical theories of Félix Guattari as a key
influence.33 Published by Yellow Now, a gallery turned cinema journal and early
champion of the Group CAP artists, Relation and relation wears its ecological
31
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perspective on its sleeve (for example, the opening essay is a short history of ecology by
the scientist Pascal Acot), but includes a multidisciplinary presentation on the concept of
relation in art, biology, philosophy, and theories of communication. 34
In his introduction to Relation and relation (taking the form of a letter to the
editor) Lennep references a number of contemporaneous thinkers who point towards a
conception of art as relation, including Claude Lévi Strauss, Michel Serres, and JeanFrançois Lyotard. Lennep draws on these theories of relationality that posit the artwork
less as a static, individuated object, but more as a network of elements open to change
and susceptible to mutual modification within a dynamic structure. Umberto Eco’s theory
of the “open work” is especially important in this regard, as Lennep writes: “As principle
of creation, it implies the intervention of the spectator, an interaction between the work
and the subject that perceives it – in short, appealing to the environment that implicates
zones of indetermination.”35 This primacy of relationality is made unambiguously clear as
it pertains to the changing role of the artist and the work: “As a consequence, the
phenomena of participation is intensified, the status of the artist is modified towards the
transdisciplinary, and his work now embraces the environment (in its broadest sense that
includes the sociological and even technologies heretofore unspecified).”36
Two features of Lennep’s understanding of relationality in art should be
emphasized: the role of the spectator as direct participant, and the role of the work as
34
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encompassing the environment in its broadest sense (akin to Stengers’s expanded notion
of ecology). While his own contribution to de l’Animal does not completely fit these
criteria, certain works documented in the exhibition do demonstrate an interest in
ecological relation in more performative terms, which evince Lennep’s notion of
relationality more fully; not only through the “indeterminate zones” of viewer
participation, but in the indeterminacy of the animals often included whose processes and
agencies are central features of the work.
In order to bring out the complexities and implications of relational works
involving animals I will discuss the five most pertinent examples from De l’Animal,
beginning with Philippe de Luyck’s Création d’un territoire pour 4 serpents au moyen
d’un champ calorifique, 1974. [ill. 2.7] The work comprises four snakes set free in a
designated area filled with sand under four heating lamps. As the serpents move sideways
across the sand, curved lines are produced as a result of their bodily movements
(photographs of this installation document these movements). In the catalogue, de Luyck
quotes Wassily Kandinsky: “Each type of line seeks an appropriate means to allow its
own realization and that, according to a basic economy: a minimum of effort for a
maximum result.”37 By outsourcing and inducing movement through temperature, the
artists draws a parallel between the painterly human line and the line-making of
nonhumans, making visible a commonality between human and nonhuman for making
their mark on the world.
In more ecologically open terms, Daniel Dutriuex’s L’inestimable toit se cache,
ailée l’éclipse (The Incalculable Roof Hides Itself, Winged Eclipse, 1984) has the artist
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photographing 20 turtles on top of the Solwaster Dolmen in Belgium—a large, horizontal
slab of stone thought to be a Neolithic grave marker. [ill. 2.8] In L’uniforme point
s’ecarte sévère le temps (The Uniform Dot Moves Away Strict Time, 1984), Dutriuex
performed a similar operation in the cemetery at Malmédy (also in Belgium) though this
time with 23 snails. [ill. 2.9] In both instances, the animals have been arranged to “spell”
out their species name in braille code (amounting either to redundancy, since a blind
person would only need to pick up one of the turtles or snails to know what it is, or to
futility, since the photograph documenting their coded arrangement can only be seen).
These works can be related to Dutriuex’s Chien de Vue, 1979, a 12-minute video work
that follows a blind man being led through city streets (most likely those of Liege,
Belgium) by his service dog.38 The intersubjective tandem of human and nonhuman
safely navigate pedestrian crossings and traffic with the cacophonous din of works in the
background. So in Dutrieux’s work, blindness or a de-privileging of sight rests on a
privileging of senses and relations more commonly associated with animality, such as
touching and hearing, or on a surrogate nonhuman vision.
Jean-Marie Gheerardyn’s work takes a different approach. In 1980, he began
breeding common houseflies, an experiment that culminated in his Tableau Experimental,
1982-84. [ill. 2.10-11] The work is two-fold: the first component is the animal breeding,
as documented by photographs showing beakers of various sizes filled with black masses
of living and/or dead flies in the artist’s studio. The second component is the “tableau,” a
flat pictorial surface of “1.40 m by 1 with dead flies stuck one next to another.”39 The
resulting “painting” has a similar appearance to Broodthaers’ more celebrated mussel
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paintings: a dark, teaming, encrusted field of jumbled textures and wings protruding from
the pictorial surface in all directions.40 In this respect, rather than incorporate the automovements of animals directly in a work, Gheerardyn exploits the auto-generating
process of insects in order to re-produce the bare medium for a pictorial practice (a
practice that remains in a mode of negative ecology, since it lets live simply in order to
use the flies as raw material).
The contributions to de l’Animal by Jacques Lizène and the artist collective Mass
Moving’s are perhaps most in keeping with Lennep’s definition of relationality. Lizène’s
installation Pièce pour un eventual visituer de l’espece canine (Piece for an Eventual
Visitor to a Space for Canines), 1974-75 was first proposed for Galerie Lucien Bilinelli,
Brussels [ill. 2.12] The catalog reproduces the purposely crude schematic drawing plans
detailing the installation: the cross-section of a gallery space shows a dog entering from
the left and coming upon audio equipment on the floor—a speaker, a cassette recorder,
and amplifier, and a microphone. The floor moldings along the base of the walls have
been painted to look like bricks using paint specified to simulate the odor of “dog shit.”41
Lizène’s description of his installation’s elements and operations emphasize the relational
characteristics of the work as dependent on human and nonhuman animal interaction:
The work is complete only when several dog visitors are present, and only when
the smell of the shit paint prompts them to defecate on the sand, and when they
gnaw on the bone, provoked by the sound of gnawing, an accompanying sound
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This is like Dubuffet and much latter Damien Hirst, though in Gheerardyn the breeding and course of the
life of his insects are part of the work.
41
Lizène realized such paintings using actual fecal painted bricks a number of times in the 1970s, including
Mur à la crotte de chien, 1977.
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piece of music (imitating inopportune barking over an electronic rhythm) prerecorded on a cassette player.42
Lizène’s proposed installation intended to immerse the human visitor in an environment
more fit for the phenomenological capacity of a dog, albeit as a cheeky gesture or ironic
instigation. In all likelihood, Lizène’s reasons for such a work has more to do with
mocking the conventions of the art world and its art critics (a recurrent preoccupation in
his œuvre).43 Nonetheless, if taken seriously, Pièce pour un eventual visituer de l’espece
canine presents a posthumanist space that privileges nonhuman over human being,
forcing the latter to negotiate a space whose sounds, smells, and spatial orientation are
more attuned to the former.
Mass Moving’s collective work offers a more sincere and socially engaged
approach, one explicitly aligned with environmental politics. Active from 1969 to 1976
(whereupon the collective disbanded and ordered the destruction of its archives), Mass
Moving was an association of artists working in tandem on various “concepts,” “projects,”
and “actions.” Their ideas and strategies were often repeated across multiple site-reactive
iterations.44 In her study of the collective’s activities, the Belgian art historian Catherine
Leclercq describes Mass Moving as a “living cell,” situating itself outside institutional
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“L’œuvre n’est pas complète que si un ou plusieurs chines sont présents, et qu l’odeur de la peinture à la
crotte les incide à déféquer sur le sable, et qu’ils rongent l’os, provoquant par le bruit de rongement, un
accompagnement sonore à la piece musicale (imitation d’aboiements intempestifes sur rythme
électronique) pré-enregistrée sur un lecteur de cassette.” Atelier 340, 265.
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In the catalog for De l’Animal, Lizéne includes a mock review positioning himself as an art critic
evaluating his own work. In this text, the artist hails the mediocrity of “Jacques Lizène” as a necessary and
humorous critique of the serious conventions of art history. In this sense, Lizène is almost certainly
influenced by Broodthaers’s sense of humor, especially the latter’s self-professed desire to make work that
is insincere.
44
In this regard, Mass Moving is an interesting precursor to the Danish collective Superflex, who similarly
conceive their collaborative works as recurring, site-specific projects they designate as “tools.”
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norms, and above all privileging restless movement and non-identity.45 LecClercq
positions the group within a post-68 discourse of political and ecological engagement
with a revolutionary sensibility of collectivity and guerilla-style provocation that solicits
spontaneous participation.46
Among the group’s more visible “actions” was its Butterfly Project from 1972,
realized in two locations: Venice and Tokyo. For Venice (as part of the Belgian
contribution to that year’s Biennale), Mass Moving built a large incubator in the Piazza
San Marco so to breed some 10,000 Pieris brassicae on site—otherwise known as the
cabbage butterfly. This large, white butterfly with dark-tipped wings is pictured on the
pamphlets disseminated by the group to the public in order to explain the project. [ill.
2.13] The incubator appeared as a massive cocoon made of polyurethane in the shape of
an irregular peanut shell seven meters high, possessing a dominating presence in the open
square (as seen in the surviving archival materials documenting the project as a
contribution in De l’Animal). [ill. 2.14] Fitted with temperature controls, along with
photometric and hydrometric measurements, the incubator featured a closed-circuit live
video feed on its outside from which the outside spectator could see inside its controlled
environment. Once the gestation period reached a certain point of development, the
incubator was opened releasing a mass of butterflies into the square—and ultimately, into
the environs of Venice. For the concurrent action in Tokyo, three “butterfly bombs” were
constructed and “detonated” across three different locations: outside a bank, a metro
station, and inside a busy commercial center. For this iteration in Japan, the breeding was
45

While the collective worked largely anonymously, today we know a number of its group members,
including Raphaël Opstaele, a graphic artist, Helen Pink, a theatre performer, and Jef De Groote, an
architect. See Catherine Leclercq and Devillez Virginie, Mass Moving: un aspect de l'art contemporain en
Belgique (Bruxelles: Éditions Labor : Dexia, 2004), 14-21.
46
Ibid., 18.
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done in collaboration with a local population residing in the Chiba prefecture just outside
Tokyo, and ultimately transferred into the makeshift boxes timed to open up on all sides
so to release the butterflies inside unharmed. [ill. 2.15] As an eco-terrorist subversion of
violent explosions, these “bombs” emitted delicate winged creatures instead of shrapnel
or radiation.
Mass Moving’s Butterfly Project holds certain affinities with Gheeradyn’s
Tableau Experimental, since both involve the breeding of insects as process and medium.
Both problematize the distinction between nature and culture: an insect’s reproductive
system and capacity for auto-movement and flight are natural insofar as they are not manmade, yet the controlled aspect of this process in breeding and the displacement of its
results can more properly be called cultural (not to mention biopolitical, since the artists
maintain the right to preside over these life processes). However, there remains a crucial
difference at the level of the system of delivery: whereas Gheeradyn fixed his insects
onto a traditional pictorial plane, Mass Moving released their butterflies within a much
larger and more ecologically open setting where they could thrive and integrate
themselves into the environment. In this regard, the Butterfly Project in Venice caused a
four-fold reaction from various disciplinary domains: it was denounced as a
disfigurement of the historic architecture along the Piazza San Marco (and indeed a
number of photographs attest to an aesthetics of infestation); it became a question of
public hygiene for the police; it was challenged by animal protectionist leagues
concerned with the well-being of the butterflies; and lastly, it caught the attention of
ecologists who warned of harmful consequences to natural eco-systems of Venice and its
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surroundings.47 In short, the Butterfly Project became imbricated within four different and
sometimes mutually exclusive discourses: aesthetic, socio-political, ethical, and
ecological. As an environmental gesture and provocation, the Butterfly Project manifests
quite perfectly Stengers’s expanded notion of ecology a site of multiplicity, disparate
causalities, and unintentional creations of meaning that are never simply natural.
Standing back from these five examples in De l’animal, some claims can be made
concerning the incorporation of animal life as a performative strategy: 1) there is a
recourse to nonhuman agency that reacts to a given situation in auto-movement; 2) this
nonhuman agency is privileged, whether aesthetically, phenomenologically, ecologically,
or otherwise; 3) the animal is outsourced as mode of creation whereby its living traces or
bio-reproductive capacities are modes of process art; and 4) there is a staging of points
one, two, and three within a given ecological context from which the artist only has
partial control over the results. In Mass Moving’s Butterfly Project in Venice, for
example, when the incubator in the Piazza San Marco was finally opened, many of the
butterflies initially opted to remain in the coolness of its inside rather than venture out
into the Venetian summer heat. Unlike the chance operations found in the historical
avant-garde (like Surrealist automatism), such an unforeseen eventuality is not purely
aleatory, but in fact only quasi-aleatory. Inherent to incorporating animals and their automovements in an installation is a certain degree of calculation on the part of the animal—
be it conscious and mindful, or instinctual and reactive—that remains only partially
unpredictable or unforeseeable. The cold-blooded embodiment of four snakes will dictate
their movements on sand under heat lamps; a grouping of turtles or snails will be
47

In response to this last charge, during their project Mass Moving consulted with entomologists and
experts who deemed the butterflies to be anodyne in relation to the Venetian eco-system. See ibid., 112.
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determined by the social behavior of their species; the life span of the common house fly,
along with its reproductive capacity and bodily size, partially dictate the feasibility and
limitations of its use as a pictorial medium; the phenomenological capacity of a dog will
allow for certain engagements in a space prepared for its being and not others; and the
collective preferences of a kaleidoscope of butterflies will dictate their auto-movements
and reactions to a foreign, urban setting. In short, pure chance is undercut by animal
behavior, volition, and agency so central to these strategies—amounting not to an erosion
of human authorship, but to a displacement of intent onto nonhuman agency (which, as
man of the practices demonstrates, falls into a danger of reducing the human-nonhuman
relation to biopolitical control).
Like much of the body and performance art practices of the 1960s and 70s, these
works involving nonhuman performers are mediated and exhibited by secondary archival
and photographic documentation in De l’animal. The animals in these works cannot be
thought of as found objects, but must be understood as materials in a process that features
the development, preferences, and inclinations of a lived body. In all these instances, the
artist’s body does not appear and plays a role only behind-the-scenes as stager of
situations. For this reason, it is helpful to think of these nonhuman performances as a
precursor to the art historian Claire Bishop’s theorization of “delegated performances.”48
According to Bishop’s analysis of delegated performances, which begins in the 1990s, an
artist will often hire a non-professional actor or specialist who gives their consent to
48

As with so much human activity, the nonhuman test subject often sets a precedent for human trials. In
this respect, it is telling that Mass Moving’s Butterfly Project leads directly to the collective’s subsequent
participatory actions titled Human Incubation, 1972-4, which involved cocooning human by-standers in a
web of plastic string for a duration left open to the participants’ will. See chapter 8 “Delegated
Performance: Outsourcing Authenticity” in Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the
Politics of Spectatorship (London; New York: Verso Books, 2012), 219-40. I argue that the nonhuman
animal performer is a missing part of this genealogy of delegated performances.
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inhabit a prescribed situation set out by the artist. In many cases, the situation hopes to
make manifest the enlisted performer’s socio-economic category in order to critique its
conventionally devalued position in social politics. These two aspects of a delegated
human performance—consent and performing a socio-economic category—are
ostensibly not applicable to nonhuman precedents.49
Nonetheless, there are fundamental ways in which delegated human and
nonhuman performances coincide. While a nonhuman cannot be a specialist in a
designated field, nothing bars an animal from being a non-professional actor in a cultural
setting. This precedent has already been set in the history of photography and film—
Eadweard Muybridge’s anonymous nonhumans in Animal Locomotion (1872-85) or the
donkey in Robert Bresson’s Au Hazard Balthazar (1966) being two of many salient
examples—not to mention in the long histories of zoological gardens and colonial
exhibitions. These nonhuman delegated performances equally entail an unremunerated
actor, one who may not be aware that it acts him or herself in an art context, but who
performs nonetheless to varying degrees of direction, coercion, and framing.50 If in
Bishop’s first typology of delegated performances “artists are exhibiting and exploiting
other subjects,” it would only be natural that the exploitation of animal subjects, to
whatever degree, offers a precedent for art that can be found much further back in social
49

While Mass Moving involved entomologists in their Butterfly Projects, these specialists remain outside
the frame of the performance. The contracted nature of delegated human performances seems to preclude
the animal as well, since any clear consent between human artist and nonhuman performer entails a far
more complex intersubjective situation. Additionally, while certain animal species are patently devalued in
the same way certain socio-economic classes or genders are, nonhuman animals cannot perform their
category in the same way as, for example, a homeless person, an immigrant, or a prostitute can. In these
three instances, to compare a human and nonhuman delegated performance appears imperfect.
50
Perhaps the first use of a delegated nonhuman in avant-garde practice was Roland Dorgelès prank of
attaching a paintbrush to a donkey’s tale and submitting the painting to the Salon des Indépendants in 1910.
This would inspire Francis Picabia’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to simply display a living animal (a
monkey) as a work of art. See George Baker, The Artwork Caught by the Tail: Francis Picabia and Dada
in Paris (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007), 98-9.
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history (alongside the exploitation of labor, women, and the ethnic other).51 This first
typology of delegation is often after an “authentic” subject, one who certifies both the
artist and the performed situation as credible, genuine, and real.52 If non-professional
actors lend the artist and the performance a level of “authenticity” the artist could never
embody on her own, then using nonhuman bodies similarly lends a level of authenticity
or rawness.53 This is true for whatever the impulse or desired effect, but most especially
when the animal performer is meant to be metonymic of an environmental issue. In this
way, a nonhuman animal does perform its socio-ecological category—and one might
even argue a socio-economic category after all, since animals can be seen to perform the
base commodification of life common to human and nonhuman subjects alike, arriving at
“species” as the baseline biopolitical category of instrumentalization.
Installations that delegate the creative energies of nonhuman life hold the
possibility for a positive ecology: rather than the negative ecology of understanding
animal life as endangered and exploited and simply redoubling this endangerment and
exploitation, a positive ecology troubles this categorical understanding of animals by
allowing for the performance of surprising traits, habits, attitudes, and relations outside
the norm. Clearly, the ideas stemming from this meeting place between the theorization
of delegated performance and the animals incorporated in De l’animal holds heuristic
value for any use of living animals in contemporary art contexts today. It also begins to
explain the correlation between the concept of relationality in the 1970s and ‘80s and
those artists initially associated with relational aesthetics in the ‘90s—most especially
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Pierre Huyghe and Carsten Höller, who quite consciously incorporate the animal in novel
ways in their respective works.54
In hindsight, De l’animal’s interest in animality is double and paradoxical: while
the organizers maintain the concept of naturalité as a morphological figure—as
unadulterated materiality in art—many of the artists incorporating the lived animal
understand this naturalness as not only simple matter, but as a process, and in some
instances, as a nonhuman agency at work that undercuts the ideologically “natural”
understanding of animal life to begin with. This is the most posthumanist dimension of
De l’animal: as an exhibition taking its cue from prior inclusions of live animals in art
(especially in Beuys, Haacke, and Arte Povera) it represents a shift away from an
anthropocentric view of movement, process, agency, and creativity in art, and a form of
de-authoring that allows animal life to take over. This de-naturalization of animals as
ecological collaborators or co-producers would be far from natural, ironically enough in
light of the curatorial emphasis on wildness. This is further paradoxical in the examples
that clearly scramble the codes of nature/culture—including the work of Marcel
Broodthaers, Yves de Smet, and Dominique Ampe who each in their own manner go
beyond any steadfast division between naturalité and human endeavors.55 [ill. 2.16-7] I
now turn to an exhibition that thematized a similar form of nonhuman agency, though
from the opposite direction of biotechnology and artificial intelligence. However, this too
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Pierre Huyghe has often incorporated nonhuman animals in his various undertakings (dogs and bees at
dOCUMENTA 13 in 2012, for example). Carsten Holler and Rosemarie Trockel’s installation A House for
Pigs and People at dOCUMENTA 10 in 1997 is another salient example.
55
De l’Animal exhibited a number of Broodthaers’s works—from his eggshell constructions and mussel
paintings to his male femur bone. I examine his work in the following chapter. Yves de Smet contributed
animal hides onto which the words ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ have been either printed or branded. The work of
Dominique Ampe, like that of Panamarenko, involves a mix of organic, animal elements fixed to
technological, kinetic constructions (most recurrently, pairs of bird feathers attached to battery power by
wire conduit).
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will bring us back to the nonhuman animal—not as paradigm of natural process, but as
the purported bareness and controllability of life itself.
2.3 LES IMMATÉRIAUX
If De l’Animal at Atelier 345 privileged wildness and the environment, then Les
Immatériaux at the Centre Georges Pompidou from the same year seemed to privilege
their opposites: artificiality, technoscience, and the immateriality of the postindustrial
urban condition.56 This now canonical exhibition was a collective undertaking
spearheaded by the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard and the design historian Thierry
Chaput. While De l’Animal has had almost no critical afterlife, Les Immatériaux enjoys a
lasting presence in contemporary art history, even if little visual documentation remains.57
The initial reception, as reflected in reviews by art historian John Rajchman, among
others, focuses on its status as a postmodern exhibition relishing the simulacra, the death
of the author, the scrambling of high/low and art/non-art, and the heterotopic and multinarrative condition of a postmodernity that today has largely fallen away from critical
attention. More recently, Les Immatériaux has been linked to relational aesthetics as an
important precursor and influence, as well as to the advent of new media in an
institutional setting and the rise of the curator as a central figure in contemporary art.58
In what follows I shift the discussion towards two different frames: first, I place
Les Immatériaux within the recent philosophical trajectory of biopolitical thought. While
Lyotard is not commonly associated with biopolitics, his exhibition at the Pompidou can
56

Les Immatériaux was held at the Pompidou from March 28 to July 15, 1985.
The continuing interest in this exhibition is reflected in the conference Landmark Exhibitions:
Contemporary Art Shows Since 1968 at Tate Modern in October 2008, in which a revisiting of Les
Immatériaux was prominent. The conference presentations were published in Tate Papers no.12,
Autumn 2009.
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In his novel reading of Les Immatériaux, which analyses the viewer’s bodily experience of the exhibition,
Kiff Bamford maintains that hitherto the “interest in the exhibition relates mainly to the display of new
technologies and the rise of the curator’s importance.” Bamford, 77.
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be understood today as a technocratic biopolitician’s dream. Les Immatériaux is an
exhibition that exerted a great amount of control on the body of its audience, all while
displaying various objects, machines, and innovations that themselves aid in the
management of bodies—even if this control was not immediately apparent in the general
confusion of the exhibition’s open-ended layout (various “zones” made up of sixty-one
different “sites”). Understanding this novel form of biopolitical control will be central to
my reconsideration of Les Immatériaux. In so doing, I not only enlist Deleuze’s late essay
“Postscript on the Societies of Control” from 1990, which holds striking parallels with
Lyotard’s exhibition, but also a subset of biopolitical thought that interrogates the role of
immunology on the social body.
Secondly, my discussion shifts to Lyotard’s concept of the “inhuman” so central
to the exhibition’s display (as already signaled in the introduction to this chapter). In the
exhibition, the inhuman arrives in the form of the bio-technosciences that invade and
dissolve the integrity and identity of the human body and ego. In an accelerationist key,
Les Immatériaux exacerbated and pushed this technoscientific inhumanism on the visitor
to its fullest (or, at least, to what was then technologically possible). Yet there is another
side of the inhuman at work in Lyotard’s writings, one that serves as antidote to its
controlling, technocratic doppelganger without returning to an unwanted, naïve
humanism. This antidote comes in the form of the infans or child who predates the human
before falling under the formative control of technology, language, and law. For Lyotard,
this inhuman is aligned with a number of terms: the “figural,” the “incommensurable,”
the “affect-phrase,” or the “differend.” In each case, this infans is an excess that cannot
be sufficiently contained by symbolic language and humanist paradigms.
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As recent developments in animal studies demonstrates, this version of the
inhuman as transgressive infans cannot be easily divorced from that other nonhuman
entity that clings to the human before its subsumption into humanist subjectivization –
namely, the human as animal. Although Lyotard considered and ultimately resisted the
nonhuman animal as an inhuman instance of the figural, the incommensurable, the
affective, or the differend, I contend that nonhuman animal life haunts Les Immatériaux
in a number of ways. This is true not only in its by-and-large absence from the
exhibition’s technoscientific display, which ultimately serves to show how much biotechnoscience works to replace the animal body. But it is also true in the ways in which
Les Immatériaux’s biopolitical control over the audience is predicated on the human as
animal, as an organism fit for immunological supports and extensions, genetic decoding,
and as that which is always already present as a libidinal basis for the subject’s
subordination to control. This position is in keeping with Foucault’s oft-cited formulation
from 1976, which has become the point of departure for biopolitical discourse today:
“For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the
additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics
places his existence as a living being in question.”59 In short, if the animal returns from its
banishment in an immaterial post-industrial landscape, it returns largely through what the
nonhuman shares with the human animal as an ambulating, sentient subject in a shared
ecological space of control whose politics places its bios at its center.
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Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume 1, An Introduction, 143. This often-quoted passage comes
from the book’s last section titled “Right of Death and Power over Life.” As Timothy Campbell and Adam
Sitze demonstrate, this section launched a new understanding of politics and life, leading to today’s
“biopolitical turn.” See See Timothy C. Campbell and Adam Sitze, "Biopolitics: An Encounter," in
Biopolitics: A Reader, ed. Timothy C. Campbell and Adam Sitze (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013),
3-4.
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2.3.2 BIOPOLITICS OF CONTROL IN LES IMMATÉRIAUX
In discussing Les Immatériaux it has become a rhetorical trope to mention
Lyotard’s formative experiences on United States highways as an ecological inspiration
for the display—both the postmodernist nebula of driving around Los Angeles and the
changing radio frequencies that mark space and time along its Eastern seaboard. This new
geographical given is a postindustrial smooth space of disorientation and overexposure.60
Kim Bamford finds the impetus for the inclusion of headphones and short-wave radio
signals in Lyotard’s exhibition in these highway origin stories.61 These headphones were
offered (for a small, non-optional fee) to the viewer before entering into the space. They
did not so much help the visitor navigate Les Immatériaux’s zones, however, so much as
supply an overabundance of information and seemingly unrelated audio content.
Additionally, unlike the liberal agency entailed by today’s audio headpieces in museums
(where one can pause or skip ahead), the visitors’ experiences were at the whim and
locational trigger of the infrared signals of the exhibition space.62
The performative aspect of the audience in headphones in a space of endless
adjustments beyond the audience’s full agency recalls Deleuze’s near-contemporaneous
essay “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” Taking his cue from Foucault’s history of
disciplinary societies, Deleuze posits an updated paradigm of social organization.
Disciplinary societies entail enclosures, which Deleuze analogizes with the digging of a
mole. Societies of control, on the other hand, operate via open spaces of modulation,
which Deleuze analogizes with the recursive and elusive movements of a snake. If
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disciplinary societies subordinate the body through demarcations and barriers, then
societies of control envelop the body “like a self-deforming cast that will continuously
change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from
point to point.”63 Experiencing Les Immatériaux must have felt less like the disciplinary
space of a traditional (modern) museum, and more like the nebulous ecology of
Deleuze’s more open form of social control. Lyotard describes this expectation in a 1985
interview:
[w]e wanted to…discover a more fluid and immaterial system for the organization
of space. So, instead of walls, we’ll have a system of webbings that will be
stretched from floor to ceiling, and the ways in which they’re lighted will permit
us to vary the distances that the eye can cover and to modulate the indications that
ought to be followed, but without being prescriptive, since many of the sites we’ll
be building will be in the form of intersections that allow one then to go off in any
number of directions.64
By-and-large unbeknownst to the visitor, her body became imbricated within this fluid
system of sensors that tracked position, fed content through headphones, and generally
held the visitor in modulated control from point to point. Each visitor was given a
magnetic card that kept track the sequence of zones visited; visitors were also encouraged
to provide feedback on their experience of the exhibition at computer terminals in situ
(one of the few lasting images of Les Immatériaux is a middle-aged man in a trench coat
at one of these terminals with Nam June Paik’s TV Buddha in the background [ill. 2.18]
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).65 So, while the space invited a certain amount of aleatory involvement on the part of the
viewer, this had the effect of dissimulating the power of the space and its more
diaphanous forms of control. In his review, Rajchman presciently understood this aspect
of Les Immatériaux, noting that “[o]ne could not ‘participate’ in this theater because one
was already part of it.”66 So immersed in her triggered surroundings, no gap or distance
was available to the viewer for more purposive and autonomous engagement. In this way,
Lyotard’s exhibition is an exemplary instance of these newer forms of control Deleuze
presciently warnings against.67
Many of the novel bio-technoscientific developments outlined in Deleuze’s essay
from 1990 were already on display in the Pompidou in 1985. From advanced
pharmaceuticals, to molecular engineering, genetic manipulation, and digital
computing—all of these inhuman immaterials are well represented in Les Immatériaux.
The “Inventaire,” one of the components of Les Immatériaux’s non-traditional catalog
that archives multiple visual and textual components, is a set of album leaves in a box
assembling and reproducing all the “zones” of the exhibition, which themselves
comprised multiple “sites.” As Lyotard makes clear in his curatorial text related to the
exhibition (though not included in its unorthodox catalog), these immaterials not only
challenge the sovereign position of “man” as “master and possessor of nature,” but these
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inhuman dispositifs alter the a priori nature and identity of the human itself.68 This loss of
mastery over the environment is redoubled in the viewer’s experience of the exhibition
space: in perpetual neuronal engagement while continually controlled by an enveloping
technoscientific display.
Les Immatériaux, then, was a bio-techno eco-system that completely immersed
the viewer and problematized any clear distinction between human subject and inhuman
apparatus. If I read a certain affinity between the accelerationist tendencies of Lyotard’s
exhibition as implementing an array of techniques that augur what Deleuze diagnosed as
a society of control, then Les Immatériaux is not an emancipatory project but in fact its
opposite: a project of enclosure whereby the medium of control and containment
becomes hidden or is misunderstood as progress and choice. Lyotard’s many cautions
about the dangers of technoscience and the limits of enlightenment as emancipation
bolsters this reading of his exhibition. It is telling that, if Les Immatériaux represents a
society of control in miniature, then its subjects can move about freely in modulation all
without being any less confined. It is striking to contextualize this strategy within the
history of zoological displays across the twentieth century, which makes great effort to
mask or erase any signs of containment, enclosure, and the separation between humans
and nonhumans.69 In fact, throughout the “Postscript,” Deleuze makes a number of
allusions to animals, domestication, and breeding. In language that describes Les
Immatériaux and modern zoological gardens equally well, he critiques their capacity for
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dissimulated control in human-animal terms: “The conception of a control mechanism,
giving the position of any element within an open environment at any given instant
(whether animal in a reserve or human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar), is
not necessarily one of science fiction”70 Rajchman’s incisive observation that one could
not participate in the exhibition because one was already in it now takes on a slightly
different air: like an animal in an integrated techno-zoological environment, one can only
perform either unintentionally or without choice. In this sense, the ostensibly
participatory aspects of Les Immatériaux are not so much a marker of progress and
innovation as much as the generalization of a bio-zoologic mechanism of control that
covers its own tracks in its own experience.
2.3.3 BIOPOLITICS OF IMMUNITY IN LES IMMATÉRIAUX
One of the consequences of being a site of control is that Les Immatériaux can
equally be interpreted as a site of protection and security. The positive obverse of the
zoological and biopolitical is the lure of being subject to the pampered spaces of
immunity, which keeps its inhabitants alive and thriving through various techniques.71
Natalie Heinrich’s sociological research into audience reception is telling in this regard.
After conducting a sample demographic survey of visitors to Les Immatériaux in realtime, Heinrich concluded that those visitors who were able to properly navigate the
exhibition’s technological makeup (including being able to pay for headphones) felt “at
home” in the space, while those who were unable to, had to “rely on the cryptic
references provided to navigate the exhibition space, [and] experienced a sense of unease,
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of loss, and occasionally felt threatened or even deceived.”72 If, as Deleuze claims,
societies of control are predicated on code words and passwords that keep some flowing
while others barred, Heinrich’s survey elicits a similar sort of social situatedness in Les
Immatériaux.
This sense of feeling “at home” in an exhibition recalls Surrealist theories of
architecture, specifically, Tristan Tzara’s uncanny paradigm of intra-uterine or wombic
comfort. Lyotard was particularly influenced by Duchamp for Les Immatériaux’s
ambience, most notably by the latter’s room design for the 1938 International Surrealist
Exhibition [ill. 2.19]. Lyotard’s inclusion of olfactory emissions (emanating from several
displays featuring artificial comestibles, along from the catalog itself, also infused with
an odor) were a conscious nod to Duchamp’s installation of a multitude of hanging coal
sacks and the presence of coffee and dead leaves in the gallery space.73 In turn, Duchamp
was influenced by one of the few Surrealist documents contending directly with
architectural space – namely, Tzara’s “D’un certain Automatisme du Goût” in the journal
Minotaure.74 After Tzara, the Surrealist sense of space was radicalized in opposition to
the hygienic cleanliness of modernist architecture, preferring an ambience of organic and
uncanny womblike dwelling. As might already be indicated by Tzara’s fascination with
the vulva (pictured in Minotaure by the indent on the head of a men’s brimmed hat), his
architectural paradigm was one of becoming-maternal, or even, becoming-mammal, in a
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pre-natal zone of organic immunity and protection from the geometric severity of
modernist space.
The architectural historian Anthony Vidler describes Tzara’s Surrealist intrauterine spaces as “dark, tactile and soft,” and as imitating the “self-constructed shelters of
childhood.”75 Lyotard’s interest in the subversive, pre-formative stage of childhood
resonates with this pre-natal architectural theories. In affinity for these architectural ideas,
the entryway vestibule of Les Immatériaux operated as such an intra-uterine space. Even
before entering the display’s sixty-one sites, the visitor was initially enveloped by the
darkness of a corridor. By walking through this entryway, from which sounds of heart
pumping and blood rushing was heard all around in the corridor, the visitor was born into
the space in mammalian propulsion.76
If I find a Surrealist correspondence between Tzara, Duchamp, and Lyotard, their
different intentions are nevertheless historically distinct. Vidler describes Tzara’s
privileging of the womb as functioning through a double intention: “On the one hand, the
return to archetypal forms marks an identification with the origins of civilization and an
explicit critique of its technological results, human and material; on the other, the notion
of womb as origin, displays a familiarity with Freudian explanations of desire and the
repressed or displaced routes of homesickness.”77 Tzara, then, is fundamentally atavistic
and nostalgic for a Neolithic maternalism that is updated by an uncanny pre-Oedipal
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stage of psychoanalysis.78 In Lyotard and Chaput’s treatment, his recourse to intra-uterine
experience is similarly regressive and embodied, yet this body has now become partially
ironic: if Surrealist architecture was a pushback against the hygienic sterility of modernist
architecture, then Lyotard détourns this legacy in order to offer a womblike experience
that opens onto the patently cyborg landscape of Les Immatériaux. Whereas Tzara’s
inter-uterine experience is a form of uterine escape, Lyotard’s treatment funnels the
spectator into a disorienting phenomenological space of bio-digital hybridity.
In the middle of this historical correspondence is Duchamp: if his 1938 room culls
from the productive energies of the industrial revolution (caffeine and coal), then
Lyotard’s environment culls from specifically post-industrial bio-technical innovations.
In all three cases the concept of immunity is operative: Tzara’s space is a primitivist and
protective space of immunity, and is essentially pre-industrial; Duchamp’s
immunological space is buffered by modernity, in both brew and energy source, and is
essentially industrial79; Lyotard’s Les Immatériaux offers its form of immunity through
bio-technical supplements and bionic engagements through information and code, and is
essentially post-industrial. It is clear, however, that only Duchamp and Lyotard
understand the double-edged nature of their immunological spaces in historical terms.
The supplements of industry and post-industry keep society running in perpetual progress,
yet while their techniques may be life-extending and protective, they can also be stifling,
controlling, and ultimately deleterious to health. If Tzara theorizes an architectural theory
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to combat technological modernity through atavistic escape, Duchamp—and even more
so, Lyotard—engage their respective industrial and postindustrial situations through a
critical embrace and acceleration of even those deleterious affects on their exhibition’s
inhabitants.
These observations on the double-edged nature of bio-social immunity map onto
what the philosopher Roberto Esposito diagnoses as the central enigma of biopolitics as
both giver and taker of life: “Either biopolitics produces subjectivity or it produces death.
Either it makes the subject its own object or it decisively objectifies it. Either it is a
politics of life or a politics over life.”80 As Esposito lays out, this biopolitical discourse
has its beginnings in the 1930s, especially in early biological and ethological writings in
Germany: the biopolitical nexus of subjectivization/death finds its ultimate and darkest
realization in the Nazi ideology of biology and species-race difference. 81 This
“thanatopolitics” (what Esposito calls the deathly obverse of biopolitics) is alluded to
starkly in Les Immatériaux. Rajchman recalls the morbid juxtaposition of Muybridge’s
photographs from Animal Locomotion (1887) alongside a film of Nazi anatomical
dissection as part of human extermination.82 The Inventaire reproduces four photographs
from Animal Locomotion—two of a naked man first standing straight before a brick wall
and then contrapposto, and two of a woman looking down and walking naked towards the
camera [ill. 2.20]. In addition to the film (Jospeh Losey’s Monseiur Klein from 1976), an
image of WWII deportation was shown alongside Muybridge’s photographs, near twelve
asexual mannequins. Lyotard titled this site Nu Vain, possibly playing on en vain (or “in
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vain”), and writes the following: “The body dépouillé [‘rendered bare’]. Nudity as the
limit of sense, as an absurd presence. Flesh is replaced by neutral, measurable,
multipliable, de-codeable material.”83 Keeping in mind that the term “dépouillé” holds a
number of perturbing polyvalent meanings in this context—denuding, stripping,
dissecting, counting, and the removing fat by way of cooking—this site proves to be the
most sobering in Les Immatériaux, a manifestation of the process of devaluation through
a humanimal collapse. The immunological paradigm of thanatopolitics—of a power that
exposes some to death in order to preserve the lives of others—could not be more
apparent. As one of the few critics who understood this biopolitical dimension of Les
Immatériaux, Rajchman asserts that in the exhibition, “life and death [were] subject to
technoscientific intervention and redefinition,” an observation that unavoidably conjoins
a dark biopolitical past with a to-be-determined biopolitical present84
If early biopolitical discourse in Germany presumed a stable, a priori essence of
the human as species in biology (as bellicose by nature, as inherently vitalist, as
dominator, and so on), then Foucault’s key contribution to biopolitical thought was to
change the terms of the human itself as a contingent historical construction (in keeping
with his anti-humanist or posthumanist leanings going back to his The Order of Things).
No longer immutable or simply given, the human in Foucauldian biopolitics is a
genealogical concept accreted by a “biohistory” that shapes the epistemologies of life
across multiple disciplines (and I add the “animal” as an entangled historicoepistemological concept similarly accreted by humanist history). Esposito defines this
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hybrid movement of biohistory in the following manner: “History and nature, life and
politics cross, propel, and violate each other according to a rhythm that makes one
simultaneously the matrix and the provisional outcome of the other.”85 This notion of
biohistory is also operative in all the processes in Lyotard’s Les Immatériaux where the
human comes to be re-defined by its bio-technoscientific environment and supplements.
If Les Immatériaux offers an immunological social setting in miniature that
produces the human as inhuman, then it is notable that the exhibition no longer functions
through the logic of the nation-state, but through a post-national, technocratic apparatus
of multi-national economic and scientific innovations rearticulating the identity of time,
space, and life itself. In other words, Lyotard’s viewer becomes the subject of neoliberal
immunology.86 Nowhere is this individualistic immune design attested to better than in
the single sleeping cells transplanted from Japan into the Pompidou. [ill. 2.21] Replete
with radio, television, air conditioning, and telephone, each cell holds enough room for
only one occupant stacked in isolation on top of the others (the “Inventaire” reproduces
this serial organization, which look like temporary storage units). Lyotard describes these
“compartments” as purely functional prosthetic environments for the human body, which
fundamentally alter traditional notions of dwelling or rootedness.
In this regard, it is interesting to note how much Les Immatériaux concerned itself
with issues of the human diet—a fact that has gone uninspected in the literature. Often
turning his attention to foodstuffs in cans and plastic packaging, Lyotard underscores the
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dietary shift from a natural relationship between society and nature, to a pragmatically
engineered diet for optimal nutrition, metabolism, and the proper consistency of fats,
proteins, and sugar. For example, the site Toutes les copies showed a photocopied piece
of cheese in profile looking less like a food and more like a microscopic or scientific
image [ill. 2.22]; Ration alimentaire displayed food rations for space travel [ill. 2.23];
Manger pressé displayed “fast foods” that cut time and raised efficiency at the price of
the cultural traditions and rituals of traditional cuisine [ill. 2.24]; in Précuisinié-Préparlé
there is a similar gesture, though here the attention is on prepackaged, prepared units of
cuisine that the consumer simply consumes as is. [ill. 2.25] Lyotard underscores the
affinities between readymade language and food: “Food in cooking, replying in
conversation, both happen to you as readymade” 87; and finally, in arôme simulé,
holographic images of fruits where projected in the space that was diffused with the
chemical smells as simulacral olfactory substitutes for actual fruit. [ill. 2.26] All these
dietary examples point to a fundamentally changed relationship between human
consumption and nature—from a purportedly traditional history of food to a conception
of comestibles as fabricated, engineered, and calculated in an increasingly de-naturalized,
synthetic, and efficient manner as diet fit for inhumans. All of these gustatory examples
either dissimulate the material rendering of any nonhuman who may have been
implicated in the readymade food, or amount to hyper-real comestible replacements of
animal material altogether (though certainly an earlier history of market dissimulation
can be found in novel forms of food packaging and labeling in the twentieth century).88
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It is for these reasons that understanding the exhibition as an immunological space
is so important, for Les Immatériaux was a biopolitical container that subjectivizes its
inhabitants variously through inclusion or exclusion, engagement or alienation, and
comfort or unease. Consequently, placing Les Immatériaux within in this immunological
biohistory, ultimately evinces its techno-liberal subject position. After all, visitors paid
for headphones that kept them shut in a solitary mental space and in unilateral
engagement with the exhibition components, even in a public setting. The more
collectively minded would have had to forego payment and the space’s open-ended
programming, which, according to Heinrich, ran the risk of being disoriented and barred
from access to the display’s full effect. This aspect of Lyotard’s exhibition (akin to what
Deleuze calls “dividuation,” an operation that fuses the mass/individual binary) does
away with both singularity (since all viewers trigger the same information over radio
waves) as well as collectivity (since the headphones keep each visitor embedded in a
pseudo-solitary state). The price of Les Immatériaux’s immunity was at the cost of the
individual and the community as traditionally defined.
2.3.4 INHUMAN, NONHUMAN, POSTHUMANIST?
This chapter began by recalling Apollinaire’s unstable uses of the term inhuman,
which points toward the Janus-faced conception of Lyotard’s more fully-fledged theory
of the inhuman: on the one hand, the inhuman as “technoscience where the flesh is
replaced,” and on the other, the inhuman as transgressive state prior to humanist
“education and other means of subjectivization.”89 I have argued that these two inhumans
are entangled in Les Immatériaux—at the level of biopolitical control and through an
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aesthetics of immunology. In both instances, the inhuman as animal supplies the
underlying material and agential conditions for the inhuman technocratic control and
preservation of biological life (in other words, Lyotard’s bad inhuman needs the good
inhuman as host). Yet the fact remains that however much Les Immatériaux seems to
undo any connection to nature and animality through its futurist techniques, the human as
animal remains its biological preconditions and substance. In other words, the repression
of animality always returns.
It is not through any previous conception of humanism that the human can be
outfitted with new skin (see “deuxieme peau” [ill. 2.27]), can be contained in separate
life-supporting cubicles, can have its senses artificially triggered, or can be managed as
neutral, measurable, multipliable, de-codeable material. Instead, this inhumanism is
predicated on the human as a managed, domesticated, and automated process contingent
with its environment and fleshy finitude. Les Immatériaux, for all its transhumanist
accelerationism, also offered a posthumanist demonstration that the human is not to be
found in language, reason, or culture, but in the affective, immunitary spaces allowing
one to breath and function with biological integrity. Foucault’s foundational insight for
biopolitics, namely, that “modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as
a living being in question,”90 is taken, at the Pompidou, as it can go by alluding directly to
an understanding life as a codeable at the molecular level. In the site titled Corps éclaté
(or “exploded body”) images of the body, its organs, tissues, and cells, were displayed
together as a universal “language” of the molecular. [ill. 2.28] In a related site, Langue
vivante (or “living language”), images of calf and rabbit embryos taken at the genetic
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scale were projected in the space, alongside images of human DNA proteins. [ill. 2.29] In
explaining this site, Lyotard asserts that today’s task is to “understand and interpret the
fundamental processes of life in terms of communication and cybernetics at the molecular
level.”91 In both cases, any humanist repression of evolutionary co-determination between
human and nonhuman animals is no longer maintainable—be it rabbit, calf, or human. At
the level of biological integrity and its most fundamental, scientific basis of genetic
sequencing, the human-animal relationship remains inescapable. Whereas Apollinaire
conceived this entanglement in a metaphoric fashion of a bloodthirsty animal inside the
human, Lyotard’s humanimal entanglement is evinced at the biological, scientific level.
The outcome of this entanglement can also arrive at an opposing insight. If so
many of Les Immatériaux’s displays allude to the human as a biopolitical animal, then the
long humanist shadow of understanding animals as machines or automatons simply
displaces this onto the human as technological or mechanistic. This too is the other side
of humanism: an anti-metaphysical understanding of life as reducible to a purely
functional unit of processes (an argument first put forth in Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s
scandalous treatise L’homme machine in the eighteenth century92). If biology can be
reduced to code, if diets can be managed as bits of information fed into a system, if
sleeping cells can be fitted to the life support functions of an organism, if natural skin can
be replaced with artificial skin, then both human and nonhuman life becomes a site of
devaluation or optimization, depending on the desired effect. For Lyotard this outcome is
the bad inhuman—the technoscientific subjectivization of life. The question then remains,
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does the philosopher offer a way out of this bad inhumanism? Does he offer a different
path or antidote that does not return to an un-tenable humanist position? To conclude this
section, I analyze this crucial question surrounding Les Immatériaux demonstrating how
the nonhuman animal is implicated within the good inhuman Lyotard offers as antidote.
If neither this technocratic inhumanism nor a naïve return to humanism is possible, the
option that remains is an inhuman (or nonhuman) point-of-view that challenges them
both.
What was largely overlooked, in 1985 but also since then, is that the fundamental
question of Les Immatériaux is man’s changing relationship to nature. Yet Lyotard is
explicit about this being of central concern. His curatorial statement makes clear that the
inhuman “new materials” on display in the exhibition put in question one of the central
tenants of Cartesian modernity, that is, man as “master and possessor of nature.”93 By
challenging this humanist mastery, Lyotard posits a de-anthropocentric view of both
culture and nature: “the human subject does not have exclusive rights in the situation of
creator-author-sender; no longer are all messages addressed to him. His task: to devote
the marvel of his nervous organization to the collection, acquisition and restitution of
unknown messages.”94 What are these heretofore unrecognized or unknown messages
that elude the humanist frame? One of these nonhuman points-of-view in Les
Immatériaux came in the form of information that exceeds the perceptual capacities of
the human—be it molecular imaging that would otherwise go unseen by the human eye
alone, or mathematical systems that make complexity of the material world
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understandable through non-phenomenological abstractions and calculations.95 The
nonhuman or inhuman view point Lyotard privileges above all, however, is the affective,
the figural, the differend, or the infans—in sum, an aesthetic dimension of sentient being
that cannot be mediated, reduced to, or commensurate with the rules of humanist
discourse. If the bad inhuman can reduce life to language or code as a matter of
biopolitical control, then the good inhuman manifests a form of resistance, of surplus, and
of excess. In this agonistic relationship, Lyotard makes it clear that he privileges inhuman
affect over inhuman control: “what else remains as ‘politics’ except resistance to
inhumanism? And what else is left to resist with but the debt which each soul has
contracted with the miserable and admirable indetermination from which it was born and
does not cease to be born? – which is to say, with the other inhuman?”96
In his curatorial statement, Lyotard describes this affective state as becominginfant in ceaseless modulation, as a de-privileging of sight (the sense of modernity and
enlightenment par excellence), and as a de-centering of “Man” as the only identity with
the capacity for “experience, memory, work, autonomy (or liberty), even ‘creation.”97
These challenges to “Man” and to humanist thought are produced by a technoscientific
inhumanism, which can take over these processes. Yet Lyotard cautions that a simple
embrace of this inhuman is misguided; instead, he argues for a way out of the confines
and limitations of both humanism and technoscientific inhumanism. How so? In
answering this question, it is useful to return to the opening vestibule in the exhibition.
After being propelled through its intrauterine experience, the first site a museumgoer
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encountered was the Théàtre du non-corps (“The Theater of Nonbody”). [ill. 2.30] The
gallery displayed five theatre set dioramas by Jean-Claude Fall, Samuel Beckett’s set
designer—each one showing a theatrical stage as a body or protagonist in its own right.
As Rajchman recounts, over the headphones “played a fragment from Beckett’s The
Unnameable, which narrates the predicament of an “I” who cannot speak yet cannot
remain silent.”98 This opening gesture of Les Immatériaux is crucial: this affective state
before the discursive institution of an “I” is not the technoscientific inhuman, but a paraontology that always runs parallel to the human being even upon entrance to the confines
of humanist discourse and law. Like Apollinaire’s octopod, this inhuman always clings to
the humanist subject. As Bamford’s analysis of the body in Les Immatériaux argues, this
opening gesture is described as a
call to the inhuman through the sound of pumping blood which is there not to
reassure us of our individual physical containers but to draw attention to that
inhuman which persists despite the teachings of humanism, through the
unarticulated phrases which, because they have no addressee, are reduced to
mutism and banished from articulate argumentation – from logos.”99
It should now be clear why this moment in Les Immatériaux is crucial for the
trajectory of this chapter. While Lyotard was primarily interested in the capacity to
reconnect with a pre-egoic infantile state as a mode of political resistance, today his
theorizing of this critical inhumanism, as it was originally for Apollinaire, seems to be
inextricably bound with animality. Since they are both infans, infant and nonhuman
animal exist within a predicament of an “I” that cannot speak but cannot stay silent
98
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either; both are affective states that engage with their environment, often with sight as a
secondary sense; and both can be repressed by the human animal upon entering the
metaphysical constructs of “Man” in humanist thought.100 If the animal haunts Les
Immatériaux through its absence, it returns via the human spectator whose affective
capacities may resist the calculated, technoscientific immersion of its zones, sites, and
displays. In short, within Lyotard’s conception of the inhuman clings a posthumanist
point of view that challenges the ideological parameters of humanism, not only through
the infans, but also animality (though it should be noted that such a critical distance was
not likely attained by very many spectators; nor is it clear how, within the enveloping
context of the display, becoming infans or nonhuman is not simply falling into
ontological precarity).
Lyotard himself would consider this posthumanist eventuality beyond his infans.
In an essay from 1991, “The Affect-phrase,” the philosopher speculates on whether or not
animal “affect” can be a meaningful utterance outside logos or speech: “Feeling is a
phrase. I call it the affect-phrase.”101 Lyotard ultimately answers in the negative,
essentially concluding that animals are the ultimate victims in that they cannot even make
recognizable claims about their own victimhood.102 Perhaps, for all its immunological
insulation, Les Immatériaux transfers this inability to make claims on one’s behalf
(ostensibly shared by infans and animal) onto its visitors; in the darkest biopolitical
reading of the exhibit, its immersion and controlled affective responses made aleatory
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self-communication difficult, and like Deleuze’s society of control, one participated in
situ without necessarily being able to communicate the quality of this participation, nor
effect any necessary changes in the surroundings should it be negative.
2.4 ANIMAL ART
The multi-site exhibition Animal Art at Steirischer Herbst in Graz from 1987,
which I turn to next, can be understood as a synthesis of the two previous exhibitions in
this chapter.103 On the one hand, like de l’Animal, the exhibition privileges animal
processes and nonhuman alterity; on the other, like Les Immatériaux, Animal Art
demonstrates the ways in which nonhumans have succumb to their own forms of
inhuman technoscientific de-naturalization. In other words, Animal Art maintains a
balancing act between a relatively open posthumanist ecology (whereby the nonhuman is
collaborated with in a positive way) and a relatively closed transhumanist biopolitics
(whereby the nonhuman is tested on or manipulated in some way). This exhibition thus
exemplifies the ways in which posthumanism and transhumanism can be interlaced,
which when synthesized becomes a mixed aesthetic like subsequent bio-art practices that
both collaborate and control the nonhuman living.104
Surprisingly little has been written about this exhibition, which collected major
figures of ecologically inflected art practices (Joseph Beuys, Hans Haacke, Paul Kos)
along with a host of lesser-known artists who, in one way or another, incorporated animal
life into their works. Here, I will limit myself to two facets of this exhibition: how the
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catalog, especially its rich set of essays, demonstrates that the ideas of bio art and many
of the issues involved are already in place before the wide spread of the technologies that
made bio-art possible, and how the disparate art practices in the exhibition reflect the
entangled impulses between transhumanist and posthumanist positions vis-à-vis
nonhuman animals in art. In both cases, I make judicious selections, and by no means
should my analysis of this sprawling exhibition be considered as exhaustive.
Few installation shots exist that are not already pictured in Animal Art’s
voluminous catalog, making its contents a crucial piece of archival documentation.105 The
catalog is composed of three sections: the first is an encyclopedic collection of art works
incorporating animal life spanning the late-1960s to the mid-1980s (only some of which
appear in the 1987 exhibition). The encyclopedia’s enlightenment connotations are
reflected in the catalog’s design: for easy reference, the heterogeneous grouping of art
works, installations, and performances are indexed alphabetically according to species by
thumb cuts on the fore edge of the book, from ants to chickens, flies, pigs, sheep, and
many other species in between. Each work is documented by a black and white
photograph with a written explanation of its meaning or process on a facing page (often
in the artists’ own words). The second section represents those artists directly involved
with Animal Art. Color plates show their work, and more extended texts offer
explanations (also often by the artists themselves). Lastly, the third section is a
compilation of commissioned essays on various topics concerning animal life in art,
culture, and science. These essays range from ethological perspectives on animal
intelligence (Jasia Reichardt’s “Are Animals Intelligent”) to ethical considerations of bio105
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genetics (Hubert Kröber’s “Possibilities and Limits of Gene Technology” and Mathias
Wahl’s “Designer Genes”) to cultural studies of the concept of animality across history
(Werner Fenz’s “Artist and Model or How Authentic is Art Reality?,” Georg Jappe’s
“From Cojotes [sic] to Muckworms,” and Franz Wuketits’s “Animals as Beings Created
by Nature and Civilization”).106 In sum, the catalog offers the first major offerings of a
critical analysis of animals in art history and advanced art practices.
Richard Kriesche—the show’s curator and a contributing artist—sets the stage for
the exhibition in his curatorial essay “Animal Huminal Digital.” The central thrust of his
argument is that recent advances in genetic technology have fundamentally altered the
concept of creation, and along with it, the concept of the work of art and our
understanding of life itself. Kriesche diagnoses two conceptions of creation. In his first
concept, a divine “organic, living work of nature [was] contrasted with man’s inorganic
dead work of art, a metaphor for creative man.”107 This reflects the long-standing concept
of art as a Platonic pale imitation of a divine template (Kriesche quotes verses from
Genesis, specifically, the passage concerning the naming of animals108). His second, more
contemporary concept of creation calls this first creation into doubt. With the advent of
genetic technology, science has allowed “man” to tinker with creation at its
“informational” level, i.e. by uncovering and working with DNA coding as the purported
substrate of life. In short, the “created” has taken on the mantle of “creator” in a
historico-epistemological hand-off. For Kriesche, the move from the first concept of

106

Richard Kriesche et al., Animal Art: Steirischer Herbst '87, 19. September-11. Oktober: Galerie Hanns
Christian Hoschek (Graz: Steirischer Herbst, 1987).
107
Richard Kriesche, "Animal Huminal Digital," in Animal Art: Steirischer Herbst '87, 19. September-11.
Oktober: Galerie Hanns Christian Hoschek (Graz: Steirischer Herbst, 1987), n.p.
108
Kriesche quotes the second book of Genesis where from the earth “God formed every beast of the field,
and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto man to see what he would call them.” Ibid.
146

creation to the second amounts to a transfer of the creative act from a transcendent source
to one that is immanent in human culture and technology.
Kriesche points to a number of consequences for the nonhuman animal in this
shift. In a clear parallel with (trans)humanism, he states that in the past, culture was
understood as overcoming animality—or that the evolution of culture was founded on
“overcoming the beast,” echoing Apollinaire’s second form of the inhuman. By the 1980s,
however, after having thoroughly expelled the animal via this exclusionary and selfnegating humanist history, the “animal is regenerated in the artefacts and constructs that
were construed by ‘cultural man’.”109 As a result, animals return as cultural, technical
products—or what I would describe as transnonhumans.110 Over the course of his essay,
Kriesche laments this turn of events, which he claims is a culturalization of the universe
that leaves no natural process unturned. Alluding to Jeremy Rifkin, an early critic of biotech and the patenting of animals, Kriesche decries the reduction of animal life to
patentable and mere technical objects of manipulation; he claims that genetic technology
has thanatological effects on the living, and that it plunges the world into a flat ontology
where “the differentiation between human, animal, and vegetable life is irrelevant.”111
Moreover, Kriesche argues that this flattening of all life into codeable information
leads to a collapse of moral security. Effectively, this flattening reveals all life to be bare
life, and “all that man is left with is his inner nature, the beast in himself.”112 In this sense,
Kriesche is working through a cautionary tale of biopower and the biopolitical
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ramifications of genetic technology on the concepts of creation, life, and manipulation.
He also seems to point out a perverse dialectic between transhumanism and
posthumanism—namely, that the further the former goes in its bio-technical endeavors,
the more it relegates the human and nonhuman to a compatible state of ontological
malleability, which preys on posthumanist affinities – in short, not transcending animality
at all, but coming back to it in far more trenchant terms.
The catalog’s expansive essay section raises many conceptual issues that presage
the bio art practices that become a reality a decade later. 113 And yet, much of the art in
the show itself cannot be properly called transgenic or biotechnological. Corroborating
the notion that novel technologies in art are preceded by yearning for their capabilities
before they can be realized (as with the development of photography in the nineteenth
century114), a number of works point towards transgenic and bio art practices without yet
embodying them in practice. A number of examples hover on the threshold between
animals and technology. These include Nam June Paik’s Sonatine for Goldfish, 1975, a
television filled with goldfish [ill. 2.31]; Stiletto’s Flying Spots, 1984/86, another
television, this time filled with flies [ill. 2.32]; and Christina Kubitsch’s outdoor sound
piece The Bird’s Tree, 1987, an outdoor installation of speakers emitting electronic
113
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recordings of endangered species of bird in a tree. [ill. 2.33] In each case, the nonhuman
is a substitute for (or is substituted by) a technical apparatus. John Billingsley’s Micro
Mouse Maze (1985) takes this further by swapping out an organic mouse for the preprogrammed movements of a robotic mouse in a maze.115 Although Kriesche claims that
“nothing is more boring than an artificialized animal,” each of these works point towards
this very outcome (albeit for disparate ends).
Other artists practice a laboratory aesthetics with nonhumans. These works do not
so much collapse or flatly ontologize animality and technicity, but present nonhuman
processes as aestheticized forms of experimentation, conditioning, and observation. For
example, the work of Argentinian artist Luis Benedit is well represented in the catalog.
For the 1970 Venice Biennale, the artist constructed Biotrom, 4000 Living Bees, a large,
artificial beehive made in collaboration with an ethologist. [ill. 2.34] Benedit installed
both real and fake flowers inside the hive’s transparent glass and steel-framed
construction, which allowed him to monitor the bees’ behaviors and preferences. From
1971 to 1972, Benedit worked with ants by constructing mazes in order to test their
intelligence and behavior. Other works tested chicken, snail, or fish behavior in a similar
vein of laboratory aesthetics within a closed system akin to the nonhuman delegated
performances discussed above. Interestingly, by the time of Animal Art, Benedit had
given up working with animals.116 He gives three reasons for abandoning the practice: the
difficulties and costs involved in such installations, the lack of interest in such work on
the part of scientists, and his reluctance to give the impression that his work privileges
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“biology” over “art.” As such, while a nascent bio-art laboratory aesthetics seems to be
underway in Benedit’s work of the early 1970s, any coupling between science and art has
not yet fully arrived.
Denis Masi’s installations also tap into a laboratory aesthetics, though in a darker
mode. In Barrier (1977-80), the artist sets up a two-faced mirror on a table with various
geometric, conical objects on one side and two Rhesus monkeys on the other. [ill. 2.35]
The monkeys push on the mirror’s surface in fear and confusion. Another work, Search
(1975-7), involves a group of rats under a spotlight who are subject to a taped loop of
recorded calls of their species. While Masi’s installation of sounds, barriers, lights, and
living animals evokes reflects a laboratory aesthetics with various installation
components, at bottom his impulse is less scientific than shamanistic. In his installationperformance Hidden Sign (1978-80) this became clear: during a six-minute performance
involving tape recorded sounds, spotlights, and a dead seagull affixed to a totemic pole,
Masi ritualistically sacrificed a live eel by biting through the animal. [ill. 2.36] In
justifying this performance, the artist claimed that: “These animals can reveal the secrets
of the future because they are thought to be receptacles for the souls of the dead.”117 Masi
thus reveals an anti-scientific (anti-modern) impulse running in tandem with the fledgling
transhumanist, laboratory aesthetics just mentioned.118 If those quasi-scientific practices
seem to trump past notions of the “Natural Order,” artistic strategies like Masi’s evince
an atavistic, religio-aesthetics that relegates the animal to more primordial conditions and
beliefs (though these strategies are nearly always uncritical, escapist, and altogether
humanist). Somewhat compatibly, Joseph Beuys is represented in the catalog with what
117
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are still the most famous instances of a fellow animal performer: the live coyote from I
Like America and America Likes Me (1974), and the dead hare in How to Explain
Pictures to a Dead Hare (1965). Even more in line with Masi’s shamanism are the
sacrificial and ceremonial practices of Viennese Aktionism (also documented in the
catalog), including now canonical performances like Hermann Nitsch’s 4 Aktion (1963)
and Rudolf Schwarzkogler’s 6. Aktion (1966).
Despite these atavistic and transhumanist works, the majority of objects exhibited
and cataloged in Animal Art are posthumanist. While the works just discussed
instrumentalize animals—be it for disparate purposes and to differing degrees—most of
the works open spaces at arm’s length from humanist control. In various ways, these
posthumanist practices embrace animality and highlight affinities between human and
nonhuman animals, challenging the long history of anthropocentric exceptionalism. I
group these works into three categories: Nonhuman performance and process art,
Nonhuman creativity, and Nonhuman culture-community.
If Benedit’s work involves testing animal processes through mazes, then in AntCooperative (1969), Hans Haacke set up a less obstructed view of the social processes of
ants. [ill. 2.37] The work consisted of an ant colony that, apart from being confined to
sand inside a glass case, did not delimit or test the insects’ movements or collective
organization. This aesthetics of relative openness is operative in many of Haacke’s works
involving animals, including the following installations and performances documented
through photographs in the catalog: in Rhine-Water Treatment Plant (1972), a water
purification process allowed gold-fish to thrive in a gallery setting, which created a
nonhuman space—a shallow floor-bound aquarium—partially obstructing a human
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architectural setting. [ill. 2.38] In Live Airborn System (1965/68), the artist fed wild
seagulls outdoors; the title of Ten Turtles, Set Free (1970) sufficiently describes another
work’s gesture; Goat in a Forest (1970), documents a goat grazing outside in the south of
France; and Norbert, “All Systems Go” (1970/71), was a nonhuman performance piece in
which the artist attempted to teach a Myna bird named Norbert (after the first-generation
systems theorist Norbert Wiener) the phrase quoted in the work’s title. [ill. 2.39] Haacke
is an important progenitor of posthumanist practices that allow for nonhuman thriving
within aesthetic parameters. This form of practice points towards positive rights (what
animals can do) rather than negative rights (what should not be done to them), which the
political theorists Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka haven recently conceived as a
“zoopolis” of integrated human and nonhuman cooperation privileging positive rights.119
A number of works in the Animal Art exhibition and catalog fall under a similar rubric,
including Paul Kos’s installations featuring various nonhuman animals, Lili Fischer’s
furniture sculpture with spiders, Werner Klotz’s drawings with snails, and Wolf Kahlen’s
gallery environments oriented for canine-being. In each case, nonhuman performers and
their processes dictate the aesthetic parameters of the work and the artist/viewer’s
relationship to nonhuman being.
A number of artists in Animal Art take seriously the creative capacities of
nonhuman cognition, volition, or aleatory movements. These fall roughly into two
categories: the visual and the sonic. The German artist Katherina Meldner’s line drawings
attest to the movements of various insects on paper. She follows the movements of an ant
colony in red pencil and any other insect that would happen to traverse the paper in green.
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The result is a teaming mass of lines that indexes entomological activity over a span of
time—both as a form of process art, but also as a reversal of human to nonhuman
authorial outsourcing. This reversal of authorial intent is taken to its fullest by the
Austrian painter Arnulf Rainer. In the late 1970s the artist collaborated with chimpanzees
in order to mimic their approach to painting. Rainer describes chimpanzees as having
“sovereign natures,” leading to artistic alterity akin to extra-traditional freedom of
expression in the art of children or the insane. As a human aping a chimp, Rainer would
paint in tandem and real-time seated alongside his nonhuman source of inspiration, which
resulted in double paintings of gestural abstraction (on one side Rainer’s painting in
mimicry, on the other the chimp’s original). [ill. 2.40]
Two other German artists incorporated similar aleatory movements. In Marianne
Greve’s Frog Music I—Tadpoles, 1984, the artist photographed a proliferation of frog
tadpoles on a sheet of blank staff music notation. [ill. 2.41] The tadpoles, looking like
quarter notes whose stems have come to life in unpredictable squiggles on the page,
dictate a musical composition depending on their positions on the staff when
photographed. A visual phenomenon was thus transcribed into a sonic one in becoming a
potentially performable score for piano (she also worked with shrimp in a similar fashion
in a composition for a sextet). Timm Ulrich’s sound pieces, on the other hand, work
directly with the audible capacities of certain species. In Bees, Wasps, Hornets. An
Acoustic Environment (1971), the artist inserted a live microphone into a glass container
holding the eponymous insects, in order to amplify the sounds they made. [ill. 2.42] In an
expanded instectile orchestral set up a year later, Ulrich released crickets in the State
Opera of Hamburg for Cricket Concerto (1972).
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This preoccupation with music, scores, chance, and the outsourcing of authorial
will reflects the ongoing influence of Fluxus. It is thus no surprise that Henning
Christiansen, a key artist and composer associated with Fluxus (having collaborated with
Beuys and Nam June Paik), contributed to Animal Art. Christiansen’s compositions often
included animal voices and sounds; in the case of his Symphonia Natura (1985), these
were recorded at the Rome zoo. In Graz, the composer staged this piece with the
cooperation and collaboration of live animals, including chickens and sheep. [ill. 2.43] In
each instance—Greve, Ulrich, and Christiansen—animals not only play a performative
role in the work, but also a compositional one. Moreover, this nonhuman capacity is
explicitly ascribed a privileged place in the biological and semiotic evolution of aesthetic
pleasure. In the catalog, Greve outlines certain theories (Darwin among them) that posit
animal sounds as a primary aesthetic event in nature i.e the first “music.” In a similar vein,
Christiansen détourns the New Testament notion of Logos not as human but as originally
nonhuman: “In the beginning was not the Word, but a chirp.”120
Meldner, Rainer, Greve, and Christiansen all incorporate nonhuman creativity
into a pre-existing genre of human creation (either graphic or musical). By contrast, the
Dutch artist Felix Hess’s interest in frogs departs from this paradigm. He asserts that such
sounds in nature are not musical, but instead represent nonhuman communication and
sociability: “Music is made for people to listen to. Frog calls serve as a means of
communication between frogs.”121 This interest in the sonic capacities of amphibian
collectives led Hess to make Chirps and Silence (1986/87), which attempts to recreate a
“frog chorus” by way of artificial, electronic, programmed “soundcreatures” that react
120
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both to each other and to human presence (thereby simulating human and nonhuman
interactions outdoors). [ill. 2.44] Two impulses are at work here: a transhumanist urge to
re-create nonhuman animals, along with their abilities and relations, as well as a
posthumanist desire to recognize nonhuman capacities for communication and their
accompanying sonic worlds. This latter preoccupation is more properly posthumanist in
that it does not simply seek to incorporate nonhuman processes into human aesthetic
genres, but rather seeks to gain human access to nonhuman forms of meaning, being, and
aesthetic worlds.122
Hess’s work with amphibious Mitsein already points to nonhuman forms of
culture-community. A number of works in Animal Art emphasize this being-together of
nonhumans, or being-together of humans and nonhumans. This form of work either gives
the nonhuman spatial priority, or underscores human-animal cooperation and
collaboration in certain ways. Haacke’s work already points to such features, as does
Kahlen’s gallery environment for dogs (which demonstrates that my four categories
overlap in a number of ways). Possibly the most evocative of such a zoopolitical,
communal gesture is Mark Thompson’s work with live bees. From 1974 to 1987, the
artist undertook various projects involving a bee colony. In Live-In-Hive (1976),
Thompson placed his head inside a glass beehive, which remained open to the bee
population that carried out its honeycomb construction and daily activities in relation to
his human head. [ill. 2.45] In his City Explorations (carried out in San Francisco, Los
Angeles, New York, and Graz from 1977 to 1987), the artist coordinated his urban
movements according to the activities of honeybees: “The situations & people I met were
122
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related to sources of nectar & pollen in the area. This exploration was possible by
deciphering the symbolic communication dances of the honey bees, which indicate the
distance & direction of food sources.”123 The artist’s movements and relationship to the
urban environment were subordinated to nonhuman activities—and once more, the artist
was influenced by a biologist, namely, Karl von Frisch and his ethological work
deciphering the honeybee’s propensity for communicating through dance.124 The
emphasis on nonhuman culture as a form of communication and social organization is
evident. Thompson makes it clear: “Through these explorations and a variety of projects I
have come to view the hive as a remarkable window into the larger natural world and
human communities.”125
2.5 CONCLUSION
Jonathan Crary’s recent book 24/7 offers a fitting example for the mixing of
posthumanist and transhumanist impulses that I have tracked throughout this chapter. In
analyzing the ways in which capital hopes to make incursions on sleep (sleep being the
only moment consumers are not tapped into its flow), Crary’s opening example calls
attention to US Defense Department research on the white-crowned sparrow. This bird
has the capacity to stay awake in flight for as long as seven days during its migratory
period, leading researchers to try and find ways of transferring this superhuman feat onto
human beings (for ultra-soldiers, but possibly also workers and consumers).126 It is
important to note how transhumanism and posthumanism are inextricably bound here: the
sparrow represents the promise of a bio-technical supplement that would allow the human
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to transcend its species finitude and limitations; and yet, such an outcome would attest to,
in part, a becoming-bird that could only be possible if the bio-cognitive and enfleshed
makeup of both human and nonhuman were similar in various ways. Taken as a whole, if
one is to judge by number and modality of its installations, Animal Art favors the
posthumanist over the transhumanist. Of course, this could be due to the fact that the
biotech necessary for transhumanist (or transnonhumanist) practices was not yet available.
Even so, the great benefit of revisiting Animal Art is to demonstrate how posthumanist
sensibilities open up more interesting aesthetic possibilities, which often align themselves
with ethical and ecological demands—like some of the more successful instances from
De l’animal from two years before. Moreover, this sensibility, unlike the more
technocratically inclined transhumanist approach, presents a challenge to the smooth
demands of capital that overwhelmingly instrumentalizes all forms of life, in what
amounts to a more promising critique or resistance to Lyotard’s bad inhuman that his
accelerationist Les Immatériaux could not make room for.
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CHAPTER THREE – MARCEL BROODTHAERS AND THE ANIMAL READYMADE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
A few years before becoming a visual artist, the poet Marcel Broodthaers, then
working on his first book of bestiary poems, La bête noir (1961), visited the Antwerp
Zoo. His photographs from this outing are preserved— among them, a melancholic
rhinoceros and solitary crocodile [ill. 3.1-2]—as well as notes for a film using the zoo as
setting. Titled “Antwerp Zoo (Screenplay),” (1961) the script gives a general indication
what the film might have involved: the opening scene would show a ship entering port
carrying an exotic animal. Speculating on the animal’s origins and destination,
Broodthaers guesses that the animal was tracked down from Hamburg, the “world centre
of animal trading,” and wonders whether the trip was a good one and if life will be
bearable for the animal in new surroundings. He notes that, in the film, the history of the
zoo would come under scrutiny, a history that customarily remains hidden from the
majority of a public with merely “a sentimental interest in animals.” Should the film have
been realized, it would have woven together three points of view: that of the zookeepers,
the public, and the animals themselves “from inside the cages.” Broodthaers even had
plans to interview visitors as well as various denizens of the zoo: a crocodile, a monkey, a
rhinoceros, and a parrot.1
In stark relief to Broodthaers’s reputation for opacity, play, and enigma, what is
remarkable about this incipient idea for a film is the straightforwardness of its ideology
critique. Broodthaers is explicit that the film should reveal the zoo’s internal
machinations. This ideology critique also functions at the level of representation: the
1
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three-fold viewpoints would disentangle “legend (fables and caricatures) and reality (up
keeping and habits of the animals),” thereby de-coupling narrative fabrication from the
reality it dissimulates—auguring Broodthaers’s long fascination with fables and their
détournement.2 This degree of critical earnestness—the ability to clearly separate
ideology from reality—soon became impossible for Broodthaers (who, like Lacan, will
soon understand reality to be inevitably structured by metaphor, fantasy, and fiction).
Even so, “Antwerp Zoo (Screenplay)” contains a number of themes that evolve over the
course of Broodthaers’s career. For one, his interest in Grandville’s nineteenth century
send ups of social mores and bourgeois institutions through zoo-anthropomorphic
caricature and satire.3 Now that the public had internalized and trivialized this tactic by
reflexively sentimentalizing zoo animals with human traits, Broodthaers implies that such
satire is no longer viable. Instead, the artist treats the zoo as an environment in which
satire unfolds directly in real-time: “We will avoid any direct satire about the visitors by
focusing rather on the amusing complicity which links certain among them to animals.”4
This repositioning of Grandville’s critique, from a readership that sees itself as comical
zoomorphic figures to an audience unwittingly performing social satire in situ, is at the
core of Broodthaers’s late installations he called décors.5
A further set of themes can be gleaned from the zoo screenplay: firstly, a
preoccupation with the inability to reply in speech or to communicate fully.
2
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Broodthaers’s planned interviews with zoo animals are presented as impossible forms of
communiqué (rhetorical, gestural, absurd, or, in the case of the parrot, as simply repeating
the question).6 Secondly, Broodthaers concludes “Antwerp Zoo (Screenplay)” with an
ode to infancy by claiming that the zoo “belongs first and foremost to the world of
childhood.”7 This interest in childhood—in its literature, its graphics, its subordination to
institutional powers, and, much like Lyotard’s infans, its critical naiveness—recurs
throughout Broodthaers’s career.8 Perhaps the most explicit example of this can be found
in the poem “The Pig” from Broodthaers’s more well-known poetic bestiary, Pense-Béte,
1963-4: “Chops hams head porcelain scarf ears on the snout of the counter…I read in
your tiny eyes a children’s book.”9
Broodthaers’s plans for filming the Antwerp zoo also augur what has become a
recurrent theme in the literature on his work—namely, the practice of institutional
critique.10 If the film sought to reveal the zoo behind-the-scenes and its production of an
uninformed, sentimental audience lulled by spectacle, then it sought to draw attention to
the container as much as what it contains. That his analysis of institutional framing posits
the “objects” on display as animals and not art leads to two crucial arguments for this
chapter: 1) throughout Broodthaers’s oeuvre, the animal holds a metaphoric complicity
with both the artist and the artwork (all three are framed and constrained by institutional
powers that exceed or undermine them); and 2) from the get-go, Broodthaers’s practice of
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This form of interview returns in Broodthaers’s sound recording Interview with a Cat, 1970, and in his
film of the waxed figure of the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham at University College, Figures of
Wax (1974). The parrot is also a key figure in his oeuvre.
7
“Antwerp Zoo (Screenplay)” in Broodthaers, 89.
8
In this sense, like Lyotard’s infans, Broodthaers’s conception of childhood is as resistor to authority
9
“The Pig” from Pense-Bête, 1963-4 in Broodthaers, 104.
10
An art practice undertaking institutional critique works to expose and analyze the cultural, political, and
economic structures that are implicated in the institutional modes of its display; zoos and museums alike
work to dissimulate these less than venerable aspects of their institutional conditions.
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institutional critique was never limited to the museum as such. Much of the existing
literature emphasizes Broodthaers’s role in creating museum fictions as a mode of
critiquing official art institutions.11 However compelling such readings may be, they
nevertheless immobilize Broodthaers’s work, paradoxically enough, within the confines
of an art historical discourse tethered to its institutions (which are often implicated in
systems of power that far exceed the museum). Yve-Alain Bois’s distinction between
restricted and structural formalism might be applied to institutional critique: there are
restricted forms of institutional critique, which aim their sights within museological limits,
and there are (post)structural forms of institutional critique, which have an expanded
view of the museum as simply one of many networked cultural and political institutions
in need of investigation.12 Resolutely, Broodthaers is of the latter variety—and this opens
up a space of questioning that exceeds those telegraphed by art historical discourse to
date.13
One of the ambitions of this chapter is to demonstrate how Broodthaers
complicates the figure of the animal in art history and visual culture in a compatible
11

For the most detailed account of the run of the artist’s museum fictions, see Haidu, 107-224. See also
Benjamin Buchloh’s important compilation of primary documents and critical essays stemming from a
special 1987 issue of the journal October, as well as Douglas Crimp’s essay on Broodthaers’s museum
fictions: Marcel Broodthaers et al., Broodthaers: Writings, Interviews, Photographs, ed. Benjamin H. D.
Buchloh (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).
12
In Broodthaers’s short text “The Degree Zero” from 1973, he is explicit that “official presentations”
include not only museums but also “other institutions (hospitals, prisons, etc).” See Broodthaers, 351. For
Bois’ distinction between restricted and structural formalism, see Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as model
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), xi-xxx.
13
The artist was adamant in critiquing not only art institutions but also its discourses as limited in scope. In
“To Be a Straight Thinker or Not to Be Blind” (1975), Broodthaers diagnoses a circuitous and crass
relationship between art, criticism, and commercial values: “Art is a prisoner of its fantasies and its
function as magic; it hangs on our bourgeois walls as a sign of power, it flickers along the peripeteia of our
history like a shadow-play—but is it artistic? To read the Byzantine writing on the subject reminds us of
the sex of angels, of Rabelais, or of debates at the Sorbonne. At the moment, inopportune linguistic
investigations all end in a single gloss, which its authors like to call criticism.” Even though museums and
galleries have since internalized (more often than not restricted) forms of institutional critique,
Broodthaers’s lament that “linguistic investigations all end in a single gloss” still rings true. Broodthaers,
469.
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mode of expanded institutional critique. My genealogical method does not favor the
better-known works presently comprising the Broodthaers canon. In some ways, I focus
on the outliers. One of these is Les Animaux de la ferme from 1974 (from here on
designated simply as Les Animaux). [ill. 3.3] This double print of multiple cows
captioned by automobile names speaks volumes about the postwar animal, and
throughout the rest of this chapter, it will serve as the nodal point of my interpretive
constellation. While immediately recognizable, it has received little critical attention.
There are two reasons for this: for one, it is not immediately clear how this work fits into
the established readings of Broodthaers as purveyor of institutional critique (in the
restricted sense). More decisively, Les Animaux concerns animals, and while these
abound his work, they tend to be either occluded in the literature, or treated as
unproblematic, traditional symbols (ironically enough for such a mythoclastic artist).
Another ambition is to think through the animal readymade and to demonstrate
that Broodthaers’s reassessment of Duchamp’s gesture necessarily involves animals in
language, taxonomy, and commodity culture. Taking Les Animaux as the organizing
work for this chapter allows me to look at three key facets of the historical readymade,
proposed by Thierry de Duve in his writings on Duchamp in the 1980s: one, its
relationship to nominalism, and the force of institutional language, law, and
classification; two, its relationship to subject formation as a result of these discursive
powers—“subject” and sujet in the doubled sense of both subject matter and subjectivity;
and three, its relationship to industrial objects and endlessly repeatable processes and
things, which form the basis of modern industry.14 The power of naming, the subjectivity
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Thierry de Duve, Kant after Duchamp (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996).
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this gives rise to, and the industrial repeatability of things serve as my main headings
situated on the left with internal sub-headings on the right. By analyzing the role of
animals in Broodthaers’s work I not only examine a multi-faceted figure in his career as
both poet and visual artist, but also how animals fare within the continuing historical
legacy of the readymade in contemporary art practices, of which I argue the pressing
need to recognize the animal readymade to be an impossible paradox.
3.2 NOMINALISM
Les Animaux is pure simplicity of image and text. On two separate color
lithographed sheets of paper, five rows of three cows each are presented in an orderly,
grid-like fashion. Some look at the viewer, others straightforward in profile. The print is a
modified or rectified readymade whose original source material comes from the publisher
Maison Deyrolle, a naturalist shop founded in 1831 in Paris that would later became a
publishing house of pedagogic materials. [ill. 3.4] Broodthaers’s prints are exact replicas
of the Deyrolle originals except for a surreptitious change in captioning. Instead of types
of cows (Vache Picarde, Vache Comtois, Vache Flamande, etc.) the names printed
underneath each figure are makes of cars (“Chevrolet,” “Cadillac,” “Chrysler,” etc.). An
avid collector of such books dealing with plants, animals, and natural history,
Broodthaers included their illustrations in a number of his works and installations—most
notably in the Musée d’Art Moderne, Département des Aigles, Section des Figures (Der
Adler vom Oligozän bis Heute) from 1972, and in Un Jardin d’Hiver I and II, 1974 (all
exhibitions discussed in this chapter).15 Since Broodthaers has changed only the cows’
names, Les Animaux thematizes first and foremost the power of nomination—one that
15

See Michael Compton, "In Praise of the Subject," in Marcel Broodthaers (Minneapolis; New York:
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functions through ordering via language and categorization. The encyclopedic aesthetic
of the prints thus reflects a history of humanist Enlightenment, and a taxonomic
procedure of naming and ordering the natural world. Before discussing how this plays out
in specific works, a brief detour into Enlightenment history and the question of animals
and naming is necessary.
In his essay “What is Enlightenment” (1984) Michel Foucault argues that
humanism and the Enlightenment are by no means synonymous. This is due to the drive
at the core of Enlightenment thinking that if left unchecked should indiscriminately root
out all dogma—including any assumptions the humanist says about himself. Because
both ancient and modern conceptions of humanism uphold such uncritical assumptions
about the human, when finally put under the test of Enlightenment critique, the parallel
trajectories of humanism and Enlightenment begin to diverge.16 One of humanism’s
uncritical assumptions is Man’s anthropocentrism: his self-authorized rights of
intelligence, morality, and emotion. This gave Man the power to name and order the
world in ecological sovereignty. In the case of animals, however, their common names
were received from a pre-Enlightenment worldview, one that nevertheless folded itself
seamlessly and unchecked into a modern, scientific discourse (even in the Latin derived
binomial naming system). From Aesop to La Fontaine, Linnaeus, Cuvier, and
contemporary popular discourses, the nomination of animals as types remains
unproblematized and programmatic. This habitual retention of animal names from one
period into another occurred even within biology by way of the typological concept of
“species.” As the philosopher of science Marc Ereshefsky points out, this is a result of the
16

This is why one might posit a posthumanist Enlightenment, wherein “man” and “human” are no longer
unproblematic forms of (self)knowledge. See Cary Wolfe’s discussion of Foucault’s essay as it relates to
Wolfe’s own conception of posthumanist theory: Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?, xiv.
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unchecked inheritance of Linnaean taxonomy. In the eighteenth century, Linnaeus
provided streamlined rules for classifying the natural world; his system was predicated on
a divine, essentialist notion of species whose meaning was derived from Judeo-Christian
creationism. Yet even after the nineteenth century Darwinian turn in biology (when
species came to be understood as evolving by non-essentialist and completely material
chance processes) categorical aspects of the Linnaean system remain and “the vast
majority of biologists use the Linnaean hierarchy and its system of nomenclature.”17 This
is not a minor point, since the “Linnaean system is the backbone of biological
classification and…prescribes how to name and represent taxa and, in doing so, provides
the template for displaying life’s diversity.”18 In recent philosophies of science, the
inadequacy of this inherited concept of species—the incongruence between preDarwinian essentialist categories and post-Darwinian observance of flux and diversity—
is one of the key problems for re-articulating any monist definition of species, or for
discarding it all-together.19
The naming of animals can come under scrutiny only if one begins to question the
very foundations on which objectivity, science, and knowledge are held: human language
and its systems of classification. For in truth, in the West at least, the received way of
naming animals—of calling them in order to order them—has roots that go much further
back than Enlightenment science. In the opening scene of Jacques Derrida’s book The
Animal That Therefore I Am (2008), the philosopher feels shame in appearing naked in
the morning with his cat looking on. In pondering this nonhuman gaze, he recalls the
17
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primal scene of naming in the biblical narrative of Genesis, which occurs in the second of
two narratives where Adam comes before Eve but after the creatures around him. The
detail in this narrative that interests him most is the gap of time between the creation of
the animals and of Adam, and Adam being given the right to name the animals. During
this abyssal gap in the Judeo-Christian text, the animals existed before they were animals
(before they were seen and called “animals”). It is difficult to find a visual representation
of this indeterminate moment in art history20—even the normally daring Michelangelo
skips over this gap on the Sistine Chapel ceiling (1508-12). Hieronymus Bosch comes
close on the panel doors of The Garden of Earthly Delights (1503-15).21 [ill. 3.5] Every
time Derrida communed with this cat in the morning he saw a creature that refers, in its
mute present, back to an ancestral form of life predating human-divine naming, from
which the philosopher poses a deceivingly simple question: “Who was born first, before
the names?”22
By asking this question, Derrida opens a space beyond or before naming from
which the animal can appear as no longer reduced to the sign and its epistemological
sedimentation in human history and knowledge. He calls attention to the power of
naming and what this power entitles the namer over the named—a power that runs
undisturbed from Genesis through the Enlightenment: “The animal is a word, it is an
appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and the
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The notable exception to this lack of visual imagery of animals in the creation narrative are Medieval
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authority to give the living other.”23 Be it through divine-sanction or scientific authority,
this power of naming is self-given and circular; the word is put in place for the placer to
find—yet ultimately found—the “animal.” That this sentence can serve equally well to
define the strategy of the readymade is telling and highlights a key affinity between the
readymade, the animal, and naming. Be it through “art” or “animal,” nominalism has a
quasi-mystical power to transubstantiate an object. The timeworn naming of a living
thing as “animal” begins to resemble the readymade strategy of calling an object “art.”
Both sacralize, naturalize, and institutionalize its subjects—be it natural or art history. If
Duchamp’s critical gesture is an ontological one, inviting culture to ask itself what is it
that makes art art, then the readymade is as old as ontology and its resulting
epistemological classifications.
In captioning his bovines as cars, Broodthaers disrupts this long history of humandivine naming. Les Animaux is a veritable object-lesson in structuralist linguistics: no
longer culling from the Romantic Book of Nature where things are signs, Saussure’s
theory of arbitrary or unmotivated signifiers in a differential system completes the
secularization of the word’s relationship to the world. If a four-legged lactating mammal
can just as easily be called a “Citroen,” then the power of pure nominalism has a
newfound visibility; the history of human-divine naming is usurped by the arbitrary
power of the signifier as no longer simply natural or theologically given (though the
stabilizing force of custom remains strong). In this way, Les Animaux encapsulates a
relationship that preoccupies Broodthaers through his career—namely, his synthesis of
René Magritte’s Saussurean paintings and drawings, with their arbitrarily captioned
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substitutions underneath quotidian objects, and the Duchampian readymade, which sheds
light on the normally hidden cultural and institutional powers that naturalize and put an
end to the unmotivated play of the sign—be it “art” or “animal.”
Broodthaers is not only offering a cheeky lesson in structuralist linguistics. Les
Animaux also represents a discombobulation of classification itself. In effect, the prints
demonstrate that both the sign and its enframing system of ordering are arbitrary (in this
case, a taxonomy of automobiles works just as well as species). The frame itself is
unmotivated, an insight that situates Broodthaers within a critical milieu challenging
Structuralism during the late sixties and early seventies.24 Yet the most theoretically
ambitious aspect of Broodthaers’s détournement of structuralist linguistics and histories
of classification is the problematization and even loss of the world and the referent
beyond language—or ‘before the names.’ Gloria Moure has observed this Wittgenstein
inflection in Broodthaers’s work as characterized by an unmooring of language and the
world: “In effect, if language was not a correlate of the facts it expressed and indeed
could not even explain the conditions of its own application—or, in other words,
possessed next to no reality content—its role was simply to validate, as far as possible,
reality, rather than reality validating language.”25 This reveals a gap between language
and the things out in the world. In short, reality is not a given reflected in language, but a
readymade construction produced by nominal power and naturalized through habit,
which has always been confused as essentially a straightforward mirror of the Real.
3.2.2 EAGLES
24
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This form of challenging language, taxonomy, and classification is exemplified in
Broodthaers’s most ambitious museum fiction from 1972, the Section des figures.26 [ill.
3.6] As so often noted, Broodthaers used the apparatus of the museum as a readymade,
assuming the mantle of museum director/curator complete with loan agreements, and
brought together nearly five hundred objects relating in some way shape or form to the
eagle.27 The display was a diverse collection of mass culture, fine art, natural history,
printed matter, slide projectors, and various other objects on which the eagle makes its
unflagging appearance—including ornate telephones, clocks, a typewriter, beer bottles,
cigar packs, cartoons, and tapestries. [ill. 3.7] Each object was numbered and displayed
with a small black plaque incised with the same phrase in one of three possible
languages: “This is not a work of art,” “Ceçi n’est pas un objet d’art,” “Dies ist kein
kunstwerk.” The two-volume catalog reproduces four installation shots, as well as over
seventy individual objects of diverse cultural provenance.28 For instance: Jean Auguste
Dominique Ingres’s drawing Drei Adler-Studien (Two Eagle Studies, 1819) is pictured
just above an indigenous Pacific Northwest “Nootka” (today, “Nuu-chah-nulth”)
Adlerkopf Mask (Eagle Head Mask) loaned from the Museum of Ethnology in Vienna;
Gerhard Richter’s personally loaned painting Adler, 1972 faces a plaster bust of an eagle
(Josef Pallenberg’s Adlerbüste, undated) and three Falco fulvus eggs.
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In light of the display’s sundry materials, a recurrent trope in the literature has
been to compare the Section des figures with Borges’ Chinese Encyclopedia as cited by
Foucault in his preface to The Order of Things (1966):
[A]nimals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame,
(d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs (h) included in the present
classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair
brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long
way off look like flies.29
Douglas Crimp claims that Broodthaers’s ensemble of eagles “demonstrates the oddness
of the museum’s order of knowledge by presenting us with another, “impossible”
order.”30 Hence all these eagle objects are deemed to be heteronomous (a word that recurs
repeatedly across the Broodthaers literature). Crimp assumes that this disparate group of
eagle objects can only be heterotopic and “surreal,” in the lineage of Lautréamont’s
sewing machine and umbrella on an operating table.31 This Surrealist-Borgesian analogy
is invited by Foucault himself, who equates the classifying table on which Enlightenment
knowledge was ordered with Lautremont’s table. With this orderly table no longer
operative in post-Classical modernity, Crimp asserts that what conceals this incompatible
or “impossible order” is discursive power—what Foucault called “discursive
29
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formations”—which makes up for the loss of a stable site by forcing knowledge and
history into a homogenizing container for aesthetic reference. More recently, Rachel
Haidu agrees with this heterotopic and discursive reading of the Section des figures as
knowledge-power, further claiming it to be a parable for the nation-state and the
formation of its public: “Broodthaers’s Sections des Figures is a double-pronged
approach to the question of discourse: it ties together the notion of a public to that of its
history, and emphasizes its role in the construction of history by institutions such as the
museum.”32 Both Crimp and Haidu maintain that Broodthaers Section des figures is, like
Borges’s Chinese Encyclopedia, a heterotopic ensemble that only discursive power can
tie together.
However inviting this analogy between Broodthaers, Borges, and Foucault may
be, some persistent questions remain. While it is true that the Section des figures
thematizes the categorical power of classification, it is debatable that the Section des
Figures qualifies as a heterotopia. In Foucault’s understanding, a heterotopic ensemble
arises in Borges’ passage because its system of classification eludes common sense, even
logic. Knowledge is disturbed by a
disorder in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately
in the dimension without law or geometry, of the heteroclite; and that word should
be taken in its most literal, etymological sense: in such a state, things are ‘laid’,
‘placed’, ‘arranged’ in sites so very different from one another that it is
impossible to find a place of residence for them, to define a common locus
beneath them all.”33
32
33

Haidu, 207.
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Nothing of the sort is apparent in Broodthaers’s Section des Figures. While its disparate
objects proliferate, they do not elude logic or classification (as the physical manifestation
of the exhibition alone would attest). They are of different materials, intended for
different uses, and uprooted from their historical contexts, but they are all conjoined by a
manifest morphological relationship to the eagle. If one were to find an analogy for
Broodthaers’s Section des Figures in Foucault’s Order of Things it would not be with his
concept of heterotopia, but rather with his account of the origins of biology in the
classical episteme. Concurrent with Linnaean taxonomy, the rise of natural history
collections in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contributed to the formation of the
concept of species.34 Whereas subsequent forms of modern biological classifications
would take their categorical cues from the internal functioning of organisms, as well as
their evolution over time, Enlightenment natural history was at its roots morphological
and superficial. As Foucault pithily observes, “[n]atural history is nothing more than the
nomination of the visible.”35 Since Broodthaers was a frequent visitor to the Musée des
Sciences naturelles in Brussels, it is unsurprising that the artist would incorporate this
lineage of natural history displays into his work, rendering ‘species’ and ‘art’ as
companion categories exerting nominal powers over their objects through facile
morphology (as Haidu recounts, the catalog was itself based on eighteenth century
system of classifying art works).
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A deconstruction of the heterotopia (as necessarily containing some level of
sameness for it to function at all) is something Crimp, Haidu, and even Foucault miss
when considering Borges’ Chinese encyclopedia. For in truth, there remain two terms or
common loci in Borges’ text that keep its entries from shimmering in separate dimensions
and unconditional disorder. Both are so obvious as to be missed: firstly, it is the alphabet
that orders and links these paralogical entries together; the familiar regularity of
alphabetic classification sets the foundation for heterotopic play. Secondly (and even
more fundamentally), it is the conceptual wholeness of the animal that prowls both inside
and outside the alphabetic list. The “animals divided into” facing outside the list must be
homogenous before they can be splintered into entries—be they intuitive grouping of
species through visible affinities or the paralogics of Borgesian a-taxonomy. As such, the
two stable entities that reside both inside and outside the Borgesian heteroclite, keeping
its entries from incomprehensible play and disorder, are the alphabet and the animal.36
This analysis of Broodthaers’s Section des figures in light of Foucauldian
applicability or inapplicability is not simply academic, for it helps to interpret his
museum fiction more cautiously. The eagle, like Borges’ “animals divided into,” serves
as the transcendental signified that orders the display from inside and out. In this way, the
discursive formation of “eagle” and “art” function analogously. This observation fits with
an approach in the literature that stressed homogeneity over heterotopia. As Rosalind
Krauss has claimed, the eagle is a reductive “principle” or “emblem” for Conceptualism
in the “post-medium condition.”37 Steve Baker, an art historian working through animal
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studies, agrees with this assessment that the “eagle generally functioned for [Broodthaers]
as no more than an emblem for conceptual art, as Krauss acknowledges.”38 So the eagle is
the great reducer and is itself reduced to a principle or surrogate for conceptual art, or art
in general. If the analogy ‘eagle is to art as art is to eagle’ is to work smoothly, then the
eagle would have to be as fictive and as thoroughly discursive as the concept of art. But
can this be? I claim that for Broodthaers the answer is both yes and no. The eagle is a
fictive, customary, fabulist category like art, but unlike the latter, it is also a really
existing entity beyond its categorizations—or, at least, more autonomous in relation to its
classification than art objects are to theirs. In other words, while the discursivity of art is
human through-and-through, the eagle always remains, in part and somewhat elusively,
on a nonhuman plane. While Broodthaers clearly made analogies between art and eagles,
reappraising his (admittedly open-ended and vague) writings connected to the Section des
figures reveals something more complex than the simple equation eagle=art.
When one takes into account Broodthaers’s fascination with animals, bestiaries,
natural history, and zoology, it would be unlikely that the artist would simply reduce the
eagle to a straightforward metaphor or principle for art. Broodthaers states this relatively
directly in his catalog for the Section des figures in “Eagle-Ideology-Public, 1972.” In
this short text the artist explains his synthesis of Duchamp and Magritte when captioning
each eagle-object in the installation with the “negative inscription” declaring “this is not a
work of art.” Broodthaers claims this inscription forces the public into a choice: the eagle
is either deemed to be “modern art” despite the negative inscription and “becomes simply
an element in a method”; or, taking the inscription at face value, the eagle reverts back to
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“classical principles” as disparate examples of visual culture—for example, “the eagle in
art, in history, in ethnology, in folklore.” Broodthaers does not advocate one direction or
the other. Instead, he concludes his text in enigmatic resignation: “I am certain that I
would have just as little luck with the serpent, the lion or the bull.”39 My contention is
that, through this resignation, Broodthaers points to a more autonomous eagle beyond the
totalizing symbolic weight of modern art and imaginary inheritance of past visual
cultures.
Nearly unanimously, critics have missed this relatively more autonomous eagle.
This is witnessed by a specific oversight in the literature on the Section des figures. As
already noted, for Krauss the eagle is reduced to a principle. For Crimp, the display is
comprised of “266 objects representing eagles.”40 For Thomas McEvilley, every “piece
(except for three eagle eggs) involved the image of an eagle, and that category overrode
all others.”41 Lastly, Rainer Borgemeister notes that all of the loans are “objects
representing eagles.”42 This insistence that the Section des Figure is restricted to eagle
representations is patently false, for two of the most visually well-documented objects do
not represent eagles at all, but, in fact, really are eagles (albeit lifelessly stuffed). One sits
calmly perched on a picturesque branch, positioned in such a way to look regal. [ill. 3.8]
The other is posed as if in mid-air swooping down with exposed talons over a galloping
rabbit, who is not a representation either, but the animal herself.43 [ill. 3.9] Like Edgar
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Allen Poe’s purloined letter, the eagle in the open among all the two and threedimensional representations that refer to the lost bird in this forest of symbolism.
Broodthaers’s photograph of a live eagle (from his visit to the Antwerp zoo) is the first
image printed on the back side of the title page in the first Section des figures catalog
from 1972. [ill. 3.10] The only critic to mention the really-existing animal seems to have
been Michael Oppitz in the catalog: “[T]he eagles put on display all operate on the
symbolic level (this is even true of the stuffed eagle, expressing as it does a certain
ideology of nature), and to the extent that Broodthaers refers us to this, he connects the
eagle back to a first level of natural/objective speech.”44 What Oppitz leaves unanswered
is, what exactly this “natural/objective” level might be and how it can be attainable
directly. The trajectory of my reading of the Section des figures has built up to this
speculative question, and I maintain that whether or not this “natural/objective” level is
even attainable remains a central ambiguity of Broodthaers’s museum fiction.
In certain texts on the eagle during this period (published and unpublished
writings from 1971 to 1974) Broodthaers offers a rather straightforward critique of
ideology critique, which remains compatible with Oppitz’s distinction between “symbolic”
and “natural/objective” levels—in effect, by showing a gap between the two.45 In other
texts, however, a more complex and subtle explication of the eagle can be found that
complicates any ambition to reach the eagle on an objective plane. If previously,
Broodthaers had described his process as uncovering a false or fictitious iconography,
then subsequent statements invoke the disconcealment of a double-fiction. Here is
44
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Broodthaers from a 1972 interview with the curators of the Section des figures Jürgen
Harten and Katharina Schmidt:
It emerges finally that the eagle is itself, from the beginning, fiction… a fiction of
which the sociological and political content is increasingly difficult to understand
the further back into the past you go. How can one fully explain the birth of the
symbol and the myth of the eagle without the archaeological knowledge we have
on this subject?46
Here Broodthaers makes an important point for any mythoclastic practice, namely, that in
order to strip away the metaphors and symbols that have accrued across history, a
working knowledge of what is not symbolic and not mythic is essential. In other words,
of unearthing a primary or “archeological knowledge” of the subject-object-figure
carbonized underneath a historical veneer of arbitrary meanings. If the eagle is, from the
very beginning, a fiction, then Broodthaers is calling attention not only to the secondary
myth of eagles as symbols in culture, but also the more primary myth of the eagle as
reducible to a typological idea like “species,” itself a categorical assumption held
together by a long history of human-divine naming—a purportedly “natural/objective”
level if there ever was one.
This eagle residing beyond or subtending this double fiction can no longer be
“natural” or “objective” in scientific positivism, but should more properly be described as
the eagle degree zero.47 Whatever Broodthaers may have thought about its attainability,
he did not think that this zero figure could be found in reality. Instead, for Broodthaers, as
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for Lacan who he was reading (word has it that the artist read Écrits, unbelievably, in one
evening48), reality seems to be a more fundamental fiction or metaphor. In one of his open
letters from 1969, Broodthaers quotes the appendix to “The Instance of the Letter in the
Unconscious,” wherein Lacan makes this reality-fiction-metaphor a fundamental kernel
of human existence: “[T]he most serious reality, and even the sole serious reality for man,
if one considers its role in sustaining the metonymy of his desire, can only be retained in
metaphor.”49 Broodthaers alludes to this reality-fiction-metaphor in a number of his texts.
In “Section des Figures, 1972” from the catalog, Broodthaers believes that “a fictitious
museum like mine allows people to get a grasp of reality as well as what it conceals.”50 In
order to break with conventional habits of seeing and understanding requires not only a
grasp of reality but also an awareness of what this reality dissimulates. Here it is helpful
to bring in the Lacanian triad of the imaginary-symbolic-real; that the tissue of reality is
composed of imaginary and symbolic structures, while the real emerges from or resides
in a deeper recess of (or perhaps extreme proximity to) phenomenal existence.
Broodthaers himself differentiates between reality and the real in the 1972
interview cited above:
I think this exhibition can make it clear that the eagle and the way it is represented
stem from fiction. Two fictions are going to be in conflict here, which will
certainly have a provocative effect. It is vital to this exhibition for us to obtain,
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thanks to this confrontation of fictions, a consciousness more vigorous than reality,
than the reality of an idea, obviously.51
In both statements, Broodthaers appears to be saying there is something deeper or more
alive than not only reality but also ideation—though these are one and the same,
something that comes across more clearly in the original French: “L’exposition tire sa
réalité de ce que nous parvenons finalement à une conscience plus forte de la réalité –
j’entends par réalité la réalité d’une idée…”52 Unlike the translation above from
Broodthaers’s collected writings, which streamlines his repetitious use of the word
“reality,” I find his insistence to be crucial. In fact, the translation should read: “I
understand reality to be the reality of an idea.” Thus the “provocative effect” produced
by this meeting of a fictitious museum and a fictitious figure of the eagle is not only a
revelation of ideology and false symbols. More fundamentally, Broodthaers is suggesting
a negative onticology that is fundamentally more elusive than reality, which again can be
taken as the Lacanian real inhabiting beyond or underneath the “archeological knowledge”
of ideology and history (in short, the big Other). This reading is compatible with Birgit
Pelzer’s Lacanian reading of Broodthaers when she claims that his works’ “correlation
with language leads him to the question of the subject and the loss of the real, to a
concrete implementation of the notion that, to be represented, a thing must be lost.”53
In order to transition to my next section, I return to a detail from the Section des
Figures installation shot of the singular eagle perched on a branch. The bird is positioned
next to a print on the wall whose genre is similar to the Deyrolle prints Broodthaers used
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for Les Animaux. [ill. 3.8] Rather than evoking an imperious and powerful bird of prey,
the print reveals the eagle to be one of any number of animaux nuisibles or “pests” (the
full title of the print is Animaux nuisibles a l’agriculture or “Animals Pests in
Agriculture”). Ignobly relegated to a taxonomy of other birds, foxes, rodents, beetles, and
vermin of all sorts, the eagle belies its common associations of “nobility, height, [and]
imperious reach.”54 For the farmer, the eagle is a pest. For the fascist, a symbol of
imperial power (the predominant reading in the literature). For the marketer of
commodities, a brand. For the art critic, a metaphor for art. But where is the real eagle
beyond these imaginary and symbolic human supports? It is clear that the subject, or
figure, will be formed by an overdetermination of symbolic discourses and imaginary
programs, without, for all that, allowing us to uncover the plenitude of eagle in the real
outside these anthropocentric projections.
Animaux nuisibles a l’agriculture thus serves as a transition to the next section of
this chapter, since the print is a didactic piece of visual culture that pigeonholes not only
the nonhuman as subject, in this case as pest, but also inculcates the human subject who
is instructed as to what is or is not a pest. This arrives at subjectivization in the human
sense: like the figure of the eagle, the human subject is herself informed in similar ways.
It is to this I turn to next, namely, Broodthaers’s exploration of subject formation and his
excavation of language and imagery as the key constituents for historico-political subject
making—something that will elucidate his interest and use of pedagogic children’s
material, as well as his fascination with the alphabet.
3.3 SUBJECT FORMATION (ALPHA-BÊTE)
54
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In her essay “Readymade Originals,” Molly Nesbit traces Duchamp’s choices for
his readymade objects back to the schoolroom. From coffee grinders to snow shovels, the
archetypes for Duchamp’s breakthrough are found in the pedagogic curriculum
implemented by the French school system in the nineteenth century. Nesbit recovers
theses readymade originals in still extant student notebooks. These include exercises for
practicing basic drawings skills, especially those that lend themselves to industrial use
and modern design.55 Broodthaers’s Les Animaux print has a similar pedagogic
provenance. In 1871 the naturalist shop-turned publisher Maison Deyrolle began
providing classroom materials to the French state, becoming the foremost supplier of
pedagogic tools—from desks to anatomical models to didactic colored plates. These latter
include captioned illustrations of wild and domestic animals, mushrooms, and various
botanical taxonomies, all in a similar style and genre as Les Animaux de la ferme or
Animaux nuisibles a l’agriculture. A recent activity book for children by the still extant
publisher, which includes a re-printing of the original Les Animaux, notes in its preface
that Deyrolle’s plates have taught generations of French students lessons in zoology,
botany, and anatomy. In this new edition, there is even added textual information telling
the student how many liters of milk these cows can produce, how selective breeding has
enhanced certain qualities of production, and how each cow typifies its French region.56
If Duchamp’s “readymade originals” attest to an institutional shaping of common
sense in the classroom, then Broodthaers’s readymade print keys in on a similar yet more
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ideologically elusive moment of a child’s subject formation. Rather than inculcating
praxis for a more industrious workforce, illustrations like Les Animaux instilled a proper
taxonomy of the natural world, along with normalizing the instrumentalization of
nonhuman animals and their biological processes. This interest in children’s materials is
not an isolated incident in Broodthaers’s oeuvre. In fact, there is a special conjunction
between objects of infancy and animal life (as noted at the beginning of this chapter). In
addition to his poetic bestiaries invoking fabulist, moralist traditions—including La Bête
Noire and Pense-bête (1963-4)—Broodthaers incorporated blackboards, picture puzzle
blocks, various toys, a panoply of references to La Fontaine, and children’s books that
implement illustrations of animals as mnemonic devices or rebuses for learning. The use
of these objects from material culture often point towards childhood subject formation as
entangled with the animal, down to learning the individual components of Western
language itself: the letters of the alphabet.
According to Nesbit, the French curriculum “began by teaching the student the
straight and curved line, explaining that the entire world of appearances was built upon
combinations of these two elements: they were the first letters of the alphabet.”57
Education without these twenty-six phonetic letters seems unthinkable, yet it was only in
the nineteenth century that historians began theorizing a modern genealogy of the
alphabet (with the empirical help of archeological finds). Before then, theories of
alphabetic origins fell into two camps, which Plato already identified in the Cratylus: the
alphabet was either divine in origin, or thought to be of human invention. That the latter
would win out in a modern linguistic method is part and parcel of the Enlightenment
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history of the critique of religious illusions (setting the stage for an understanding of
alphabetic script in evolutionary terms). According to the historian Johanna Drucker, one
of the quintessential discoveries of the nineteenth century was to see alphabetic writing as
the precondition and producer of history itself: “It was this link, between the creation of
narratives about the history of writing and the realization that it was writing itself that
created history, which was perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of nineteenth
century theories about the alphabet.”58 These theories were also the first to trace
alphabetic letters back to their pictorial origins, be these “hieroglyphic precedents or…the
objects associated with the letternames.” 59 If alphabetic writing could be traced back to a
primordial human drive to preserve and record certain facts, then the formal conditions
and origins of alphabet script were pictographic and mnemonic in nature.
Letters proliferate and cling to Broodthaers’s works from start to finish—on
children’s stools, bricks, toy blocks and puzzles, in paintings, films, and writings, as well
as across his installations, such as the dual slide projectors in “Le Privilège de l’art, 1249197 that playfully scrambled any proper phonetic relationship between individual letters
and rebuses.60 Echelle avec alphabet, 1965-71, a readymade work featuring a small
child’s ladder leaning against the wall, appears to thematize childhood development into
the orders of adulthood as driven by alphabetic order. [ill. 3.11] On the ladder,
nonsensical words and partial alphabets are written on the small planks of wood that form
its rungs. Just above the ladder, affixed to the wall at child’s eye-level, is a large painting,
empty save for a half written “y” an “z” in its center and an incomprehensible word
58
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scribbled on the lower left. Above this painting at adult eye-level is a painting of the
alphabet written neatly in proper, lowercase writing. Mental and physical growth runs in
tandem with the acquisition of typological systematization—from disorder to order and
from the imaginary to the symbolic. As with so many of Broodthaers’s word games, the
concept of alphabetic “order” should here be taken in both the formal and legal sense.
Like Deleuze and Guattari’s diagnosis of traditional pedagogy, in which the student is
always inculcated by the “order-word” from a schoolmistress who does not so much
inform as command, the road to adulthood runs through an imperious alphabet.61 For his
part, in order to détourn the order-word or order-letter, the artist even designed his own
picture book for children in 1972, in which the ordering of the letters renders its
alphabetic exercises unusable for orthodox learning.62
With this manifest interest in the alphabet, Broodthaers coded certain poems and
works with this theoretical genealogy of the alphabet, beginning with his most celebrated
collection of poetry, Pense-bête (1963-4). Depending on the inclusion or exclusion of the
hyphen, the word “pense-bête” has at least three meanings. Transliterally, it is “animal
thinking.” Still literal but pejorative, it is a “silly thought.” Its most common usage,
however, is idiomatic: a pênse-bete is an aide-mémoire or a mnemonic device. The word
contains its own meta-mnemonics. In order to remind the reader of its meaning via an
internal semantic relation, the hyphenated word piggy-backs on the literal sense of its
component parts, thereby alerting the reader to its definition: a thought (pense-) so easy
to remember that even a dumb animal (-bête) could do so. Fittingly, then, Broodthaers’s
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Pense-bête is a bestiary filled with jellyfish, boas, dogs, flies, and skates, among a
number of other animals.
The most important lines in Pense-bête for my analysis of the alpha-bête—the
conjunction between animals and letters—are the poems “The Ox” and “The House.”
They face each other across the gutter of the book. On the left-hand side is “The Ox,”
which reads in full: “On the tongue, he plays the tightrope walker. He has succeeded.”63
If read in light of the history of the alphabet, these lines key in on a crucial feature of its
development. What began in early Semitic writing systems (Seirites, Caananite,
Phoenecian) as the “aleph,” a pictograph representing the morphology of an ox’s head,
became abstracted and shifted ninety degrees in the Greek alphabet to produce the letter
“A” (so that today the ox lurks in the letter A with its horns point downwards and its
snout upwards). Excavating this origin reveals a residue of mimesis in even the most
stylized typography. Yet Broodthaers’s poem does not only point back to this
pictographic origin of the first letter of the alphabet. For if the ox has succeeded “on the
tongue,” then Broodthaers’s poem also alludes to the historical triumph of the alphabet as
a phonetic system. In other words, the poem points to the humanist victory of signs and
language as reducible to speech-sounds, and it is here where a discussion of alphabetic
origins becomes more than an uncovering its hidden animal figures: the phonetic alphabet
always presumes meaning to be synonymous with human speech at the occlusion of other
forms of communication (a reduction that, by this chapter’s end, will be shown to
implicate both art and animals)
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At the same latitude across the page from “The Ox” is “The House,” which reads
in full: “On the slippery slopes where the braggart digs his abyss, the house makes its
niche.”64 Here Broodthaers alludes to the second letter of the alphabet, the “B,” which has
its pictographic roots as the “bet” or “house.” Initially a simple rectangle or frame
demarcating inside from outside, this pictograph turned phonetic symbol became
bifurcated and bubbled out into the second letter of the alphabet. Broodthaers once again
implicates phonetic speech through the “braggart” who cannot help but speak or sing his
own praises (this motif is a recurrent theme in his work, especially through the figure of
La Fontaine’s vainglorious crow). Taken together, “The Ox” and “The House” poems
reproduce the synechdotal etymology of the word “alphabet,” which gets its name from
the fusion of its first two letters (aleph-bet, or ox-house).
With these two poems, Broodthaers places the A and the B, and by implication,
the alphabet, on precarious if not abyssal grounds: the A-ox has succeeded on a tightrope
(a possible reference to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra) while the B-house was built on slippery
slopes over an abyss. In a contemporaneous text, De l’écriture a la typographie (1967),
the novelist and typographer Jérôme Peignot describes the emergence of the alphabet
similarly as a quasi-miraculous event whose letters were shaped out of chaos over the
abyss of non-meaning. Peignot finds latter-day re-enactments of this materialization of
the sign-letter out of nothingness in van Gogh’s painting (crows over fields doubling as
primordial sign shapes), as well as the Belgian poet Henri Michaux’s formal
experimentations with neo-alphabetic poems, which are written-drawn as undecidable
mixtures of pictograms, ideograms, and letters.65 The “quest for a new alphabet,” or for
64
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unearthing the primordial event of forming symbols and signs from images and shapes, is
a return to a semiotic zero degree common to van Gogh and Michaux.
The observance of this co-originary nexus between image-sign, or pictogramsymbol, is central to a more consequential text from 1967 than Peignot’s, namely,
Derrida’s Of Grammatology. In the section titled “The Alphabet and Absolute
Representation,” Derrida states that divorcing pictography or image from phonography or
speech-concept is impossible outside of metaphysical dogmatics: “[P]ure pictography and
pure phonography are two ideas of reason. Ideas of pure presence: in the first case,
presence of the represented thing in its perfect imitation, and in the second, the selfpresence of speech itself.”66 As such, neither speech nor painting can ever do away with
their indicative function, and they are both held together by a fundamental inscriptive and
graphic activity (or arché-writing). In other words, pure mimesis and pure speech are
necessarily contaminated by the spatio-temporal preconditions of writing, be it in the
mind or on canvas. It is no wonder that what connects Derrida’s early philosophy to
Broodthaers’s work, however obliquely, is a mutual attention to Mallarmé. For the
philosopher, Mallarmé opened the way for his concept of différance, for the material
spacing and non-presence that form the unconscious preconditions for signs and
meaning.67 For the artist, Mallarmé’s emphasize on the materiality of language was of
equal importance, (as was the notion of space, Broodthaers even claiming that Mallarmé
is the “source of modern art” and “invented modern space”68). In fact, Broodthaers takes
this material reduction of language as far as it can go in his Un coup de dés jamais
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n’abolira le hazard. Image, 1969. [ill. 3.12] The book is an appropriation of Mallarmé’s
original poem, yet attempts to parse out language-writing from form-image (in contrast to
Michaux’s synthetic poetics). Broodthaers reprints the poem in his “Préface” in a
standard format reading left to right, with only forward slashes indicating what once was
Mallarmé’s idiosyncratic spacing in the original layout. After this textual preface, the
formal typographical play of the poem is preserved as black lines and blocks, whose size
and placement are dictated by the original layout across 12 double pages. Text and image
have been distilled and kept in separation, or as separate as possible, for it is clear that
while the lines no longer reproduce phonetic letters, they make manifest the latent yet
necessary spatio-temporal preconditions of arché-writing, or the sin qua non of all
textuality, be it written or spoken.
Interestingly, the critic Thomas McEvilley advances such a reading of
Broodthaers’s Un coup de dès by taking recourse to nonhuman perception: “By
eliminating language [Broodthaers] returns a classic Modern text part of the way from
culture back to nature—from acculturated human thought to thinking “like an animal,” to
seeing the page as, say, a dog might.”69 McEvilley’s translation of “pense-bête” in his
essay as “animal thinking” may get the better of him here, yet there is some truth to his
observation. Broodthaers, in affinity with Derrida, demonstrates that language and form
are fundamentally inseparable; that the minimum requirement for both speech and
writing is spacing and differentiation. To strip away phonetic sound-signs while keeping
the formal differentiations on the page make the human and nonhuman immersed at the
same level of information. This serves to show that not only speech—so often deemed to
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be anthroproprietary in humanist thought—but also writing, are supplemented by a past
nonhuman foundation, which, like the aleph, has its animal origins dissimulated or
effaced. This observance of arché-writing as pre-human or pre-phonetic is a crucial
component of recent posthumanist theory. One of its key reference points comes from Of
Grammatology, specifically, the following passage: “[s]ince ‘genetic inscription’ and the
‘short programmatic chains’ regulating the behavior of the amoeba or the annelid up to
the passage beyond alphabetic writing to the orders of the logos and of a certain homo
sapiens, the possibility of the grammè structures the movement of its history according to
rigorously original levels, types, and rhythms.”70 From this point of view, one might even
read Broodthaers’s formal distillation of Un coup de dés as the grammatico-genetic
sequencing of Mallarmé’s poem, of which human and nonhuman have equal perceptual
access.
3.3.2 AUTOPOIESIS
Arising from its first two component letters, the alphabet is a tautological system
of the metonymic variety. In recent posthumanist theory, this type of sui generis
formation is described as “autopoiesis.” Originating from biology to describe an
organism’s ability to self-generate, an autopoietic structure is any self-contained system
arriving at fruition self-reflexively.71 Such a structure can materialize through basic
cellular multiplication or phenomenological nervous function. This structure can also be
semiological, since language is what opens onto an autopoietic access to the world—the
bringing forth of a world through correlating codes. The stakes of autopoiesis become
evident when framed as a question of origins: if there exists such a thing as a purely
70
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autopoietic, self-contained structure, then this structure is autonomous and contains its
own origins. It is self-sufficient in the purity of a self-efficient cause. In other words, it is
a natural entity not generated by culture in any human sense. If, however, such a structure
only appears to be autonomously autopoietic—in that peeling back layers reveals hidden
origins that have been effaced or repressed—then this structure contains a historicopolitical interference from outside its structure. Its ontological and epistemological
origins reside partly outside itself. Duchamp’s readymades revealed art to be of the latter
historico-political variety, since they disclosed the institutional and discursive mechanism
outside the art object as its source (a bourgeois mechanism of power that historically
erased itself by appearing to be a natural given). Like the bourgeois concept of art as
autonomous, the humanist subject is a structure that portends to be a natural given.
Across a number of philosophical corners since at least the 1960s, Man-as-humanistsubject came to be understood as no longer a natural entity, but rather a self-reflexive
historico-political process of consolidation that covered up the tracks of any nonhuman
features or origins, including his animality and the nonphonic dimensions of his language.
Broodthaers’s treatment of the alphabet reveals it to be of the historico-political
variety, since its nonphonetic and pictorial origins, like the aleph and the bet, have been
dissimulated through the abstraction of phonological typography. Yet Broodthaers’s
autopoietic aesthetics are not limited to the alphabet. Seemingly obsessed with origins,
the artist’s poetry and visual vocabulary is replete with objects verging on autopoiesis:
his recurring use of mussels, eggs, coal can all be described as self-contained base units
of self-generation. [ill. 3.13] From these base units in his early work, Broodthaers can be
shown to expand these autopoietic concerns to a higher level of complexity by the
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1970s—namely, to the equally tautological generation of human subjectivity itself.72 In
examining how autopoiesis functions in his work, I limit myself first to the figure of the
mussel; then I move to speech as the historically privileged form of recursive subject
formation.
In “La Moule,” his most celebrated poem from Pense-bête, Broodthaers describes
the mussel as having craftily avoided the mold of society. She formed herself out of
herself, thereby achieving perfection. Having secreted her own shape in tautological
perfection, the mollusk is an autopoietic creature. In the poem, this structure of pure
containment is equated with the counter-liquidity of the “anti-sea.” In Broodthaers’s
vocabulary, the anti-sea serves to describe any structure that, like the mussel, amounts to
pure containment and consolidation. Conversely, any association with the “sea”—fish,
water, and foam—often represents the smooth space of non-identity and the corruption of
individuality or self-containment.73 One only has to recall another poem from Pense-bête
to emphasize this elementary liquefying power of the sea: “Water. All it enfolds is
smaller than it.”74 In some of his open poems, Broodthaers contests that even a priori
geometrical shapes like triangles, cubes, spheres, or cylinders cannot escape this law of
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the sea.75 In this way, the oscillation between the container and that which exceeds
containment—the “anti-sea” and the “sea”—reflect a fundamental binary in
Broodthaers’s work. This dialectic between sea and anti-sea is comically played out in
Broodthaers’s Belgian Lion, 1968, a found plastic toy of a lion’s face melting into
shapelessness, only to be formed and contained by frying pan as frame.76 [ill. 3.14]
If the mussel is synonymous with the anti-sea, with pure containment, then its
sister poem, “The Jellyfish,” represents the diffusive properties of the sea. Like
Broodthaers’s positioning of the ox and house poems, the jellyfish floats parallel with the
mussel from across the gutter of Pense-bête. Unlike the mussel, this ocean dweller attains
perfection not through formal containment, but through pure formlessness: “She is
perfect. No mould. Only body.”77 With no shell (moule-mussel) the jellyfish is
diaphanous and flouts structure. As Jean-Philippe Antoine has remarked in his astute
readings of these poems, “[m]ussel and medusa present the double model of perfection,
since both lie beyond the grasp of the means of mechanical reproduction. The first
through the invention of its own mould, and of the autonomous space the latter grants it;
the second by doing without any mould whatsoever, without losing body for all that.”78
Antoine’s insight is important for any autopoietic reading of Broodthaers’s poetics, for if
a structure can be mechanically reproduced—that is, be a result of a process outside itself
(like a print is to a printing press or a car to an assembly line), then it cannot truly be
autopoietic.
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For his 1966 exhibition Moules Oeufs Frites Pots Charbon, Broodthaers offered
another poem featuring the mussel, “My Rhetoric.” The poem serves as a caption for the
image of a glass bottle filled with mussels, and it implicates the mollusk once more as
creaturely autopoesis: [ill. 3.15]
Me I say I Me I say I
The King of Mussels Me You say You
I tautologize. I conserve. I sociologue.
I demonstrably demonstrate. As for the sea of mussels, I have lost the time lost.
I say, I, the King of Mussels, the speech of Mussels.79
Unlike the mussel from Pense-bête, however, the mussel of “Ma Rhetoric” is autopoietic
in appearance only.80 His formation relies on a repetitive and seemingly overeager form
of speech. This sovereign mussel has also changed genders. Male and monarchical, he
sounds anxious to demonstrate his self-containment and self-generation. Moreover, if the
mussel from Pense-bête reads as a naturally secreting formation holding off the anti-sea,
then the repelling of the anti-sea ascribed to the King of Mussels is cultured, sociological,
and self-preserving.
There are two elements to consider in reading this important poem. Firstly, the
King of Mussels is a parody of the Cartesian cogito (“Me I say I Me I say I”), a parody
that seems to uncover the circular logistics of this seminal humanist motif. If I think
therefore I am purports to autopoietic purity, then Broodthaers shows there to be a
supplemental statement of expression needed to sustain this self-reflexivity. Namely, a
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Marcel Broodthaers, Moules oeufs frites pots charbon (Antwerpen: Wide White Space Gallery, 1966).
Translation taken from Broodthaers, Marcel Broodthaers: Collected Writings, 158.
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Though, strictly speaking, mussels are also not fully autopoietic. Their shells, while secreted from the
ground up, are generated through an assimilation of protein sourced from its environment that calcifies.
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speech that affirms itself through itself as the self-same basis for thought in
consciousness: Me I say I, or I think therefore I am the one who says what thinking is by
saying I. In other words, both the King of Mussels and the humanist subject only appear
in self-authorized sovereignty—they both “demonstrably demonstrate” themselves—and
the decision to equate the cogito with speech is revealed to be a historico-political
decision.81 Secondly, the poem is about the effacement of origins from which this selfauthorized autonomy sustains itself. In the original French, there is a play on words that
is lost in the English: “Au niveau de mer des moules, j’ai perdu le temps perdu.” The mer
of mussels can sound as homonym for both “sea” (mer) and “mother” (mère). Both the
sea and the mother corrupt any claims to the anti-sea of tautological self-formation (one
through Darwinian oceanic sources, the other through matrilineal origins). Embedded
within this play on words is also a literary allusion, for if the King of Mussels has “lost
time lost,” then he can no longer be in search of it—he cannot go in search of lost time (À
la recherche du temps perdu). This allusion to a Proustian reflex of childhood memory
and history, which the royal mussel has lost time for, can also be understood as an
effacement of origins. The “King of Mussels, the speech of mussels,” is amnesiac.
Broodthaers’s fascination with autopoesis and self-affirmation through speech is
inspected further by way of a parrot in two related installations in 1974. The first, Ne
dites pas que je ne l’ai pas dit—Le Perroquet (1974), was the only new work exhibited at
the Wide White Space Gallery as part of Broodthaers’s re-visiting of his 1966 exhibition
Moules Œufs Frites Pots Charbon.82 Now with an amended title reflecting the bird’s
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inclusion, Moules Œufs Frites Pots Charbon Perroquets, the new installation featured a
living African grey parrot enclosed in a birdcage resting on a stand, flanked on both sides
by his ever-present potted palms. [ill. 3.16] As part of the opening, Broodthaers read his
poem “Ma Rhetoric” from the original 1966 catalog. In overhearing the artist’s recitation,
the parrot would (presumably) repeat the poem over the course of the exhibition’s run.83
Both artist and bird, then, attest to a living presence in the gallery, and both do so with
the capacity for speech as recitation. As part of his exhibition L’Eloge du sujet that
opened a few days later at Kunstmuseum Basel, Broodthaers would include a second
version in the room titled “La Chambre du Perroquet.” [ill. 3.17] This iteration was
similar to the first, except for three important changes: the parrot was no longer a living,
breathing bird but a stuffed dead specimen (a red headed Amazon parrot under glass
borrowed from Basel’s natural history museum); the recitation of “Ma Rhetoric” was no
longer spoken live but played over a recording device; and the title of the work was
changed to Dites partout que je l’ai dit.
Haidu persuasively interprets Ne dites pas que je ne l’ai pas dit—Le Perroquet as
Broodthaers’s comical take on the artist retrospective. Essentially, the live bird
“vacuously repeats” the artist’s words, thereby emptying out meaning through repetition
akin to the re-installation inherent to the museum retrospective.84 This reading is certainly
compelling, yet it does not take into account the call and response relationship between
first and second versions. Paying attention to the subtle differences in titles manifests
something more than a parody of art retrospectives. It raises important questions about
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the space of elocution and the ownership of language, as well as the subjecthood these
give rise to. In both instances, it may be assumed that the parrot is the surrogate for the
artist (and vice versa), both of whom recite “Ma Rhetoric”: “Me I say I Me I say I.” In
order to recite this poem, however, writing takes precedence, since both human and
nonhuman rely on an inscribed copy of the poem for their recitations. More precisely, the
artist’s speech relies on his text and, in turn, the parrot’s speech relies on the artist’s
speech for mimicry. Speech is therefore revealed to be a secondary and tertiary order in
respect to the primary source, writing (an irony that should not be lost on a poem whose
protagonist, as I analyzed above, privileges a tautological definition of the cogito as
reducible to speech acts). If the space from which their elocution arises is primarily
textual, or from a borrowed language outside the mind-as-speech, then the parrot
installations pose certain questions about the role of language in subject formation and
the discursive shaping of an “I” whose semantic conditions reside outside itself.
In both versions, the parrot-artist affirms that he is the one doing the speaking, yet
does so in two different ways. The first title, Ne dites pas que je ne l’ai pas dit, translates
to “do not say that I did not say it.” Through an imperative utterance, the parrot-artist
declares his ability to speak, that no one should speak in his place, and that he is not
simply vacuously repeating borrowed phrases (though admittedly, this could always be a
possibility no matter the utterance). He forbids anyone from speaking on his behalf, or
from saying that his words are not his own (in alliance with autopoiesis, since the parrotartist is declaring himself to be self-reliant in speaking his own mind). In the second
version, however, the parrot-artist is no longer so self-sufficient. The space of elocution is
no longer closed off in the shell of its own utterance. Like the first installation, its title is
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an imperative utterance, yet one that necessarily amounts to a supplication or request:
Dites partout que je l’ai dit, which translates to “tell everyone that I said it.” However
demanding or forceful this request may be, it categorically relies on others’ ability to
speak on its behalf. In contrast to the self-reliance entailed by the first title, whose
performative structure already attests to a certain ability to speak in one’s place, this
second title relies on an audience to spread the word.85
These observation lead to more than simply a parodic take on the retrospective, as
they attest to a questioning of the role language plays in subject formation. This is in
keeping with the contemporaneous and multi-faceted de-centering of the subject in
Lacanian psychoanalysis, structuralist, and poststructuralist theories: language is only
borrowed by the subject and will outlive him; textuality courses through and interpellates
the subject, supplying him with the coordinates for his place of locution; the subject, as
with the author function, is never self-contained, but always reliant on a discourse that
both pre-and-postdates him; and, pedagogically, much like a parrot, a human subject
begins as a child vacuously repeating and mimicking words, signs, and gestures that
ultimately congeal into an “I” over time, from the alphabet onwards. In his mock school
exercise book, Projet pour un traité de toutes les figures en trois parties, 1972,
Broodthaers is unambiguous about this:
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Running parallel with this subtle shift from a self-reliant to reliant elocution is the move from a living
presence to an absent presence in the gallery space. In the first version, the parrot is alive and, whether or
not in automatic parroting or with semiological intent, has the ability to make speech sounds (as Derrida
would say, even if his ability to say “I” is not as semiologically self-aware as a human saying “I,” the
tropical bird has the ability to be or do I). In the second installation, a different parrot is stuffed and dead
under glass. He has lost the ability to be or do I, not to mention the ability to repeat “Me I say I Me I say I.”
Analogously, in the first version, the artist is present alongside the living bird, while in the second he is
absent and only preserved by voice recorder. Both bird and voice are embalmed, one with formaldehyde
and the other through magnetic tape. In this way, the artist mimics the parrot as first a living presence in the
exhibition space, and then a petrified absent-presence.
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In French, we say of someone who writes and speaks appropriately that he is a
man in good possession of his tongue (language)…What if before he acquired this
mastery, the tongue (language) belonged to another and was merely on loan…86
My analysis of Broodthaers’s treatment of the alphabet evinces a certain
skepticism towards speaking, though one could mention many examples of this in
Broodthaers’s work—most notably, his recurring use of La Fontaine’s fable Le Corbeau
et le Renard (The Crow and the Fox) with its eponymous crow whose garrulous vanity
always gets the better of him. Haidu persuasively understands Broodthaers’s
disengagement with the occupation of the Palais des Beaux-Art, Brussels in 1968 and his
turn to writing open letters and museum fictions as a dissatisfaction with direct political
speech.87 Broodthaers’s Interview with a cat (1970) may further allude to his distrust of
speech. Recorded in 1970 during the iteration of his Musée d’Art Modern, Département
des Aigles in Düsseldorf, the artist asks the feline, in dumb repetition, “is this a pipe?”
The cat can only reply through a non-phonetic voice, one that could never meet the
conditions of the interview, which coerces as certain type of speech (and even if the cat
could, Magritte’s paradox is notoriously unanswerable anyway). In his recent
interpretation of this recording, de Duve treats the cat as essentially stupid i.e. that the
work is “hilarious” in the artist’s insistence on repeating a question the animal can never
understand.88 Maybe, but Broodthaers seems to beg a reversal. One might very well
consider the stupidity of a human—in this case the artist, who is almost certainly cheekily
standing in for the art critic—insisting on using speech to interact with a nonhuman—in
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this case the cat, who might be a surrogate for Broodthaers himself and his skepticism
towards what he understood to be the woefully reductive tendencies of art critical
discourse. In other words, if there is a bêtise here it is the speaker thinking he will get a
meaningful response when engaging either a painting or a nonhuman simply via speech.
3.4 INDUSTRIAL REPEATABILITY (THE ANIMAL READYMADE?)
“I don’t exhibit living creatures, men or animals.”89 This is a curious statement by
Broodthaers seeing that he included a number of living animals in his work (as this
chapter has begun to demonstrate). One way to understand this claim is by keying in on
the word that so preoccupied Broodthaers, namely, “exhibit.” Exhibiting and including
animals are two different things—the latter evokes a modicum of participation, while the
former only reification. So when, in 1966, Broodthaers’s placed chickens in crates just
outside the Galerie Gogeime, they were, strictly speaking, not objects in the show. A
photograph shows the artist feeding the birds on the street, while through the windows
the gallery is filled with gallery goers to his exhibition. [ill. 3.18] Perhaps Broodthaers
was drawing a parallel between gallery and cage, though whether he is the chicken, or the
crowd is a flock, remains undecidable (both readings are always possible). Having used
egg shells in his work for some years to this point, his inclusion of these chickens serves
to partially un-alienated their labor, or at least make their contributions more visible.90
It is here that Broodthaers most clearly complicates the postwar reception of the
readymade as being tantamount to what De Duve has called the “anything-whatever.”91
While he exhibited a slew of dead animals (eagles, snakes, mussels, or at least their
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shells) when Broodthaers chose to interact with living animals—be they chickens, parrots,
a camel, or a cat—they are rarely presented as art objects but as catalysts, participants, or
performers. When it comes to incorporating animal life into art, he complicates what for
so many others—Fluxus, Beuys, Vienna Aktionism, and many contemporary artists
since—are uncomplicatedly readymade forms of life.
The original context for Broodthaers’s statement is a circa 1970-5 radio interview
with the Atelier de Création Radiophonique, France Culture, which included fellow artist
David Lamelas; Broodthaers attempts to explain his incorporation of a really-existing
camel from the Antwerp zoo in the first version of Un Jardin d’Hiver and in the [6
minute] film Jardin d’Hiver (ABC) (which was filmed during the first version of Un
Jardin d’Hiver and subsequently played over a television monitor in the installation’s
second version, Un Jardin d’Hiver II). 92 Both documentary photographs and the film
show the camel with handler and artist crossing the streets of Brussels, standing just in
front of the Palais des Beaux-Arts, as well as inside the corridor of the exhibition space.
[ill. 3.19] Bemused by how easy it was to loan the camel, Broodthaers explains that the
animal’s presence among the palms of Le Jardin d’Hiver draws a “parallel between two
exoticisms” – on the one hand, the exoticism of the winter garden, and on the other, the
exoticism of an animal having more “to do with the desert.”93 In a contemporaneous
interview, the artist claimed that his Un Jardin d’Hiver evokes the desert through its
absence (that is, aside from the connotations of actual potted palm trees in situ). Instead
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of open air, sand, and hot sun, however, this “desert” refers to the desolation and
emptiness of contemporary culture: “This desert, which is both real and symbolic, first in
terms of the situation, so from an illustrative point of view, and of the current political
and economic situation, but also certainly even more so the desert reigning within our
society, the desert of leisure, in the end the desert of the world of art.”94 Broodthaers’s
“desert” is therefore symbolic and pejorative, yet for all that, still a real space. Un Jardin
d’Hiver represents both the colonial appropriation and domestication of nonwestern
forms, as well as the eventual banalization of these forms in their host culture—the
emptiness and vapidity of consumer culture.95 The camel then, in turn, represents the
desert in a doubled sense: as a symbol of its indigenous climate, which like the palms
only allude to the desert obliquely, and as a really-existing form of life plucked from its
surroundings and domesticated/inserted within the dryness of leisure culture (zoo), as
well as within the conceptually driven art world (gallery); after all, it should not be lost
that this first iteration of Un Jardin d’Hiver was part of a group show of conceptual
artists, including Carl André, Daniel Buren, and On Kawara, whose works would
certainly have seemed dry next to Broodthaers’s winter garden installation.
For all this, however, the camel is not only a symbol or surrogate for the desert.
When Broodthaers led the animal from her adopted home to his gallery opening, she
became a nonhuman viewer of contemporary art. In this sense, it would appear that, after
all, Broodthaers made use of the Antwerp zoo script discussed at the beginning of this
94
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chapter. Instead of visiting and filming the zoo directly, however, Broodthaers re-creates
the zoo himself (in effect, making a zoo-fiction much like his museum-fictions, complete
with loan agreement). Rather than speculate on nonhuman viewpoints from inside the
cages, Un Jardin d’Hiver brings a nonhuman to witness contemporary art and culture;
rather than comparing zoo-goers to the animals on display, Broodthaers set up satirical
conditions that show the institutional complicity between the zoo and the gallery as
tangential spaces of spectacle, conquest, and domestication; lastly, in a species reversal, it
is now the nonhuman animal that visits and gawks at the confines of human activity.
Like the eagle, however, this really-existing camel is something more than a
symbol of institutional critique, or even a cheeky nonhuman museum visitor. In the same
interview with Lamelas, Broodthaers disavows this somewhat facile gesture of camel as
vehicle of institutional critique. What really interests the artist (like his feline
interviewee) is the animal’s inability to communicate—its mute presence in a context that
calls for endless discourse—as well as its beauty: “For me, the camel is about noncommunication. The camel is animal beauty. I’d say that the rest doesn’t interest me, I
mean, the palm, the museum.”96 When Broodthaers asks Lamelas what he thinks of the
camel, the Argentinian artist replies with an institutional question concerning the
mystifying powers of the museum. Yet once more Broodthaers insists not on answering
this question, but redirecting it to deal with the camel (“No, no, but what does the camel
mean?”). When Lamelas answers more directly, he finds the animal’s presence to be

96

Immediately after this statement, Broodthaers’s says: “To make things clear, ‘I’d say’ means that I’m not
saying it.” This seems to disavow his original disavowal. Yet it also performs non-communication and a
lack of clarity through speech, which is a recurrent thread in this chapter. “Interviews with Marcel
Broodthaers at the Atelier de Création Radiophonique, 1970-5” in Broodthaers, Marcel Broodthaers:
Collected Writings, 456.
202

comical, a description that strikes Broodthaers as apropos: “he’s quite right, because
beauty, in the present situation, when you touch it, is something comical.”97
As with Broodthaers’s outdated poetic bestiaries that no longer communicate
clear-cut lessons, or have been made un-readable in plaster, this “animal beauty” is out of
place in a contemporary context of primary structures, conceptual art, and the demands of
the art market for commodifiable objects. Moreover, as a singular life form that cannot
simply be procured from a factory or shelf, the camel cannot be a readymade in the
Duchampian sense. This is so in two ways: since it is found to be beautiful, however
anachronistically, it cannot fulfill the anti-aesthetic requirements of Duchampian antiretinality (and by extension, cannot take part in the cerebral aesthetics of conceptual art),
but more crucially, a camel cannot be an industrially reproduced object. Of all the
historical connotations initially lost in the postwar reception of Duchamp, it is the
forgetting of the readymade as a repeatable, industrial object, which was a crucial
component of its critical thrust.98
This latter observation—that the animal as fleshy, singular existence resists its
reduction to a readymade industrial object—returns me one last time to the Les Animaux
print. In fact, the relationship between industrial repeatability and nonhuman animals is
the darkest feature of this work. Broodthaers’s substitution of automobile models for
names of cows is not only a pithy object lesson in structuralist linguistics. Nor is it simply
a détournement of pedagogic material culture and its role in subject formation. It is also a
history lesson in the expansion of industrialized agriculture. Broodthaers’s nominal
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substitutions alert us to the long material history of the modern Fordist assembly line as
galvanized by animal production and commodification. In the animal studies literature,
this genealogy is well-known: Henry Ford’s inspiration for his assembly-line found its
impetus in a Chicago slaughterhouse, which by the early nineteenth century had already
mechanized the mass disassembly of animal bodies. In Animal Capital, Nicole Shukin
offers a compellingly conjoined material history of slaughterhouses, automobiles, and
film.99 Not only was gelatin, rendered from animal bodies, a pre-condition for the making
of celluloid, but the desire for a moving filmic spectacle can be traced back to the on-site
public tours of slaughterhouses given by the companies themselves for publicity.100
Shukin analyses the tour books handed out after the tours, which blunt and naturalize the
apparent on-site violence by a narrative mediator in the form of a child leading adults on
a tour of the facilities. Here the normally hierarchy of pedagogy is reversed, for it is the
child who informs the adult (for example, in one image the little girl sits on a railing
pointing to dead pigs hanging on hooks, as if giving the well-dressed couple looking on
the tour). Of course, behind this dissimulating reversal of the child-adult relationship are
yet other adults behind the scenes who are in the business of mass slaughter, and whose
pamphlet facilitates the flow of bodies, capital, and spectacle.
In the history of twentieth century art, the mechanization of the slaughterhouse
has not been without its detractors, though for reasons that have more to do with
aesthetics than with ethics. Bataille’s 1929 commentary in Documents on Eli Lotar’s
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photographs of a Parisian slaughterhouse already draws attention to this changing role of
the animal in modern economies.101 Ever unwilling to let go of sacrifice, Bataille laments
the end of ritualistic traditions involving the animal, its “orgiastic” blood-flow, and the
meaning of its death within the structural fabric of culture. He redirects his nostalgia
towards a critique of the meaninglessness of modern slaughter. He deplores the aseptic
conditions of modern production, which turns once meaningful killing into a pathological
site to be disavowed and “quarantined like a plague-ridden ship.”102 This creates the
conditions for a modern subject whose increased distance from slaughter and sacrifice
leads to boredom and an unhealthy obsession with cleanliness. Once this subject takes
over the city, Bataille argues, we have a modern populace with the collective vitalism of
mere vegetables.103
Lotar’s photographs in Documents partly bear out Bataille’s history of a desacrificial economy. On the one hand, the bloody aspect of the slaughterhouse remains
visible: in one photograph, a slab of animal flesh seems to be sliding along the stone floor
in its own blood like a large pad of furry butter. [ill. 3.20] This is the “chaotic” aspect of
slaughtering that Bataille pines for. On the other hand, another photograph shows a
courtyard outside of the slaughterhouse. [ill. 3.21] On a wall scrawled with graffiti, the
workers have propped up mostly inedible (yet still useful, possibly for celluloid) remains
of cow hoofs and ankles side-by-side, one after the other. Unlike the blood-soaked scene
of the other photograph, here the serialized aesthetic of modernity reigns. There is no
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blood and nothing seems out-of-joint. Only one hoof falls out of line, sliding to the side
and behind the others. This aberration reads like a formal stain in the composition, for in
all other respects, anti-septic modernity is on the cusp of complete victory. This
photograph conditions the viewer to accept inimitable forms of life as serialized objects,
which can be endlessly reproduced and lined up in a row—in other words, as animal
readymades.
During the postwar period this objectification of domesticated nonhuman animals,
which gave them the appearance of being industrially reproduced as readymades, would
reach completion in factory farming practices that removed the animal from city and
pasture into Taylorist factory systems, today called CAFO (concentrated agricultural
feeding operations). In the same year Broodthaers published Pense-bête, the first major
critique of this industrialization of animals appeared in Europe, Ruth Harrison’s Animal
Machines (1964), and was translated into seven languages. Her study led to an
amelioration of these intensive farming practices under the “European Convention for the
Protection of Animals” in 1976. One can find symptoms of these historico-technical
changes at the level of animal production and agriculture in contemporaneous art
practices. The simulacral multiplication of identical cow heads in Warhol’s screenprinted wall paper beginning 1966, and Gerhard Richter’s photorealist painting of a dairy
cow in profile, Kuh, 1964 are both well-known examples. [ill. 3.22-3] However, neither
Warhol nor Richter disturbs the status of the cow as anything other than a pop
commodity.
Going further towards problematizing the animal readymade through
individuation is the Belgian artist Jef Geys’s Cow Passports, 1965-91. [ill. 3.24] This
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series is the outcome of intermittently assisting his father-in-law, a cattle merchant, and
involves a standardized protocol for cataloging the bovine inventory on an administrative
card file. The top half of the inventory card includes a space for a photograph of the cow
in question. The bottom half is filled out by the merchant worker and includes three
boxes of equal size for inputting the animal’s date of birth, his or her gender, and a
description of the animal’s coat. Below these boxes is a typological outline of a cow—the
any-cow-what-so-ever—allowing the worker to draw in a formal approximation of the
animal’s spot and patterns. The base, readymade units of the work therefore reflect an
aesthetics of administration or the papers of agricultural bureaucracy. If filled out
conventionally, the cow remains anonymous and whatever unique formal characteristics
the nonhuman may display are reduced to visual markers of identification and inventory.
Geys’s Cow Passports intervene in this anonymity by flouting these conventions.
First and foremost, instead of describing coat patterns he gives each cow a name: Amelie,
Hortense, Catherine, Dinah, and so on. This nominal power is the readymade-in-reverse:
rather than subsume a subject-object into a mass of undifferentiated generalization (such
as species, eagle, or art), here the proper name gives the subject-object an aura of
singularity (even if proper names are never purely unique, in that they are always shared
among individuals104). Rather than denominate the gender, Geys crosses out, underlines,
or draws a box around either “male” or “female”—without always reflecting the actual
gender of the cow—and writes his own name in the box. Lastly, rather than mimic the
animal’s spots and patterns in the typological outline of a cow, Geys inserts abstract lines,
colors, and shapes of all sorts, as well as photomontage, making the card file a unique art
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object. In this way, Geys lends the powers of art as auratic individuation to the already
unique animal in order to re-emphasize his or her really existing singularity. Without this
singularization (which is not given by the artist as much as revealed, since s/he is always
already singular), the animal can be inserted within in an administrative aesthetics of
generality. However modest, Geys work undercuts the typological powers of
commodification. Broodthaers's Les Animaux does so as well, but from a different critical
angle: rather than emphasize the singularity of specific, really-existing animals,
Broodthaers identifies them with brand names of mass produced cars in order to show the
absurdity of such a collision between singular forms of life and mechanical reproduction.
One should note that Les Animaux also plays with gender, which is lost completely when
the dairy cows on the left print and the bulls on the right print are flattened out by
identical company names.
3.5 CONCLUSION
Broodthaers was no animal liberationist. This would be too direct a style, should
he even have had such inclinations. If he chips away at the commodification of animal
life, then it is by-and-large due to two facets of his larger critical program: 1) the animal
is surrogate for the artist and the art work, both of which are equally under the
objectifying and generalizing will of commodity culture; and 2) the animal is one of
many subjects that attest to a failure of an unmitigated faith in technological progress. In
the same way that Broodthaers distrusts the bombastic a-history inherent to certain
vectors of the historical avant-gardes, he is equally distrustful of re-calibrating art
practice to match the socio-technological progress of modernity. Buchloh’s canonical
reading of the industrial poems is telling in this regard:
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Broodthaers’s decision to identify his poems as “industrial” could not possibly be
attributed to this position of the modernist artist. After all, Broodthaers no longer
incorporated naively the effect of industrial modes of production upon artistic
practice, and he explicitly criticized the seemingly progressive structural
simplification of artistic work as the aesthetic internalization of rationalistic order
and technocratic instrumentability.105
This critique of art works as sterilized via technocratic rationalism could serve equally
well to describe the reification of the animal readymade. With characteristic irony and
over-identification, Broodthaers seems to allude to this industrial negation in a poem
from 1964: “Replace the lamb with a mechanical reaper.”106 Moreover, since poems and
animals are clearly bound in Broodthaers work in a number of ways (as I have shown
throughout this chapter), it is not an interpretive stretch to say that industrial poems and
industrialized animals go hand-in-hand. Both are disquieting in their silence. Both are
trampled on and instrumentalized by commodification.
Another way to describe this rationalistic order and technocratic instrumentability
is to say that art, poems, and animals have each been subsumed in an aesthetics of
administration and bureaucratic efficiency that strips them of form and content in the
service of the market. Nowhere is this function more present than in what is possibly
Broodthaers’s most difficult and arcane exhibition—MTL-DTH at the MTL Gallery in
Brussels 1970. This installation, which Broodthaers deemed to be a single work, was a
proliferation of notes, revisions, and re-worked poems, some of which were new and
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many were altered versions from La bête noire and Pense-bête. The exhibition was a
veritable archive of his poetic process: both hand-written and typed lines, often
accompanied by esoteric scribbles and drawings. The papers were compartmentalized
and inventoried into four sections for display in the gallery—A, B, C, and D, of which the
first three were installed open under glass and the fourth displayed concealed in a closed
folder during the course of the exhibition.107
As a whole, MTL-DTH presents a mass inventory of predominately animal poems
without actually presenting the finished poems themselves.108 The exhibition, which
Broodthaers explicitly claimed to be commercial in orientation, seemed more interested
in the minutiae of taking stock and of commodifying every last shred of consumable
material—be it a scribbled drawing or a half-developed idea for a poem. This aesthetics
of administration is thus shown to level out poems and animals. It performs the
becoming-inventory of objects on the market and distills Marx’s definition of exchangevalue by making all things subsumable to an exchange rate. If properly reified,
everything, even poems and animals, can be translated into the language of
commodities.109 It is no wonder, then, that in his self-interview for MTL-DTH,
Broodthaers invokes the word “capital” in one of the few instances in either his writings
or visual works. The term he uses to describe capital is l’appeau, or a “bird call,” a vocal
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decoy “used in hunting to trick the hunted animal, to lure it before the hunter’s gun.”110 In
answering his own question to elaborate on what this might mean, Broodthaers responds:
“L’Appeau. Capital nightmare. Capital itself.”111 Broodthaers’s definition of capital as
l’appeau not only reinforces the theme of animality and hunting the weak. It also reflects
yet another instance of distrusting the speaking voice, since bird calls are predicated on a
false affinity as trickery in order to lure and down an animal. In other words, the
temptation of capital, like the siren, or the birdcall, is as strong as it is detrimental to the
animal, the artist, the poem, and the artwork alike.
Broodthaers’s vocabulary and object making was no stranger to the leveling force
of capital, though he rarely named it so directly. In this instance, rather than being a
limitation, Broodthaers’s oblique sensibilities allowed him to see the flattening effects of
capital from a broader horizon. It is not only monetization and currency that levels
culture, but other totalizing concepts that developed in tandem with modern economies. I
have already analyzed a number of them in this chapter: species, taxonomy, and the
alphabet. This chapter has also attempted to demonstrated that mussels, eggs, coal, and
the a priori geometrical shapes that litter Broodthaers’s poems and visual works mime the
commodity fetish, which itself appears, like the anti-sea, to secrete its own value in
perfect self-generation. Above all, I have sought to show that Broodthaers’s treatment of
animals implicate a faltering and exhaustion of the readymade. The three key dimensions
of the readymade—its power of nomination, its capacity for subject formation, and in its
reliance on industrial repeatability—all breakdown or enter into paradox coming face-toface with an inimical subject-object, being poetic or nonhuman.
110

“Interview with Marcel Broodthaers by Marcel Broodthaers, 1970,” in Broodthaers, Marcel
Broodthaers: Collected Writings, 275.
111
Ibid.
211

CHAPTER FOUR: KYNICAL FEMINISM—STRATEGIES OF (OVER)IDENTIFICATION WITH
ANIMALITY

4.1 INTRODUCTION
The 1970s and ‘80s saw a re-kindled interest in Cynical philosophy. This
represented a notable intellectual shift. In his study of the ancient philosophical school,
Michel Onfray notes the dearth of interest before these decades: “[T]he cynics and their
methodological practice of subversion, it would seem, did not merit scholarly
consideration.”1 The watershed moment came with the publication of Léonce Paquet’s
edited collection of primary sources, Cyniques grecs. Fragments et témoignages in 1975.2
On the heels of Cynicism’s rehabilitation in the 70s, the subsequent decade saw two
major philosophical figures entering a deep engagement with this topic—both as an
object of historical scholarship and as a cultural study of their present moment. Peter
Sloterdijk published Critique of Cynical Reason in 1983, which became a best seller.3
Sloterdijk’s idiosyncratic scholarship offers a profound diagnosis of modern cynicism as
an enlightened yet unhappy consciousness, as well as a positive reinvigoration of a
distinctly “kynical” attitude as performative antidote to modern cynicism. During that
same year, largely independently, Michel Foucault’s final lectures at the Collège de
France also offer an exegesis of ancient Cynicism along with suggestions for use in
contemporary politics as a form of fearless truth telling (or parrhēsia). Foucault argues
that art should play a pivotal role in this parrhēsia, and that artists “must establish a
1
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relation to reality which is no longer one of ornamentation, or imitation, but one of laying
bare, exposure, stripping, excavation, and violent reduction of existence to its basics.”4
What is missing from this account of Cynicism in the 1970s and ‘80s is the role
feminist artists and theorists played in its rearticulation, an omission this chapter begins
to address by analyzing works and texts that inhabit kynical terrain. Although this
approach could have wide-ranging applicability to art and culture post-68, I focus
specifically on feminist practices that identify—and at times over-identify—with animals
or states of animality. This strategy, I argue, critiques the tightly woven historical nexus
of humanist and androcentric thought. I call these practices “kynical feminism,”
following Sloterdijk’s terminology of “kynicism” as sardonic parody (in contrast to the
resigned detachment of the modern cynic). The body is often the central feature of this
strategy, since, as Sloterdijk tells us, “kynicism discovers the animal body in the human
and its gestures as arguments; it develops a pantomimic materialism.”5 In this way,
kynical feminism not only challenges those historical power vectors of male-human
supremacy (especially its carnophallogocentric kernel), but it also functions as an
embodied strategy of resistance to modern cynicism and its symptomology of political
resignation and defeatism.
How do feminist practices identify with animality? And how does this differ from
over-identification with it? In the first instance, the artist aligns herself with a nonhuman
position in order to escape or resist androcentric confines. Here, identifying with
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animality affords a positive association. In the second instance, everything is reversed.
The artist aligns herself with animality, yet does so by embracing its pejorative
connotations, i.e. the “animal” or “beast” as an ideological leverage for debasement and
inferiority in relation to the “human.” She identifies with this trope to such parodic
degrees, however, that her operation ends in performative absurdity, which often serves
to dislodge not only woman from essentialist forms of signification predicated on
naturalness, passivity, and animality in its pejorative sense, but the nonhuman animal as
well. In short, a strategy of over-identification goes so overboard in embracing
androcentric cultural estimations of so-called feminine-animal lack that this male,
humanist dogma is ridiculed and opened for re-valuation. The difference between
identification and over-identification is crucial for this chapter.6 It is important to note,
however, that this difference is spread across a spectrum, and the kynical artist is always
in danger of sliding towards the cynical.
In this chapter, examples of kynical identification with animality include an
engagement with nonhuman forms of communication and relatedness, a focus on the
somatic and the self-sufficient body, a contempt for authority, and a general refusal to
separate nature from political and cultural matters. Examples of kynical overidentification with animality include becoming-food, or an anthropophagical sexual
politics of meat, domestication in the hands of androcentric humanist history, and the
various humanistic codes that debase and marginalize the nexus of woman-animal-nature.
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Along similar lines, the practices I discuss either identify with animals or animality in
order to accord dignity and recognition of victimhood on both the human and non-human
body (as to the latter, sometimes only incidentally), or over-identify with misogynist
histories that make use of animality and nature as terms of debasement in order to
demonstrate androcentric incoherence and absurdity.
It is only recently that such an analogy or affinity between woman and animals
has been re-appropriated as eco-politically positive. Eco-feminism, intersectionality, care
theory, and posthumanist theory all point in this direction.7 Undoubtedly, the major
reason why feminism and a concern for nonhuman animals have only recently been
theorized together is that their conjunction is fraught with danger and possible
misunderstanding. Human and nonhuman oppression have been, and often continue to be,
a “dreaded comparison.”8 There are those who worry that attention to nonhuman
concerns demeans human politics. As the eco-feminist biologist Lynda Birke argues, this
anxiety presumes humans and nonhumans to be discrete entities—that human men and
women are anthropological or sociological subjects, while animals are purely biological.9
This ignores sexual difference in nonhumans, as well as the evident panoply of
nonhuman sociability, not to mention the fact that humans are often—in at least certain
respects—biologically determined species in their own right. Separating humans and
7
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nonhumans also maintains the division between nature and culture, a division that has
long been challenged. The human community has always been entangled with nonhuman
communities in mutual well-being or mutual precarity during environmental stress. For
all these reasons, Birke insists that if “we are to take difference seriously, as feminist
theorists insist, then we need to think more about the other beings around us.”10 The
kynical feminist practices that I discuss in this chapter begin to think about these “other
beings” in ways that may be incipient, provisional, or even inadvertent. My approach is
not chronological but offers flashpoints within feminist practices of this period that
involve animality, and provides, in part, a fresh look at canonical objects, as well as
heretofore-neglected works, performances, and texts.
4.2 LOUISE BOURGEOIS (SEXUAL ANTHROPOPHAGY AND THE AESTHETICS OF MEAT)
Louise Bourgeois expatriated to New York in 1938 aged 27, after an association
with the Surrealist group in Paris. Her work is often discussed within a psychoanalytic
framework, notably the Freudian offshoot of Melanie Klein.11 Bourgeois is also often
understood as having employed strategies of over-identification with psychoanalysis
itself. In Mignon Nixon’s monographic study on the artist, the art historian points out a
fruitful contradiction within Surrealism as a point of departure for this over-identification.
On the one hand, the movement’s instrumentalization of the female body reduced the
latter to a site of violence, bondage, disfiguration, and entrapment.12 On the other hand,
the Surrealist fascination with the liberating potential of the unconscious as defier of
10
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bourgeois society—especially through the figure of the hysteric—offered women artists a
means of parodically identifying with purportedly feminine neuroses, especially the
neurotic “patriarchal mother,” as a way to challenge bourgeois norms.13 In this way
Surrealism, though largely androcentric, paved the way for a critical identification with
feminine tropes as a point of resistance from within the movement’s interest in Freud’s
theories. The French theorist Sarah Kofman shows that Freud was aware of the
eventuality that women would use his theories against him.14
Bourgeois’s work also points towards a counter-Freudianism from within
psychoanalysis. In this regard, by the late 1960s and 1970s, there is an (largely unnoted)
affinity between her practice and Deleuze and Guattari’s far-reaching critique of
traditional psychoanalysis. In their 1975 text on Kafka and minor literature, Deleuze and
Guattari pinpoint two strategies of resistance that can equally be found in Bourgeois’s
oeuvre. The first is a process of over-identification with the Oedipus complex, what they
describe as “exaggerated Oedipus”: a parodic pantomime of the position of the father in
psychoanalysis (the father and the Oedipal triangle are amplified to absurd degrees, as in
Kafka’s “Letter to the Father”).15 The second is a process of identification with animality,
or what they call “becoming-animal.”16 Identifying with nonhuman animals supplies a
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line of flight resisting patriarchal coordinates: “Inside or outside, the animal is part of the
burrow machine. The problem is not that of being free but of finding a way out, or even a
way in, another side, a hallway, an adjacency.”17 Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of
“becoming-animals” and their mutually reinforcing strategies of identification and overidentification can be understood as part of the kynical resurgence I account for in these
decades.
Bourgeois exaggerates Oedipus to parodic extremes and deploys her own
identification with animality. She has described her career in entomological terms, as a
Kafkaesque burrowing: “I fit into history like a bug in a rug.”18 Bourgeois evokes the
insistence of instectile boring as a parasitical femininity within a largely androcentric art
history. Here, woman-animal offers a counter-history and, over the course of Bourgeois’s
career, this insect will grow and loom in her work.19 There is an immunologically stoic
aspect to this kynical femininity that aligns itself with animality. Bourgeois makes this
clear when describing She-fox, 1985 [ill. 4.1], a black marble statue of a headless
mammal weighed down by two rows of scarred and corpusculent breasts: “People do
things to her but she can endure it, she can stand it, it doesn’t affect her, mutilated as she
is.”20 Identifying with animality can function as a mode of embracing debasement as
inoculation, protection, and armor—even though, with this strategy of identification,
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there is always the risk of sliding from the kynical to the cynical, or from mocking
resistance to internalized resignation.21 It is a dangerous gambit of embracing a position
of weak force, or, as Bourgeois claims in describing her various installations called “lairs,”
which she often defines within a thematic of animality and escape: “admitting that we
have no power, we become more than ourselves.”22 Now, if Bourgeois deploys strategies
of over-identification with the father and identification with animality in a number of her
works, there is a site in which they collapse into each other—namely, in Bourgeois’s
aesthetics of becoming-meat and anthropophagy. The animal is always in danger of being
caught and reterritorialized—in confinement, as victim, as flesh for consumption. The
animal then falls prey to carnophallogocentric power (to be defined below) of the
patriarchal subject who demands sacrifice and the tearing of flesh. Bourgeois identifies
with animality as becoming-meat and over-identifies with the anthropophagical drive of
andro-power. However successful this doubled strategy may be, in the end, it is not
without its own problems of sliding dangerously from the position of kynical mocking to
a cynical assumption of the subject position being critiqued in the first place (or the goose
simply taking on the wrongs of the gander).
One of the high points of Bourgeois’s use of over-identification—of an
“exaggerated Oedipus”—is her notorious sculpture La Fillette, 1968, an oversized phallic
object made of plaster covered in latex. [ill. 4.2] Robert Mapplethorpe’s half-length
portrait of the artist for her 1982 retrospective at MoMA, in which she cradles La Fillette
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wearing “a tufted coat of monkey fur,” is arguably better known than the work itself.23 [ill.
4.3] Nixon’s analysis of La Fillette is determined largely by this photograph: she
describes the sculptural phallus as a part-object send up of a phallocentric (art) history
through psychoanalytic clichés: “Bourgeois’s gesture parades a panoply of Freudian
tropes: fetishism, penis envy, castration anxiety, the obscene joke.”24 This psychoanalytic
parody is emphatic, and crucially, cuts across gender positions. From a male perspective,
any recourse to fetishistic comfort is undercut by the absurd size of La Fillette. He who
would disavow his castratability has it confirmed by a patently detached member writ
large. From a female perspective, the absconded penis fulfills the purported envy of
feminine lack, though to equally parodic degrees, since here the baby is quite literally
(and pathologically) a penis. Nixon is keen to situate this penis envy within a complex of
maternal drives by reading La Fillette as an object that begs “to be mothered.”25 In other
words, that a baby can compensate for phallic lack—thereby becoming a pointedly
female fetish in the psychoanalytic economy—is a conflation that Bourgeois and
Mapplethorpe tackle head on through a photographic repetition of a maternal posture:
“Grinning at the patriarchal overvaluation of the phallus, Bourgeois travesties Freud’s
theory of female sexuality, lampooning the convention of female desire for a little one.”26
The kynically dressed Bourgeois in fur, smiling for the camera, conflates penis and
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baby—a conflation that parodies male anxiety, the (grand)maternal phallus, and penis
envy all at once.27
This Freudian complex of motherhood—with its conflicted knot of competing
affection and aggression—determines Nixon’s persuasive reading of La Fillette. Lest her
reading overdetermine this object, however, other interpretive possibilities should be
explored. In fact, Nixon signals that her maternal reading might not be the first to come to
mind, since when exhibited “the sculpture hangs menacingly from a hook.”28 More
accurately, La Fillette is pierced at its tip not with just any hook, but by an S-curve meat
hook.29 When suspended from the ceiling, La Fillette unavoidably conjures an aesthetics
of slaughter—as if this out-sized phallus were a flank of beef in a walk-in cooler
(complete with testicles whose rounded and smooth differentiation double for femur bone
protruding from torn flesh). As it happens, this meat hook is only one sign of many that
leads the viewer into the domain of a what Carol A. Adams has called the “sexual politics
of meat.” If La Fillette presents the phallus as slaughtered flesh, then Bourgeois’s work
goes beyond castration anxiety and penis envy; in this reading, La Fillette is the phallus
becoming-animal-becoming-food.
In this context, the hanging sculpture must be read as a part-object, though a
decidedly male part object. Instead of milk-filled breast, it is now the penis as
consumable flesh and object of libidinal satisfaction. From a traditionally male
perspective, the anxiety is not only of castration, but also of being consumed—of losing
the penis twice over—first, through bodily detachment, and subsequently through
27
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cooking, mastication, and digestion. From a female perspective, we enter the domain of
retaliatory anthropophagy and a burlesque disavowal of lack through an over-identifying
incorporation of the phallus.
In an interpretation that attempts to recuperate Bourgeois as a Brancusian
modernist, Rosalind Krauss compares La Fillette with Linda Benglis’s 1974 ad in the
pages of Artforum in order to demonstrate that while Benglis belongs to the sexual
politics of the 1970s, Bourgeois remains fixed in the 1940s and 50s. [ill. 4.4] Krauss
misreads the tone of Bourgeois’s work here: claiming that Bourgeois cannot be a
contemporary of Benglis is to say that La Fillette cannot be a kynical object. Benglis’
parodically oiled up body clutching a prosthetic erection over-identifies with machismo
so as to render it absurd, yet somehow La Fillette does not?30 There are two specific
reasons why I find Krauss’s interpretation to be limiting. The first has to do with her
canonical analysis of the necessary conditions of modernist sculpture, namely, that to
secure its autonomy it has done away with the plinth. If this were the case with La Fillette,
its suspension and hook would have to be incidental and not a part of the work, which
diminishes its polyvalence. Any persuasive reading should maintain that the hook serves
as its base and the ceiling its floor, and while not site specific, the relationship between
object, hook, and ceiling is fundamental to the signifying chain of phallus-become-meat.
Secondly, Krauss assumes La Fillette is a “dildo.”31 Bourgeois’s object may not
be a dildo at all—or, if it is, oddly enough the state of its tumescence remains equivocal.
While petrified and solid as a plaster sculpture, the gristle of La Fillette’s flesh-wrapped
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contours is less erect than flaccid (this is especially true when hung, as gravity seems to
account for its length rather than any inner libidinal force). The head of the phallus is also
pointed and partially retracted, which, physiologically, signifies a loss or restriction of
blood flow. At best, La Fillette is sexually informe, undecidable either on its way to
tumescence or in the act of receding. Paying attention to this difference that Krauss’s
reading fails to note adds meaning to Bourgeois’s work, as compatible codes of
emasculation only pile up. Not only does La Fillette feed into anthropophagical castration
anxiety, the sculpture is a perpetual goading of male impotence, for what use value might
there be for a flaccid and not fully erect dildo? What sort of Medusa-effect has petrified
this partially drained phallus? It can also be argued that when displayed balls hanging
downward, these double as breasts and the triangular torso and head recall a human
prehistory of totemic fertility objects—an art historical reference not without precedence
in Bourgeois’s oeuvre.32 This would invert an androcentric staple of virility into a
gynocentric trope of fertility (phallus becoming female form, though crucially enough,
not as a phallic mother, since the figure is neither erotic nor soothing to male anxiety).
Codes of emasculation are also operative at the level of language. Fillette means
“little girl” and the retaliatory irony is clear, since this diminutive term of patronizing
endearment boomerangs back onto its male user (since the “little girl” is a phallus).
Moreover, at the syntactical level of case gender, La Fillette also points to another form
of semiotic feminization: from le filet (e.g. of meat) to la fillette. Filet, as the practice of
processing flesh through flaying and deboning is itself already euphemized through
feminization: La Fillette, synonymous with “little girl/daughter,” has its etymological
32
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origins in the word for a thread or ribbon worn in the hair. As the sociologist Noëlie
Vialles has observed, the violence of the slaughterhouse is often dissimulated through the
feminization and vegetalization of flesh—a point that ecofeminist theorists have also
uncovered in order to demonstrate how both women and animals are feminized so to
legitimize their exploitation.33
So, hanging like a slab of beef in the cold, La Fillette is powerless and drained of
life blood, becoming not so much a part object of female desire (phallus-child), but a part
object of carnist desire (phallus-meat). This, I argue, is the most kynically radical aspect
of Bourgeois’s object. It is as if La Fillette prefigures Derrida’s neologism
“carnophallogocentrism,” and does so tooth for tooth. For Derrida, “carnivorous virility”
is tied to a symbolic structure and denotes “the idealizing interiorization of the phallus
and the necessity of its passage through the mouth, whether it’s a matter of words or of
things, of sentences, of daily bread or wine, of the tongue, the lips, or the breast of the
other.”34 The potency of the father/man is predicated on both symbolic and literal
consumption of the world, which includes the domination of what threatens him the
most—women, children, and animals. In the end, however, this “head of state,” who
accepts a sacrificial economy of blood and bone, ends up opening himself to
anthropophagical precarity—he too can be consumed.35 This is precisely what La Fillette
suggests. On the one hand, La Fillette exaggerates Oedipus and amplifies the power of
the phallus—yet on the other, this amplification only results in a bigger cut of meat
hanging on a hook: emasculated, drained of vital force, and on its way to being consumed.
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The French word for “meat” holds this contradiction in place, as the via of viande
connotes life in death; recall Roland Barthes’s quasi-cannibalistic claim that eating a
steak confers “bull-like strength.”36 Ultimately, La Fillette takes this sexual politics of
meat to self-defeating lengths of the carnophallogocentric subject eating his own tail.
La Fillette’s sexual politics of anthropophagy is not an isolated incident in
Bourgeois’s oeuvre. He Disappeared Completely into Silence, 1947, an illustrated book
of mechanomorphic figures and austere architectural shapes, includes a scene of
carnophallogocentric violence. As a collection, He Disappeared Completely into Silence
evokes a sense of urban desolation, which serves as a backdrop for female loss and
frustration confronted with supercilious males who like to hear themselves speak yet have
problems hearing others. Each engraving is accompanying by a text, which is often
irresolute or cryptic. One of these short texts for plate 7 tells of a grizzly domestic
incident in which misogynist aggression finds an outlet through woman-becominganimal-becoming-meat: [ill. 4.5]
Once a man was angry at his wife, he cut her into small pieces, made a stew of her.
Then he telephoned his friends and asked them for a cocktail-and-stew party.
Then all came and had a good time.37
Bourgeois’s engraving illustrating this butcherous scene is enigmatic. If the deadpan text
describes andropower and its a-social consumption of the wife now reduced to pieces, the
image is more oblique. It shows two bio-mechanomorphic figures engaged in struggle on
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an anonymous rooftop. The figure on the left has an intestinal tube that rounds down into
its legs, and a torso and head reminiscent of Surrealist biomorphic shapes. While the legs
and torso of this figure are contained within an obelisk-shaped architectural covering, its
strange zoo-vegetal head of bone, feather, flower, and fishbone pops out the top. The
figure on the right, whose biomorphic contours appear clitoral, is without any
architectural protection and gives the impression of being forced by the other figure into
torturous devices—at the top, a square, guillotine-like apparatus, and at the bottom, a tree
house-like structure cordoned off by a circular railing. Both figures seem to be wound up
through mechanisms protruding from their sides, and both appear hooked up to a network
of power lines and conductors. From this visual analysis, the figure on the left seems to
be the husband and the one on the right to be the wife, though this remains far from clear.
The only sure observation would be to describe this ensemble as a sadistic machine
running a complex series of pulsations and entanglements.38
Nixon’s compelling interpretation of He Disappeared Completely into Silence,
and this seventh plate in particular, places its mechanomorphic figures alongside Marcel
Duchamp’s The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (The Large Glass), 1915-24.
Nixon claims Bourgeois “retools” The Large Glass, and that in her version, “the
narcissistic eroticism of the bachelors who grind their own chocolate gives way to the
explosive sadism of the husband who stews his own wife.”39 In the bride turned wife and
the bachelors turned husbands, the partition between the sexes has been lifted to grave
consequences in mutual aggression—from which the “weaker sex” certainly gets the
38

In a later edition of He Disappeared into Complete Silence from 2005, Bourgeois adds a deep red color to
this plate: in the intestinal tubing, the biomorphic fishbone head, in both winding mechanisms, and the
crate-like box of the tree house structure. This color reinforces the violence and suggests an obscure
apparatus for blood transfusions.
39
Nixon, 96, 99.
226

worst of it. The woman becomes prey to her husband’s aggression by becoming-meat for
the stew, which reduces her flesh to a part object for satisfying that aggression (and like
all cuts of meat as part objects, her cuts of flesh stand in for the whole while
dissimulating the living complexity of the whole from which the cuts came). Twenty
years later, in La Fillette, Bourgeois turns this around in retaliatory female aggression. It
is no longer the woman who is in danger of being consumed, but the male in his most
sensitive and coveted seat of power.
Bourgeois takes this anthropophagic retaliation to its natural conclusion in her
1974 installation The Destruction of the Father. [ill. 4.6] This installation is paradigmatic
of her format of the “lair”: a cave-like room that envelopes the viewer in red light with
organic protuberances made of wood and latex swelling from the floor and ceiling. In the
middle of the lair is a long slab with various smaller shapes strewn about, which are
vaguely reminiscent of body parts (both human and nonhuman).40 This scene of
destruction is accompanied by a narrative, written by Bourgeois, of a mother and her
children sitting in silence at the dinner table with their smug and garrulous father (the
work is alternatively titled The Evening Meal). Once again, the tables are reversed, as the
family, fed up with their patriarch, throws him down on the table and proceeds to devour
him. Like La Fillette, this elaborate installation preys on the andro-anxiety of being
consumed and digested: if the sculpture turns the head of androcentric subjectivity into
meat, then the post-prandial installation turns the whole body of the male into a meal (as
a reversal of the wife-turned-stew from He Disappeared Completely into Silence).
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The Surrealist interest in anthropophagy, especially the “edible beauty” of the
female figure as inspired by Lautréamont’s poems The Songs of Maldoror (1868-9), was
already well established by the late 1920s.41 This proclivity for cannibalizing the feminine
was not restricted to male surrealists, but can be found in the work of prominent female
practitioners as well. Meret Oppenheim’s Spring Banquet, 1959, a happening-like event
in Bern, involved the artist and friends eating food off the body of a naked young girl
lying on a table—lobster, steak tartar, mushrooms, and whipped cream and ladyfingers.42
This work—like Daniel Spoerri’s “Eat Art” in the 1960s and Arman’s contribution to the
movement with a sculptural work of women’s legs sculpted in edible marzipan—is
relatively light and uncritical (at least in respect to when nonhumans are involved).43 By
contrast, the most patently subversive example of female “edible beauty” is Lee Miller’s
1930 photographs of a breast she secretly procured from a Parisian hospital after a
mastectomy.44 [ill. 4.7] Miller arranged the cancerous breast on a plate, and placed this on
a mat with knife and fork. Known as Severed Breast from Radical Surgery in a Place
Setting, the pair of images shows the rounded flap of amputated skin and nipple with
corpuscular fat and blood oozing on the plate, inviting the breast to be read as a rare piece
of meat or slice of pie with blueberry filling. Rather than decry female objectification
directly, Miller stages an over-identification with edible beauty, a ghastly pantomime
41
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serving up the outcome of animalizing and sexualizing the body as object of libidinalgustatory satisfaction (breast, part-object, meat). This is possibly the most kynical
feminist work of over-identification in the pre-war period.45
There are several modalities of kynicism to unpack here. In the case of
Oppenheim, the artist embraces cannibalism as a festive gesture. Yet her Spring Banquet
simply identifies with the male surrealist affinity for edible beauty, assuming the
orchestration of woman-as-food as would any male surrealist.46 In Miller’s case, the artist
is more clearly over-identifying with an andro-aggressive strain of cannibalism. Miller’s
still shocking photographs embrace an untenable position of woman-as-animal, womanas-food. While presented as a food, there is simply no way (barring irremediable
pathology) for Severed Breast from Radical Surgery in a Place Setting to be
reassimilated into a naïve erotic embrace of female edible beauty. That said, Miller’s
Severed Breast remains tied to a position of female victimhood, albeit in confrontational
over-identification that sends off an affect of radical unease.
In something of a synthesis of Oppenheim and Miller’s strategies, Bourgeois
over-identifies with andro-aggressive cannibalism but does so by assuming the subject
position of the victimizer in retaliatory gyno-agression. Oppenheim’s work is cheeky, but
easily subsumed by andropower. Miller’s photographs are kynical in their shock value,
but remain fragile victims. Only Bourgeois’s work extends the role of the female kynic
beyond passivity and victimhood by over-identifying with male, carnophallogocentric
violence in scenarios where the gender tables have been turned. In light of this, it is not
45

As Allmer points out, Miller’s Severed Breast likely influenced Oppenheim’s My Nurse, Spring Banquet,
and her interest in sexual anthropophagy. Ibid., 54-5.
46
That Oppenheim’s Spring Banquet would be re-staged as Cannibal Feast at the last Surrealist Exhibition
in 1959—using a mannequin rather than live model, from which both men and women enjoyed animal
flesh and fluids—shows the waning kynical edge of this gesture.
229

surprising that Bourgeois held her own cannibal banquet.47 Ultimately, however, even
this strategy proves to have limits, for Bourgeois’s kynical instigations can easily fall into
a cynical embrace of the violence and power of the other side. Perhaps one way out of
this untenable impasse of victimhood-vengeance is to identify with animality and
maintain that violence against both human and nonhuman bodies is untenable—which is
to say, to advocate for a posthumanist paradigm.
4.3 ANNETTE MESSAGER (DOMESTICITY AND CARE)
From an anthropophagical aesthetics of meat arises a more general point about
woman-animal subordination, namely, the long history of domestication. Etymologically,
“domestication” and “domesticity” are of course conjoined. In social history, the practice
of domestication (making tame) and domesticity (of belonging to the home) were closely
connected. Beginning with the Neolithic (or agricultural) revolution of over 10,000 years
ago, the move from nomadic human groupings to rooted horticultural societies proved
decisive: the agricultural territorialization of domesticated nature, notably herd animals,
was concomitant with the herding of women in the centralized planning of a sedentary
abode. This led to profound changes in social life, which, as the historian Chris Harman
argues, drew a path towards the classification and stratification of society—including the
demotion of women whose labor in nomadic groupings had been on equal footing with
that of men: “she became simply a ‘wife’, a subordinate in a strange household. Ruling
class women were increasingly treated as an ornament, a source of sexual pleasure or as a
breeder of heirs.”48 Woman and animal were reduced to domestic labor and wombic
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vehicles for maternal production driven by androcentric power. It is for this reason that
feminist activists could draw connections between domesticated animals and woman, and
why a theorist like Luce Irigaray would devote a chapter in her Ce Sexe qui n’en est pas
un (1977) to critiquing woman-as-commodity and as fundamental unit of socio-cultural
exchange.49
The conjoined history of woman and nonhuman animals in the history of
domestication raises the question: could human civilization have developed otherwise?
Part of the feminist struggle has been to demonstrate that female subordination is by no
means ineluctable, but a product of long-held patriarchal historical forces. Similarly, it
has gone unquestioned (until very recently) that the domestication and commodification
of nonhuman animals was a prerequisite for the formation of human societies. Nathaniel
Southgate Shaler, a venerated nineteenth-century paleontologist and geologist, held the
view that domesticating animals led to progress in human civilization—including
advances in housekeeping, agriculture, warfare, and commerce, of which all ‘set men
upon their upward way’.”50 Much more recently, the sociologist David Nibert argues
against this ideological precondition for the genesis of civilization, especially the notion
that domestication and human progress go hand-in-hand: “[T]he practice of capturing and
oppressing cows, sheep, pigs, horses, goats, and similar large, sociable animals for human
use did not, as Shaler put it, “set men well upon their upward way.” Instead, Nibert avers
that the history of nonhuman domestication set a precedent for justifying the devaluation
of certain humans (women, non-whites) through similar biopolitical techniques of control
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and debasement (so dominating nonhuman bodies did not breed progress, but yet more
domination). A destabilization of the inexorable notion of domestication-domesticity
would thus represent an ecofeminist strategy that seeks to undermine the historical
discrimination of gender, race, and species.
In the early 1970s, Annette Messager (b. 1943) turned from painting in the style
of Jean Dubuffet and Francis Bacon to a practice of using found materials in installations
evoking the domestic sphere. A foundational trigger for this turn was Messager’s
decision to work out of her apartment, which she bifurcated as a dual space: the bedroom
for drawing and collecting, the dining room for taxidermy and studio display.51 [ill. 4.8]
From the start, studio work and domestic work are intertwined. If Bourgeois, as I have
argued, tended to over-identify with male tropes, Freudian analysis, and woman-animal
anthropophagical violence, then Messager’s strategy is less cohesive. At times, her work
over-identifies with feminine domesticity and animality, yet this can range from a
melancholic form of resistance to a more confrontational kynical edge. Her work also
identifies with certain positive aspects of the domestic sphere, especially its focus on
caring and comfort, as well as the more negative aspects of the domestic female condition.
So while Bourgeois operates more frequently in a kynical mode of negation, Messager
toggles between an over-identification with negativity (de-valuating negativity through
parody) and positive forms of identification (valuing what is normally de-valued).
Messager’s Les Pensionnaires (Little Boarders) from 1971-2 inaugurates her
mature work. [ill. 4.9] The origin story of Les Pensionnaires is by now well known:
51
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around the time she was asked by the Galerie Germain in Paris to produce work using
wool for an exhibition sponsored by Woolmark, Messager stepped on a dead sparrow in
the street. This chance encounter between human and nonhuman led her in and care for
the sparrow by knitting the bird a wool sweater. Messager began accumulating more dead
sparrows, handing them over to a taxidermist (and studying taxidermy herself). She
provided her growing collection of preserved birds with clothing and housing, made
contraptions for taking them on walks (as well as separate contraptions for disciplining
bad behavior), and even developed an alphabet made of feathers in order to teach them
language. All of these components of Les Pensionnaires were displayed in the studio
space portion of her apartment. The sparrows could be found lined up in neat rows under
glass or in a cabinet (Le Repos des pensionnaires, Boarders at Rest, 1971-2),
photographed strapped to their walking devices (La Promenade des pensionnaires,
Boarders’ Walk, 1971-2), pinned to the wall casting a shadow (L'ombre portée sur le mur,
The Shadow, 1971-2), or reproduced in Messager’s sketch book (Mes croquis d’oiseaux,
My Sketches of Birds, 1972).
By-and-large, the literature on Messager’s Les Pensionnaires reads this work
through a maternal lens. Sheryl Conkelton’s assertion that Messager’s “concern with the
sparrows reflected traditionally female maternal and protective instincts” is representative
of this critical consensus.52 Messager herself has described her aesthetic undertaking of
nurturing sparrows in terms of mothering or caring for a child. And yet, Messager is also
on record as saying that it “really annoyed me that people would very often ask me
whether or not I wanted to have children, whereas this question was never put to boys my
52
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age.”53 It is as if the writing on Messager also presumes to ask this question about
motherhood, betraying its own desire for the artist’s maternal drive to be evidenced in
authorial intent or unconscious transference. Messager’s annoyance complicates this
reading and questions why motherhood is an essentialized, biologically determined
presumption for a woman artist. While a maternal drive does seem to be operative in
Messager’s Les Pensionnaires, it should be recognized that the impulse to care, to nurture,
and to protect far exceeds motherhood tout court. After all, one does not need to be a
mother to care for another—and analogously, the title of the work points towards
fostering or hospitality in general, not parenting in specific. So to limit an interpretation
to maternal transference is to occlude a more general propensity for empathy in mutual
existential precarity—be it human-to-human, or human-to-nonhuman.
In Les Pensionnaires, Bacon’s lingering influence on Messager’s post-painterly
practice comes through in a thematic concern with nonhuman identification. The British
painter famously identified with butchered carcasses: “If I go into a butcher shop I always
think it’s surprising that I wasn’t there instead of the animal.”54 Bacon not only
recognized the self-consuming anthropological outcome of carnophallogocentrism—that
to eat the other is to risk being eaten/eating oneself—but also confirms the shared
precarity of enfleshment in humans and nonhumans. For Bacon, we are all potential flesh
become meat. Deleuze describes this becoming-meat as the “zone of indiscernibility”
between human and animal, which serves as the basis of Baconian pity not towards
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animals, but towards human suffering.55 For her part, Messager’s identification with
animality is less focused on shared bodily victimhood and more on positive affinities. In
an interview from 1988, Messager affirms that “we are all human animals. There is not
that much difference between me and my cat; we have a shared language.”56 She
recognizes a shared language and a transmission of affect that exists between human and
nonhuman animals.
Attentiveness to the nonhuman in Les Pensionnaires opens onto three wider
interpretive possibilities. First, as a possible subject-object of care it is the sparrow who
makes the maternal transference of nurturing possible in the first place. This is an
important point, for it keeps Messager’s gesture from falling into pure psychosis. If the
artist were babying rocks, logs, dolls, or other inanimate objects devoid of sentience, her
work would beg a purely pathological reading.57 Since the birds were once living,
breathing beings, human identification with their existential vulnerability makes sense—
and anyway forms the basis for pet keeping, animal welfare, and animal rights. This fact
is often missed, especially when the sparrows are interpreted as surrogates for women
and children. Laurel Fredrickson’s otherwise astute reading of Les Pensionnaires makes
such a claim, without extending consideration to the nonhuman. She concludes her essay
by drawing a parallel between Messager’s early work and the traumatic subjects of
humanist history who have been relegated to the periphery of recognition based on race,
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Deleuze’s argument that Bacon is a religious painter in his treatment of flesh-as-suffering means that
Bacon, like the Vienna Actionists, has not extricated himself from a Judeo-Christian economy of sacrifice.
See Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans., Daniel W. Smith (London: Continuum,
2003), 24.
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Annette Messager, in radio interview with M.L. Bernadac “Woman Artists.”
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The fact that the sparrows are dead lends credence to a certain pathological or melancholic dimension to
the Little Boarders. Dressing the birds in sweaters, teaching them a language, and disciplining them are all
point to disturbed mental transference—though its status as a work of art provides a performative gap. For
someone to do the same in complete earnestness, without framing it as a performative and meaningful
artistic gesture as Messager does, would be more genuinely idiosyncratic, if not pathological.
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gender, and age: “As victims of violence in both physical and psychological ways, many
women and children have been similarly placed outside of official discourse and their
traumas have been hidden, unresolved, and unacknowledged.”58 Fredrickson leaves
unacknowledged any consideration of species—of the panoply of nonhumans similarly
“placed outside of official discourse.” Whereas the fact that the sparrows become
available for the artist as largely under-valued urban denizens, whose sentience and
enfleshment give them the status of potential victims-in-themselves, would suggest a
transversal connection between woman-child-animal as differently yet analogously
precarious in the socio-political humanist structures that traditionally devalue them.
Secondly, Messager’s Les Pensionnaires is more than a simple act of fostering. If
a maternal drive is operative in her Les Pensionnaires, then it points towards a
conjunction between parenting and domestication, for Messager takes in a nonhuman in
order to care for it.59 This is a peculiar form of domestication, however, in that it is devoid
of any obvious use-value. Drawing in the assistance of an animal, either forcefully or in
mutual benefit, has always been done in terms of use-value.60 Messager’s birds, however,
provide no obvious use-value outside pseudo-companionship and providing bodily
material for an art installation. In this sense, Messager’s gesture thematizes the act of care
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Fredrickson, "Memory and projection in Annette Messager's early work," 59. At the heart of
Fredrickson’s reading of Messager is a consideration of trauma and posttraumatic stress syndrome.
59
A conjectural anthropological theory of canine domestication is interesting in this regard, in that it is
believed to be Late Stone Age women who began the process. Those who lost their baby after birth would
find abandoned wolf pups in the forest. As Heiner Mulhmann argues, this elicited an intuitive act of
human-to-nonhuman transference of care: “As the women had sufficient milk in the breast after the birth of
their own children which had died, they suckled the abandoned cubs in the impulse of extraspecific charity.”
See Heiner Mühlmann, The Nature of Cultures: a Blueprint for a Theory of Culture Genetics, trans., Robert
Payne (New York: Springer Verlag/Wein, 1996), 5-6. In this way, women were the first kynics. This
anthropological theory is not without its problems, however, since it relies on a biologically determinate
understanding of woman as automatically nurturing.
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Although this is arguably no longer the case when it comes to companion species, the long-view history
of domesticated pets is a story of mutual use-value between human and nonhuman (humans tolerating
felines in the home so to ward off rodents, for example).
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as a benevolent act of domestication. Yet bringing in this angle of domestication is highly
ambivalent. On the one hand, domestication (of both women and animals) leads to
pathology and boredom in its attendant forms of corporeal confinement, from the most
minute to the most severe (kitchen, cage, zoo, slaughterhouse, and so on). In this way,
Messager’s Les Pensionnaires enacts a moment of over-identification with domesticitydomestication as a perilous process. She takes care of dead birds in her domestic setting
as a process of transference, obsession, or pathology. On the other hand, caring and being
cared for provides protection from a threatening outside, which forms the very basis for
the home in the broader political sense of eco-nomics. In this way, the domestication of
humans and nonhumans is pharmacological—both poisonous and beneficent. The initial
act of noticing the dead sparrow was an incipient moment of posthumanist recognition—
a properly zoopolitical reaction to a fellow urban denizen.
Thirdly, Messager’s Les Pensionnaires is a gendered détournement of taxidermy.
Historically, taxidermy has been a male preoccupation, one that reflects a drive for
ecological sovereignty and andro-humanist domination of nature (often as an escape from
culture and industry).61 Normally, the animals prey to such artificial preservation and
theatrical staging are exotic, rare, or dangerous specimens, often products of trophy hunts.
Messager’s use of taxidermy throughout her career, though especially in the
comparatively humbler Les Pensionnaires, subverts this traditional program. Her
sparrows are some of the most quotidian and mundane urban dwellers; they are neither
exotic, rare, nor dangerous. Instead, unless one takes an interest in them (as Messager
does, excerpts from the ethologist Erik Sablé), they are meaningless background noise in
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For a discussion a taxidermy and recent art practices, including its female subversion, see Aloi, 24-48.
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the circulation of the cityscape. Not only caring, but preserving these sparrows lend them
a certain amount of value, visibility, and dignity not normally accorded them. One also
needs to make a distinction between noticing a deceased bird on a sidewalk and those
artists who seek out an animal for use as material in art. The gendered difference between
Messager’s humble gesture of care and (for example) Damien Hirst’s hiring of an
expedition to kill a tiger shark is clear, and betrays the latter as safely tethered to—
perhaps cynically so—an historically andro-humanist drive for ecological sovereignty. As
a project, even before its transference onto the question of mothering or maternal
pathology, Messager’s Les Pensionnaires is first and foremost a project foregrounding
the identification of the devalued and overlooked—be it woman or bird.
Messager’s post-Les Pensionnaires oeuvre is replete with procedures of overidentification with domesticity (and can thus be linked to this original gesture of
ambivalent care). The most pertinent examples involve the artist’s embracing of domestic
rituals and home keeping. Take, for example, her collection of misogynist sayings from
around the world that she embroidered onto little pieces of fabric, Ma collection de
proverbs (My Collection of Proverbs, 1974). [ill. 4.10] She began assembling this selfdescribed “pessimistic” archive of clichés in 1973, all of which betray a rampant
projection of male fears onto the female body.62 Unsurprisingly, many of these sayings
pivot from an analogy with animals: “a woman has nine lives like a cat,” “the world has
been destroyed by women and wolves,” “woman is the most subtle creature in the animal
kingdom,” “a woman has a spider’s eye,” “a woman without a man is like an untied
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The only exception, Messager notes, is the figure of the mother who is never debased in popular male
wisdom. Messager and Bernadac, 234.
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horse,” and “a woman, like a goat, should be kept on a leash.”63 (These sayings thus attest
to Nibert’s claim that nonhuman domestication is concomitant with human debasement).
Rather than critiquing these sayings directly, Messager amasses and reproduces them—
an over-identification redoubled by the chosen medium of embroidery. In one of his more
notoriously speculative moments, Freud claimed that the only artistic medium available
to women is “plaiting and weaving,” which he claims stems from compensatory female
pubic hair that serves as a matted, women covering for their shameful lack of a phallus.64
So repeating these phrases within the purported historical limits of female expression is
an attempt to travesty both.
Messager’s other collections in a similar vein comprise her taxonomy of domestic
chores—not unlike Chantal Ackerman’s Jeanne Dielman, 23, Quai du Commerce, 1080
Bruxelles (1975), a film that similarly presents its audience with an affect of domestic
tedium. These include Messager’s Mon livre de cuisine (My Cookbook, 1972) and Mes
depense quotidiennes pendant 1 mois (My Daily Expenses Over the Course of a Month,
1973). The first is a dog-eared notebook on graph paper amassing the artist’s recipes,
complete with gastronomic images cut out from magazines and organized with tabs
according to food animals: fish, beef, chicken, pork, rabbit, lamb, veal, and so on. [ill.
4.11] The other is a hardback notebook/scrapbook that documents Messager’s living
expenses, including trips to the laundry, the baker, the grocery store, and the butcher. [ill.
4.12]
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Out of the 102 proverbs that make up Messager’s Ma collection de proverbs, 17 involve an explicit
woman-animal analogy, and numerous others compatibly reduce woman to nature. For the complete list,
see ibid., 234-9.
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See Freud’s lecture on “Femininity” (1933) in Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis, trans., James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 164.
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Both of these works present the fetishization of domestic life (the compiling of
recipes, the retaining of receipts) as perhaps obsessive and certainly repetitive. In one
sense, presenting what are normally understood as humble documents of daily life (and
coded feminine) as artistic objects elevates this material culture as worthy of
appreciation: female domestic as conceptual artist avant la lettre. In another sense, which
was almost certainly Messager’s overriding intention, her cookbook and quotidian
accounting make the tedium of artist-collector-domestic visible in parodic overidentification. However compelling either of these gestures may ultimately be, I would
like to focus on the peculiarity of their ideological blind spots in relation to Messager’s
original gesture of care in Les Pensionnaires. If, as I have argued, this foundational work
was a process of identification and over-identification involving nonhumans that
thematizes care, then these subsequent works using similar strategies involve a betrayal
of this original moment of kindness. This is especially true of Messager’s cookbook: it is
a kynical overidentification with a history of female domesticity that, simultaneously,
slides into a cynical complicity with the conjoined history of domestication as widespread
violence towards nonhuman animals. This amounts to a cognitive dissonance at the heart
of her initial practice of care.65 Of course, Messager’s falling into complicity is largely
ideological. The kynical critique of female domestication is a moment of enlightened
false consciousness: Messager knows very well that woman should not be confined to
domestic tedium, and so her artist-collector embracing of these materials is a pantomimic
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This compromise or slackening of her original gesture of kindness in Les Pensionnaires is also evident in
her more spectacular installations beginning in the early 1990s implementing a wide assortment of animal
bodies. The demands of scale and spectacle represents a stark contrast to the humble moment of identifying
with a single dead sparrow on the ground. Pertinent examples include her 1993 installation for the 2 nd Lyon
Biennale comprised of numerous and varied dead birds and a squirrel on pikes with masks, or more
recently the massive profusion of species in taxidermy in “Them and us, Us and Them, ” her installation
from 2000 at the Palais des Papes, Avignon. For these (as well as other similar examples), see Annette
Messager, Annette Messager, The Messengers (Munich; New York: Prestel, 2007), 364-5, 464-5.
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instigation. When, however, this strategy of over-identification involves the unnoticed
violation of a nonhuman body (who was equally dominated in bored confinement before
being put to death), the work betrays an unenlightened false consciousness—or, more
simply, an ideological blind spot of incoherence not yet recognized by the artist (but
which has become more obvious today). For how can taking care of little birds, even
when this falls on the scale of over-identification with motherly pathology, be squared
with the unthinking use of other animals as simple flesh for food? Messager’s fall from
kynical instigation to cynical complicity is predicated on an exacerbation of domesticity
that, in turn, colludes with the unseen dangers and wrongs of its fellow traveler: the long
history of nonhuman domestication that subtends the very human domesticity Messager
seems to critique in her work.
4.3 VALIE EXPORT (ECRITURE FEMININE AS POSTHUMANIST PERFORMANCE)
The most kynical feminist artist of the seventies and eighties was arguably
VALIE EXPORT.66 Her early (and still most celebrated) performances embrace selfobjectification to such degrees that they problematize the more mundane ideological
manifestations of female objectification. Take Aktionshose: Genitalpanik (Action Pants:
Genital Panic), 1968, an action undertaken by the artist in which she (purportedly)
entered a Munich art-house cinema wearing crotch-less pants, exposing her genitals to
the audience row by row;67 [ill. 4.13] or TAPP und TASTKINO (TAP and TOUCH
CINEMA) from the same year, which found EXPORT walking around Vienna
encouraging the public (usually male) to touch her bare breasts within a box-turned-mini66

EXPORT’s name change alone is a form of over-identification, in two ways: with regard to the macho set
of the Viennese art scene of the time (as conveyed by her use of capital letters) and with consumer culture
(since “EXPORT” was a common brand of cigarettes).
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The well-known photographs associated with this performance of EXPORT in crotch-less pants holding
a gun were taken a year later in 1969.
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theatre strapped to her torso.68 [ill. 4.14] In both instances, the artist was the agent and
subject of her own objectification, compelling her audience to traverse the scopic fantasy
of the screen—to move from a mediated access of the female body to a more immediate
one in the flesh (which inherently changes the experience of the original fantasy in
various ways, often destroying it). An introductory discussion of EXPORT’s relationship
to kynicism would not be complete without Aus der Mappe der Hundigkeit (From the
Portfolio of Doggedness), 1968, her collaborative performance with the artist Peter
Weibel who was led around town on all fours by leash. [ill. 4.15] Like Diogenes,
EXPORT preferred the company of canines to men (and so transformed her man into a
dog). There was also a kynical reversal at work here, both in terms of power—it is now
woman who wields it—and in its recourse to gender debasement via animalization—it is
now man who is the inferior beast.69 From the Portfolio of Doggedness is in keeping with
a long intellectual tradition of critiquing domestication as slavish complicity. From Aesop
to La Fontaine to Deleuze and Guattari, the kynical wolf cannot accept the cynical dog’s
subordination to social convention; any dog who accepts the leash is betraying his
freedom for the sour cream of dependency and security.70 This critique had great currency
during the anti-bourgeois and sexual liberation contestations of the 1960s and 1970s.
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In clear human-nonhuman female analogy, one of EXPORT’s drawings that accompanied this
performance in the journal Film shows the box with two holes fastened to the udders of a dairy cow. See
Valie Export, Valie Export: Archiv (Bregenz, Austria: Kunsthaus Bregenz, 2012), 232.
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In one of Sloterdijk’s few accounts of female kynicism, he tells the story of Phyllis and Aristotle. The
famous courtesan controls the famous philosopher in similar terms by placing Aristotle on a leash.
According to Sloterdijk, this anecdote constitutes a “bridge from male kynicism to female kynicism,
especially to the kynicism that can be observed in the present-day women’s movement.” Sloterdijk,
Critique of Cynical Reason, 254-5.
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The fable in question, which goes back to Aesop, is “The Dog and the Wolf.” In line with the antidomestic sentiments of this fable, see Deleuze and Guattari on pets as oedipalized animals and their
notorious claim that “anyone who likes cats or dogs is a fool.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus:
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 240.
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Reflecting on Tap and Touch Cinema in a text from 1989, EXPORT affirms that
her performance captured “the violence of patriarchy through acts of self-chosen
demonstration.”71 And yet, even by this point (late 1980s) she no longer fully holds to its
strategy, recognizing that even if woman becomes the subject of her own reification, at
the end of the day she remains an object: “In the long run…this campaign of women’s
sexual self-determination, which clearly demonstrates the shift in the relationship
between the sexes, occurs at the expense of the woman actionist.”72 This insight can be
taken further. It is always possible that female self-objectification, even in kynical
mockery, can double back on itself to become a source of the very pleasure it was hoping
to parody. For example, male participants in Tap and Touch Cinema might
enthusiastically embrace the pleasures of groping bare breasts in a box—naively or
cynically—thereby deflating any critical impact this encounter could have held for
them.73 Ironically, kynical gestures depend on an audience who is thereby triggered into
enlightenment—or out of cynical entitlement—an outcome that is not always reliable.
EXPORT asserts that in order to go beyond this limitation, the artist must extricate
herself from the arena of bodily commodification all together: “In the future, the goal of
‘getting out of the established trade as an object of exchange’ (Luce Irigaray) should be
pursued much more radically.”74 EXPORT became increasingly aware of these strategic
limitations in the early seventies. This does not mean her kynical edge abated. Instead,
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Valie Export, "Aspects of Feminist Actionism," New German Critique, no. 47 (1989): 90. Emphasis mine.
Ibid.
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The same danger holds for From the Portfolio of Doggedness: if in being walked on a leash the man gets
masochistic pleasure from said subordination and animalized debasement, then the power relation is
reversed once more—and ultimately, as Deleuze has shown, the masochist holds even greater power than
the sadistic “master.” See Gilles Deleuze and Leopold Sacher-Masoch, Masochism (New York; Cambridge,
Mass.: Zone Books 1989).
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she armed herself with theory, especially psychoanalysis, and refined her strategy of
over-identification so that it could not so easily be subsumed by androcentric enjoyment.
This critical awareness—of the kynical female body becoming a source of cynical
enjoyment for the male viewer—informs EXPORT’s complicated relationship to her
Viennese Actionist colleagues immediately preceding her. An argument could be made
that Hermann Nitsch, Otto Muehl, and Gunther Brus represent the apex of kynical
instigation in performance art: masturbating in public, working with raw meat,
desublimating the sexual drives of the human animal, and refusing every convention of
“good” society, including the demand to work. All of these actions could equally well
describe the kynical antics of Diogenes in fifth century BCE.75 Yet de-sublimation—
coupled with a complete deregulation of what materials can be included as art—leads to
certain problems. However effective this embodied kynical resistance to repressive
idealist values might be, there is a grave blind spot in their artistic economy: Viennese
Actionism maintained a proclivity for sacrifice that wrought violence (both simulated and
real) onto both human and nonhuman bodies in order to combat stifling bourgeois
conventions. And yet a minimum definition of bourgeois interests is that of a power that
masks its violent effects—be it on class, gender, or species. The radical violence of the
Vienna Actionists therefore uncomfortably redoubles those very forms of violence
propagated by bourgeois culture, especially towards woman and animals. The only
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Sloterdijk goes so far as saying that Diogenes’s public masturbation was “the first Happening of our
civilization.” He argues that this event began a new chapter in human sexuality, one that challenges the
idealist tendencies of discourses on love: “Plebeian onanism is an affront to the aristocratic soul-to-soul
game, as well as to love relationships in which individuals, for the sake of sexuality, subjugate themselves
to the yoke of a relationship. The sexual kynic, from the start, counters this with a self-satisfaction
unburdened by scruples.” Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 253.
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difference is that while bourgeois culture masks or dissimulates its violent debts, the
Viennese Actionist does not.76
It is easy to see how this attempt to reveal the dark underside of human drives is
an example of kynical gestures slipping into cynical complicity. This ideological
collusion is nothing other than an unquestioned carnophallogocentric humanism at the
heart of the Vienna Actionist program. Unsurprisingly, then, anthropophagical sexual
violence is well represented in their canon of performances and writings: Muehl’s
Material Action 3, 1964, covered a naked woman with breadcrumbs, chicken soup,
tomato sauce, and eggs—a comestible ensemble fit for the artist to bite into at the
buttocks. [ill. 4.16] Nitsch’s thirty-first action The Immaculate Conception, 1969, placed
a naked mock-crucified woman alongside a freshly butchered lamb carcass; in a violent
syncopation of blood, splaying, and flaying, Nitsch spread open the vaginal cavity of the
woman with one hand and the disgorged bodily cavity of the lamb with other (doubling
down on the female sex as wound). [ill. 4.17] The ZOCK Manifesto, written by Muehl,
takes the accelerationist sensibility of Futurist manifestos to a parodic extreme, calling
for the killing of all “useless” animals and plants (“useless animals on land, sea and in the
air will be eliminated”), an “all-out chemical war against insects,” and the
implementation of a biopolitical republic that includes the storing of blood, the forced desegregation of human breeding (“the color of future ZOCK people will be grey,” i.e. a
homogenized race), and the cannibalistic extermination of post-maternal females (“every
woman who has already had children will be slaughtered and eaten by the ZOCK youth
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Even in its most orgiastic moments of religiosity that re-opened the historically sublimated practices of
ritual sacrifice through desublimation, pitting the tame bourgeois against his own religiosity, Vienna
Actionism necessarily redoubled these acts in a Bataillean reclaiming of violence—something that is
decidedly problematic today, if not jejune.
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at enormous mother’s day events”).77 In brief, examples of both real and fantasized
carnophallogocentric violence in Vienna Actionism are not in short supply.78
EXPORT emerges from this milieu with a very different, and at times ecofeminist, version of Actionism, one that counters her more androcentric compatriots. In
her own work, EXPORT maintains the kynical edge of the Actionists who come before
her, while remaining far more attuned to not only to the human female body, but also to
the nonhuman body whose sentience and communicative abilities offer her moments of
performative identification. In the rest of this chapter, I investigate this evolution of the
incorporation of nonhuman life in her works: first, the short film Mann & Frau & Animal
(Man & Woman & Animal), 1970-73, which interweaves a complex mix of kynical
identification and over-identification in its critique of androcentrism. Second, in her
collaborative performances with living birds from the mid-1970s, which offer a point of
departure for posthumanist forms of embodied communication. And finally, the
performance Restringierter Code (Restricted Code) from 1979, where the identification
of the female with the nonhuman body resonates in mutual precarity, and a mutual
struggle to “speak” as counter-writing or counter-history, is most fully realized.
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The ZOCK manifesto is clearly a futurist parody (“ZOCK will destroy without exception all institutions
that are more than one minute old”). Despite this, the fact remains that the Vienna Actionists committed
similar acts of violence outlined in the manifesto, albeit on a much smaller scale. It is also telling that the
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intensive farming (keeping useful animals alive), environmental degradation and species extinction (killing
off “useless” animals), and neoliberal economic shock policies (“the famine that ZOCK will cause by
ravaging the economy is a welcome event that will realize ZOCK’s most drastic aims”). See Muehl,
“ZOCK Manifesto,” in Malcolm Green, Brus, Muehl, Nitsch, Schwarzkogler: Writings of the Vienna
Actionists (London: Atlas Press, 1999), 99-101.
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While the carnophallogentric violence I emphasize is undeniable, it should be acknowledged that the
Vienna Actionists’s interest in masochism, androgyny, and the complicated role and complicity of the
women involved in these performances, all make the movement, however compromised theoretically and
ethically, a complex affair. See AMOR PSYCHE ACTION-VIENNA The Feminine in Viennese Actionism
(Prague; Nuremberg: DOX PRAGUE, a.s., 2012).
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Export’s nine-minute film Mann & Frau & Animal opens with the close-up of a
chrome faucet with hand shower coiled and resting on top. The camera lingers on
individual parts of mundane plumbing—hot and cold valves, coiled metal tubing, a
gleaming spout that slowly drips water, the empty tub. After this methodical setting of the
scene, a female hand moves in from off screen turning on the faucet. The water swirls
down the drain out of sight, and the camera pans close to the drain, emphasizing its dark
cavity. The female hand then unscrews the showerhead effectuating a consolidated
stream of water, turning the hand shower into a spigot rather than a diffuse set of jets.
The film then cuts to this same female figure seated naked in the tub with legs parted
(with by a tonal shift in the film from a heretofore cool blue to warm sepia). The garter
belt tattoo on her left thigh, stemming from her action Body Sign Action in 1970,
indicates this figure to be EXPORT herself. Holding the spigot above her naked body
with her right hand, the fingers of her left open the folds of her labia up and back so that
the stream of water makes steady contact with her clitoris. EXPORT’s moans become
increasingly more audible (the viewer never sees her upper torso or face). Her legs
convulse, intermittently opening and closing; and by bringing the steady stream of water
closer and closer to her body, the glans of her clitoris becomes more and more engorged
and pronounced—a stimulation that the camera emphasizes by panning slowly in and out
from between her legs.
Then an abrupt transition: the sound cuts out and the viewer is momentarily
presented with the picture of a black equilateral triangle on a white background. Equally
suddenly, a grotesque male voice begins grunting as the camera cuts back to a full-frontal
view of the artist’s parted legs, now in full color. The naked woman, no longer in the tub,

247

now lies supine on a white bed sheet (throughout this section of the film, the camera is
fixed and focused on her pelvic region). Her genitals emit an opaque off-white pus or
phlegm, which could be male ejaculate. The strange male grunting changes the tone of
the film. What seemed to be authentic sounds of female pleasure in the first part are
replaced with comically strained vocalizations, ranging from the heaving panting of a
male overly invested in orgasm, to the sort of noises one might make to scare children.
All the while, the artist contracts her groin muscles, which makes it seem as if the
grotesque voice is coming from her vagina, as if possessed. After increasingly frenetic
grunting and straining, a cut in the film suddenly replaces the pus (or ejaculate) with
smeared blood. [ill. 4.18]
The triangle reappears, signaling the last portion of the film. The male noises give
way to whale song—distant oceanic reverberations that register as sentient
communication but whose meaning remains hidden in alterity (the use of whale song is
deeply ambiguous in this context, as I examine in a moment). Now, instead of a moving
image of the female figure, a photograph of the artist’s splayed legs on the white sheet is
submerged in a stop bath tray used for developing photographs. A male arm is extended
over the photograph with blood dripping from its palm and onto its surface, specifically
concealing the vagina with red opacity. [ill. 4.19] As blood accumulates over the image,
the camera pans in as the whale songs continue to echo as soundtrack. When the camera
pans back out again, the male has absconded with his bleeding hand, leaving the bloodied
photograph to rest in the middle of the bath tray, and the film ends.
While this short film is well known, it has been very little discussed. In her
monograph on the artist, Roswitha Mueller only mentions the film as “investigating
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woman’s pleasure” through taboo images of “orgasmic and menstruating female
genitals.”79 Since the exhibition and publication of the EXPORT’s archive in 2012, her
notes for the film aid in interpretation.80 The typewritten specifications comprise three
sections mirrored in the film. In part one, “section onanism,” EXPORT describes the
longing to feel one’s own power through orgasm; while this power is available to men
with ease, conversely, they (men) have neglected female jouissance, both physically and
psychically. In part two, “section vagina-sperm-blood,” EXPORT maintains that women
have too readily preoccupied themselves with fertility, even when it is not in their best
interest to bear children; she implies that the desire to procreate is an all-consuming
pressure. Finally, in part three, “section darkroom,” EXPORT describes an
epistemological correspondence between the androcentric coding of photography and the
female as the bearer of this gaze through the photographic image.81 This explains the
male bleeding on the photograph, which the artist explains to be “symbolic penitence” for
the appeasement of male guilt, but which cannot truly disturb the patriarchal order.82
Mann & Frau & Animal can be placed within the emerging discourse of “vaginal
iconology” of 1970s feminism, which understood female anatomy and pleasure to be a
site of political contestation.83 As a political gesture, the film’s first section, of the female
body in masturbatory satiation, is fundamentally kynical, flouting bourgeois propriety in
liberty from male interference. In part two, this self-sufficiency is intruded upon.
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EXPORT’s text confirms the white pus to be seminal fluid and the blood to be menstrual,
marking this intrusion not only as male but also as procreative. So, the first intrusive
projection is biological and concomitant penetration and insemination, designating
woman as the site of fertility and male gratification. Finally, in part three, the female
body, once captured on film, becomes yet another site of projection—of both the male
gaze and his guilt. This succession in Mann & Frau & Animal reflects a complex
movement from female self-sufficiency and agency to increasing mediation and loss of
volition. What begins with the authentic immanence of self-pleasure devolves twice over
in a loss of control and ability to communicate one’s own body. The diegetic female
sounds of pleasure give way to non-diegetic male grunting; the unity of sound and image
becomes fractured, and the female body is alienated by the absurdly discordant male
voice. Accompanying this change is a clear loss of agency, since active hands and body
that once controlled water pressure and pleasure disappear, leaving a limbless lower body
spread out on the bed (more simply, from subject of pleasure to object of projection—or
vagina as part object for the male drives dissimulating the rest of her). The second
moment of mediation occurs when the female form falls into photographic
representation—a doubled object-hood of a photograph captured on film, and of body-assubject becoming body-as-object, doubly objectified in photographic distance.
Special attention should be paid to the change in tone from section to section. Part
one offers the viewer a sincere moment of identification with female jouissance —an
identification that in certain respects ostracizes the male viewer (it certainly does not
cater to any male coded pornotropes). By contrast, part two is a parodic moment of overidentification with the enemy. The male voice and his fluids are amplified to such
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comical degrees that they serve to thematize his intrusion as both brutish and buffoonish.
The male subject, panting and ridiculous, is reduced to absurdity. The final section is
more enigmatic. The introduction of animality through whale song is at once a moment
of identification and over-identification. This ambiguity rests on the fact that marine
mammals—especially whales and dolphins—were at a critical historical juncture in the
early 1970 (as Marker’s work can attest to in chapter one). These cetaceans were
undergoing a process of reconfiguration in the human imagination (in science and in
popular culture) from an archaic pejorative animality to a posthumanist animality
whereby the nonhuman belies human exceptionalism.
To be sure, the trope of woman-animal-nature has a long pedigree in cultural
history, and EXPORT’s use of aquatic sonority over-identifies with this trenchant
essentialism. The final scene may even be read as comic—as if the female sex and whale
noises were equally enigmatic and mysterious beings. It should be noted that this
essentialization of woman-animal-nature underwent an update in the postwar period.
Beginning with postwar military experiments in bioacoustics (on both side of the Cold
War) that dispelled any notion of the ocean as silent or uncommunicative, the 1960s and
70s saw the sea refigured as a communicative pastoral maternity. As Mette Bryld and
Nina Lykke demonstrate, the trope of woman-animal-nature was displaced into the
depths of the sea for this first time. They note that this refiguration came as a pair, with
the newly loquacious motherly waters as the obverse of the scientific (and patently male)
exploration of acoustics coming from outer space—the other extraterrestrial domain that
captivated the postwar imagination:

251

In contrast to the image of a high-tech scientist broadcasting intelligent radio
messages from the Beyond of space, the imagery that evolved around the noisy
sea drew on the configurations of non-technology, Woman and Native. From this
watery ‘inner space’ came not the radio waves that suggest ‘advanced’ electronics
but sound waves that connect with biology…sounds that were generated by the
bodies of the sea creatures and hence perceived as ‘primitive.’84
This binary of sky father and sea mother places man as the techno-cultural subject, while
woman and nonhuman animal are instances of primitivo-natural biology. Mann & Frau
& Animal, then, can be interpreted as over-identifying with these tropes in its couplings
of motherhood, cetacean, womb, and ocean in order to travesty this rigid division (as it
does with Freudian tropes that similarly hinge on an essential connection between woman
and animality).85 The final section of the film even echoes this anthropo-cultural binary
formally, with the procreative female figure submerged underwater (indexically captured
in the developing tray enveloped by whale song) and the male arm free to abscond
hovering overhead (with blood dripping in Christian penance as, in fact, the religiosymbolic origin of this father-as-sky).86
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If Mann & Frau & Animal were to be interpreted exclusively as mocking the
tropes of woman as reducible to nature, enigma, and irrationality, it would miss the
scientific and cultural developments surround the whale in the early 1970s that were
arguably more impactful than the sky father-mother sea binary. For it was at this very
moment that whale vocalizations mediated a change in the existential fate of these marine
mammals and reconfigured their being in the popular imagination. In fact, it was a
specific recording—Songs of the Humpback Whale (1970)—that elicited an immediate
empathic recognition of nonhuman emotion and intelligence. [ill. 4.20] Cetacean
vocalizations found their way into popular music and film, as well as congressional
hearings and meetings of the International Whaling Commission (they were catalytic for
the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972).87 As D. Graham Burnett puts it in his
defining history of the science of whales in the twentieth century: “It would be difficult to
overstate the significance of this work for the campaign to end whaling…[s]uddenly,
improbably, it was as if anyone with a radio could her these most mysterious of animals
sounding their own dirge.88 With this eco-history in mind, EXPORT’s use of whale song
in Mann & Frau & Animal can be understood as identifying with an alterity that makes
claims for itself and belies humanist dogmas about nonhuman being. For in a kynical
rebuttal of Heidegger, how can an animal be poor in the world if it can sing and feel joy?
The ecofeminist parallel is clear when articulated in terms of a shared struggle
across the 1970s: both animal liberation and women’s liberation forced a reconsideration
of andro-humanist domination and its illusory exclusivity of various ontological
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capacities. It is as if EXPORT channels the nonhuman voice as an affective witness in
solidarity with her own plight as a purportedly inferior being in a long patriarchalspeciesist history. In this way, the final scenes of Mann & Frau & Animal might not
simply be parodic; in distinct yet mutual alterity, woman and whale make reinforcing
claims on the viewer for recognition (that they be not simply bearers of children or oil).
The recurring triangle in Mann & Frau & Animal, then, does not represent the discrete
subject positions of the Oedipal triangle as it may initially be thought (with the adult male
in power), but a transversal and secularized trinity as emphasized by the ampersands in
the film’s title.89 This amounts to an ontology that is radically posthumanist, as it not only
scrambles gender determinism, but also re-introduces animality into the conception of the
human. It also evokes one of the critical advances of eco-feminist thinking, namely, that
both commonality and difference should be taken into account when considering the
various human and nonhuman beings of the world.
There is an additional eco-feminist affinity that should be underscored: both
whale vocalizations and the contemporaneous theories of écriture feminine emphasize the
language of the body as a form of non-phonetic meaning that resists androcentric speech
in idealized logos. As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this embodied
resistance is a fundamental aspect of the kynic’s deployment of the body as a pantomimic
argument. I turn to these contemporaneous developments next as a way to introduce
EXPORT’s performances with nonhumans that offer a point of departure for
posthumanist forms of embodied communication in a mutual struggle to “speak” as
counter-writing or counter-history to andro-humanism.
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Les Cahiers de GRIF (the acronym stands for Le groupe de recherche et
d’information féministes) was a Belgian journal that ran from 1973 to 1982 and
assembled a number of feminist theorists, artists, and filmmakers (including, among
many others, Messager and EXPORT). In the editorial of its first issue, the journal
emphasizes its open-ended and pluralistic approach, its international scope, as well as an
understanding of feminism as a problem not only for women but for all of society, men
included. Closing out this first editorial is a phrase that underscores the aptness of its
acronym: “A warning scratch [griffe], without underestimating the touch of a velvet
paw.”90 This closing play on words emphasizes the insistent work of the mark, scratch,
talon, and claw as an interspecies identification of resistance through writing and
animality.91
If humanism, as Sloterdijk has described it, is a history of men sending each other
letters, the embodied precarity and communicative potential of those humans and
nonhumans that fall outside the sanctioned confines of androcentric expression represent
a counter-writing and a counter-history that is posthumanist.92 One form of counterwriting is écriture féminine, which at times aligns itself with nonhuman mark making,
and represents one of the conditions of possibility for eco-feminist thought, and for
solidarity between gender and species liberation. Writing in Les Cahiers de GRIF,
Françoise d’Eaubonne, the French writer who first coined the term “eco-feminisme,”
argues for an irrevocable link between writing, the body, and feminist revolutionary
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politics—a link gleaned in her kynically titled: Mémoires Précoces: Chiennes de jeunesse
(Precocious Memoirs: Young Bitch, 1965).93 On more theoretical terrain, a number of
feminist thinkers proposed a similarly somatic notion of writing, which might take
recourse to a kynical identification with nonhuman animals.94 Hélène Cixous’s celebrated
text “The Laugh of the Medusa” is one such example. Not only does she invoke the
mythological figure of Medusa, an animalized female with snakes instead of hair and the
power to provoke castration anxiety, but throughout her manifesto, Cixous braids the
physiologically charged female body, writing, and nonhuman alterity together as a
dynamic insurgency resisting the limitations of androcentric speech, reason, and idealism:
“She doesn’t ‘speak,’ she throws her trembling body forward; she lets go of herself, she
flies; all of her passes into her voice, and it’s with her body that she supports the ‘logic’
of her speech. Her flesh speaks true.”95 Here, speech is supplemented by embodied
writing, and the animal in woman, which is far more productive than mere bare life or zoe,
is never far away. In kynical, embodied laughter, “woman un-thinks the unifying,
regulating history that homogenizes and channels forces, herding contradictions into a
single battlefield.”96 And instead of being corralled by the bellicosity of history—in
which “gynocide” and exploited “species off whose back the history of men has made its
gold” are of a piece—it is only natural for Cixous that “women take after birds.”97
Like Cixous’s call for a corporeal écriture feminine whose semiotic range far
exceeds the restricted code of male, humanist speech, in EXPORT’S work birds provide
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a parallel agency and embodiment with the female body. EXPORT’s own writings trace
an evolution towards an expanded field of semiotic corporeality. In “Women’s Art: A
Manifesto” from 1972, she calls out art history and mediatic culture as fully androcentric,
and sends out the command to “let women speak.”98 In subsequent texts, however, simply
taking the mantle of speech is seen as doomed to failure, as it remains within the confines
of history as male logos. In “Aspects of Feminist Actionism” from 1989, EXPORT lays
out the difficulty of using words for emancipation: “It was not possible to ‘find one's own
words,’ because words belong to men.” Further complicating matters, turning towards
bodily forms of communication came with its own obstacle: “Nor was it easy to find
one's words in body language, because it too was mainly occupied by male fantasies.” 99
The “mute language of the body” thus had to find modes of expression that could explode
the confines of male, humanist history and expectations. One way in which EXPORT
sought to achieve this resistance was by bringing other counter-humanist bodies into her
performances—namely, nonhuman animals who provide both positive and negative
forms of identification.100
Mann & Frau & Animal is one of the first instances of EXPORT incorporating
animality in her work. But if the film’s use of whale song can be understood as both
identification (nonhuman alterity that challenges androcentric humanism) and overidentification (a mocking embrace of woman=nature), then a number of performances
involving birds offer a more clear-cut instance of nonhuman identification. Asemie - die

98

Valie Export, "Woman's Art: A Manifesto," in Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: a
Sourcebook of Artists' Writings, ed. Kristine Stiles and Peter Howard Selz (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996), 869.
99
Export, "Aspects of Feminist Actionism," 87.
100
EXPORT’s use of animals is only one of many strategies for creating this new embodied language. The
use of new media, film, and her solitary body in performance are others.
257

Unfähigkeit, sich durch Mienenspiel ausdrücken zu können (Asemia - The Inability to
Express Oneself Through Facial Expression), 1973 comprised the artist in her studio, a
bird, a table, a palate knife, and hot wax in a pan. [ill. 4.21] The video of the performance
opens with the following phrase written directly on the floor in chalk just in front of the
table: “the inability to express oneself though facial expression.”101 These words define
the pathological condition lending the performance its title— “asemia” being a hyperaphasic condition whereby a subject is unable to either express or receive signs and
symbols. Around these words, EXPORT hammers nails into the floor at equidistant
intervals. The film documenting the performance then cuts to the artist on all fours, naked
atop the table that has been prepared with a white tablecloth. She holds a little pouch,
from which she reveals a living parakeet whose wings flutter in an attempt to fly away
(and nearly does). Gently, EXPORT ties a string around one of the bird’s legs, keeping
the feathered biped tethered to the table. After another cut excising an unspecified
amount of time, what appears to be a different bird lies lifelessly on the same spot where
the previous bird was just tied.102 This bird is coated in hot wax with matted wings
splayed out on the table. EXPORT proceeds to poor hot wax onto her feet and hands—
fixing her own appendages to the table (for her remaining hand, the artist is forced to use
her teeth to clumsily poor wax from the pan, which eventually falls over to the side).
Once self-immobilized by the cooling wax, the artist picks up the palate knife resting just
in front of the bird with her teeth. Slowly, she extricates herself from the congealing wax
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by cutting away the outlines of her hands and feet. Asemie closes with EXPORT, having
freed herself, peeling off the wax coated palm and footprints and placing them on the
corresponding imprints left on the table by her hands and feet.
Asemie was included in the Animal Art exhibition catalog enumerating recent
work involving animal life, discussed in chapter two. In her text accompanying this piece,
EXPORT explains that formal quality of wax connotes the embalming and killing of
expressive potential. She notes that traditionally, wax is a medium that captures
expression (as in a mask). Here, however, wax is used to impede it. Since both birds and
hands have the capacity for embodied gestures in communication, immobilizing these
corporeal forms of language entails a loss. The embalming wax is analogized with the
social conventions that dictate these bodily expressions to be outside the purview of true
communication. The more these conventional codes take over, the more inter-personal
communication becomes constrained, lost, and repressed, and the more woman and bird
become asemic.
Two other works by EXPORT from the mid-seventies incorporate birds. In
Brechbare Regeln meiner Kraft. Ein poetischer Flugversuch (Breakable Rules of My
Strength: A Poetic Attempt to Fly), 1975, performed in Copenhagen, EXPORT was tied
up in string on a platform alongside a bird whose leg, like that of Asemie, was affixed to a
string tied to a nail on a board. A film of the performance shows the artist struggling
while bound and using her teeth to free the nail from the board—thereby freeing the
bird.103 Like Asemie, there is a direct, embodied affinity between human and nonhuman
(though in this instance it is the bird who goes free). Along similar lines, Implementation,
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(Implementation, 1974-75) is a closed-circuit video installation involving a bird tied to a
makeshift perch standing just in front of a projector screen. [ill. 4.22] The screen is
divided into twenty squares of equal size and measure (numbering 1-20 at the top left of
each square). The directions for the installation dictate that each square “sector” of the
screen is to be “scanned by the camera and transmitted to the monitor.” From this closed
circuit set up—of a live feed from video to monitor—whenever the bird attempts to fly
away (in futility) she has the chance of momentarily being captured on the monitor—
effectively captured twice over: once in actuality by being tied down, once in moving
image reproduction. This would only happen serendipitously, i.e. when the “scanned
square is coincident with the square of the bird’s movement.”104 This work is related to
another performance using the same installation set-up, namely, Movement Imagination
No. 5 (1974/75). For this iteration, however, EXPORT takes the place of the bird. It is
now the artist who jumps or attempts to fly in front of the screen so to be fleetingly
captured in the closed video loop.
In all these cases involving avian life, EXPORT identifies with and makes an
embodied analogy with her own body and that of a bird. Both are in various states of
confinement, of being held back, of being captured or liberated. In each case, EXPORT
sets up the conditions of possibility (or impossibility) from which both she and her
nonhuman collaborator have varying degrees of success or failure. Following Pamela
Lee’s interpretation of EXPORT’s work, these processes of identification replicate the
conditions of “bare life”—of existing under biopolitical controls that dictate value, life,
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and disposability.105 This species-mutual incapacitation can be found in numerous
drawings by the artist, most notably, HANDVOGEL, 1974. [ill. 4.23] The sketch shows
two birds from above—one approximately twice the size as the other, both sprouting
human hands instead of feathered wings. The work is a striking premonition of Vilèm
Flusser’s observation (in 1979) that it is only our hands that allow us to apprehend threedimensionality, something birds can do anytime in flight: “[t]o fly like birds is to be able
to use the whole body as if it were a hand, to be able to move oneself entirely
within…space.”106 Yet EXPORT’s fusion of human hand-bird body enacts a mutual
negation of capacity: it is as hard to image these hands reaching out in space as primate
utility as it is for them to be serviceable wings for avian flight.
It is important, however, to emphasize the kynical positivity of these gestures.
While they identify with certain negative constraints, they nevertheless invite the viewer
to recognize certain positive capabilities of communication, resistance, and empathy—
should the viewer be compelled to do so. In other words, these performances identify
with bare life in order to undercut biopolitical control by witnessing that even
animality—the purported zero degree of bare life as zoe—is replete with positive values
shared by human and nonhuman alike in mutual resistance.
EXPORT’s most elaborate work involving animals, Restringierter Code
(Restricted Code), 1979, reflects a prolonged chance for inter-species identification.
Restringierter Code was performed twice—first at the Centre Pompidou in Paris, then for
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the Performance ‘79 exhibition in Munich.107 It is a theatre performance using new media
components, a human baby, a dog, a hamster, a parakeet, and the artist herself. [ill. 4.24]
Three television monitors frame each side of the on-stage installation. Stage right,
EXPORT is seated at a table with comestibles and a single monitor on the floor, all inside
a large wire cage—effectively, a domestic room without walls.108 Moving from stage
right to left the audience was presented with: two clear tanks on top of each other
separately housing the hamster and parakeet; one larger open top clear cube, into which
the large brown dog is placed; and finally, a crib in which the human infant is placed. As
bodies are being arranged for the performance, the atmosphere in the theatre is one of
levity. Numerous audience members chuckle, especially at the bemused baby who is
immediately drawn to the puzzled dog. Once everyone is in place, Restringierter Code
plays with the mix of live and mediated bodies of both human and nonhuman through a
closed circuit live video feed: the three monitors on stage right next to the artist relayed
her movements, while the three monitors on stage left (as well as the single monitor
inside the artist’s cage), relayed the movements of hamster, bird, baby, and (more often
than not) dog.
EXPORT scripted Restringierter Code in three parts, which she follows closely in
performance.109 In part one she eats at the table while her fellow performers are also fed
(aside from the baby, who stands silently and is clearly entranced by the dog just next to
his crib). After some time, EXPORT moves from socially conventional ways of eating
107

Performance ‘79 was an exhibition at the Städische Galierie Lenbachhaus on January 1, 1979. The
Pompidou performance, on February 8th, 1979, was part of an “interdisciplinary day of body art and
performance.” Only the Münich performance was documented. Sylvia Szely and Valie Export, Export
Lexikon: Chronologie der bewegten Bilder bei Valie Export (Wien: Sonderzahl, 2007), 96.
108
Restringierter Code is thus related to Hyperbulia (1973), a performance in which EXPORT is naked on
all fours in a similar cage. The wiring was electrically charged by being hooked up to a live battery.
109
See transcript in Szely and Export, 96-7.
262

towards more unconventional methods—for example, by using her fingers to take in food
and making various noises. Part two begins with the artist cleaning herself in postprandial gestures that clearly mimic animal grooming. She cleans her face and head by
licking her hands in order to transfer saliva (presumably how the hamster is also cleaning
him or herself, though the vantage point of the filmic documentation does not allow the
viewer to see the movements of the relatively smaller creatures on stage). Human to
nonhuman mimicry then takes off. EXPORT is seen crawling, panting, barking, roaming
on all fours, and holding her hands over the lip of the wire structure holding her captive
as the dog does with paws over top edges of his clear cube. Over the course of the 30minute film documentation, the artist takes turns mimicking the sage though curious baby,
then the increasingly agitated dog whose whimpers morph into imploring barks. Yet the
reverse is also apparent, as the baby comes to mimic the dog and the dog comes to mimic
the artist in a feedback loop. The third part of the script dictates that the increasingly
frenetic transmission of affect from humans to nonhumans should lead to a trance-like
state or intoxication.110 Restringierter Code closes with EXPORT lying on the ground,
rhythmically moving her arms on and off the floor in loud thumps, and finally, with her
writhing convulsingly from inside her domestic cage with dog and baby looking on.
EXPORT’s patented interest in mimicry in her work’s titles and in their
performative logic might conjure Roger Caillois’s entomological theories, which were so
influential to the Surrealists.111 In the 1930s, Caillois argued that the phenomenon of
animal mimicry—of morphing into the shape of another animal or simulating the
appearance of inanimate matter—was a process of depersonalized automation of
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boundary breaking infusion with the environment. As the art historian Joyce Cheng
writes in her study of mimicry in Surrealism, “[a]utomatism…is taken to a radical level
by Caillois, whose impetuous remedy against human subjectivity is to dispense with the
human altogether and to look into the insect and animal world for models of alterity.”112
With EXPORT’s emphasis on trance and ecstasy, as well as the obvious connection of
performance as mimicry, it is tempting to read Restringierter Code along the lines of
Caillois’s early theories.
By the postwar period, however, Caillois had come to disavow his youthful
theories on animal mimicry. In his Man, Play, and Games from 1959, mimicry is updated
as a form of play in similitude.113 Leaving aside the complex differences and similarities
between humans and nonhumans in their varied capacities of mimicry (or, in related
fashion, for imprinting), Caillois’s reworking of the concept, in its most general sense and
for varied ends, is a recourse of passing for another in masquerade. Caillois still holds
insects as his privileged figures, yet notes a difference in relation when analogizing them
to human mimicry: “…mimetism of insects immediately affords an extraordinary parallel
to man’s penchant for disguising himself, wearing a mask, or playing a part—except that
in the insect’s case the mask or guise becomes part of the body instead of a contrived
accessory.”114 Moreover, while animal mimicry is often used to frighten for self-
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preservation, in the case of humans and their games, mimicry is described as a
pleasurable activity and a type of identification with the strongest.115
Restringierter Code does find EXPORT undergoing a process of
depersonalization through mimicry or imprinting, but not simply as a way of dissolving
into her environment. She quite clearly imitates her fellow nonhumans as a becominganimal other in mutual affective relays on stage. Yet this is mimicry as identification for
escaping the rigid confines of human sociability. Where EXPORT departs from Caillois’s
theory of mimetic identification in human masquerade is that she is clearly not
identifying with the stronger, bit with the weakest (along with women, animals and
infants have historical resided outside the human domain of full rights and reason).
Restringierter Code is thus the opposite of Deleuze and Guattari’s contemporaneous
theory of depersonalization, which equally sought to explode Oedipal rigidity in smooth
space, namely, their becoming-animal. EXPORT’s becoming-animal is a becoming
constrained, for if there is a subject position in striated space, it is the animal who
becomes pathologically unhinged in containment. In this sense, what begins as playful
identification morphs into paralyzing over-identification at the conclusion of the
performance. EXPORT’s kynicism is thus twofold: it mimes a nonhuman position (or not
yet fully reasoned human, in the case of the baby) as a form of escape from normative
sociability, as well as a headlong embrace of animality in order to make bodily
containment manifest. Like many of the other examples in this chapter, then, this
performance is a complex mix of empathy and identification that, due to historical and
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cultural power constraints, must also be interpreted as a moment of over-identification in
order to embody resistance from within patriarchal and specieist vectors of power.
As an artistic contribution to the history of animals in philosophy, Restringierter
Code ultimately serves to critique any notion of pre-existing ontological poverty, as the
Heideggerian view of animality would have it: the animal is not intrinsically poor in the
world (a poverty that, in the first place, can only be claimed in relativity with the human
by the human in the sui generis of circular reasoning).116 Instead, the animal is poor in the
world due to the “restricted codes” placed on its being (or its body is a restricted code in
relation to the system of dominance it finds itself, which amounts to the same thing). As I
have argued in respect to EXPORT’s Mann & Frau & Animal, analogizing this to the
female condition is a central feature of eco-feminist critique. Like the nonhuman, woman
is not inherently inferior to man, but is often relegated as such by a historical system that
is as patriarchal as it is speciesist (a system that, once again, can only be maintained by
androhumanist power in groundless self-affirmation). EXPORT is explicit about this
parallel in her notes for Restringierter Code: “Using the body as a means of expression is
a restricted code, since society exercises control over the body…The distinction between
animal and human bodily expression is thus ideological.”117 EXPORT describes this
restricted code of the body in such a way that scrambles the ideological division of the
animal and human, as well as the more general division of nature and culture. The body
“sings” and “sounds” in “trance” and “ecstasy”—and is accordingly punished if it moves
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This is a problematic compromise and humanist regression in Heidegger’s conception of Dasein. For a
protracted critique of Heidegger’s Dasein along these lines, see Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the
Question.
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outside what is socially sanctioned.118 If, for EXPORT, the body is a restricted code, its
constraints come only from androhumanist impositions that arbitrarily curtail the bodies
and capacities of certain humans and nonhumans alike.
4.4 CONCLUSION
Towards the end of EXPORT’s feature film, Invisible Adversaries (1977), the
central female protagonist (“Anna”, played by Susanne Widl) sits in an office speaking to
her male psychotherapist. Throughout the film—which functions loosely as a
retrospective of EXPORT’s work to that point, including a reprisal of the photograph and
grunting noises from Mann & Frau & Animal—Anna is increasingly convinced that
humanity is being taken over by the Hyksos, a mysterious race of alien entities that take
host in people. Akin to Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), this science fiction
premise is allusive of the social mechanism of ideology—of being interpellated by the
state, capitalism, and the media, resulting in subjects who remain ideologically blind to
these forces, or, for those who become aware of them, resigned in cynical realism. Anna
attempts to confide her suspicions of these nefarious invisible adversaries to her
psychotherapist, but he only responds with pragmatic clinicism and diagnoses her as a
schizophrenic—an update of the female hysteric who cannot deal with the realisms of
existing society. It is during this scene that she calmly claims: “I am alone in my search
for human beings.”119
This statement unavoidably recalls one of the more well-known stories associated
with Diogenes of Sinope, who, when walking around the streets of ancient Athens in
broad daylight holding a lantern, responded to his perplexed fellow citizens in kind: “I
118
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Valie Export, Invisible Adversaries=Unsichtbare Gegner (Chicago, Illinois: Facets Multimedia).
[1:33:37]
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am in the search for human beings.”120 With these statements echoing each other from
two different cynical ages, both Diogenes and EXPORT express the same desire for a
sovereign, authentic self who is not beholden to ideological forces that warp social
behavior. Or, as Sloterdijk puts it when recalling this story of the lantern in daytime, “[i]f
true human beings are those who remain in control of their desires and live rationally in
harmony with nature, it is obvious that urbanized, social human beings behave
irrationally and inhumanely.”121 In this chapter I have argued that certain feminist
practices in the 1970s and 80s can be interpreted in these performatively kynical terms. I
have also argued that these strategies, in various ways, involve an identification or overidentification with animality. Invisible Adversaries offers yet another example of this
when scenes of Anna grooming herself (trimming pubic hair, washing, shaving, etc.) are
purposely syncopated with those of a fish being prepared for cooking (salting, de-scaling,
fileting, etc.).122 [ill. 4.25-6] Clearly, EXPORT is exemplary of this kynical feminism, but
Bourgeois and Messager also hold these affinities.
I conclude, however, with a caveat about the limitations of such a strategy
(something I have alluded to over the course of this chapter in various instances). One of
the issues surrounding kynicism is that it often remains at the level of diagnostic. A
kynical artist will resist the enemy by becoming the enemy in viral overidentification.
This may certainly serve to make manifest certain wrongs or absurdities in ways that
unimpassioned forms of ideology critique cannot; nonetheless, the action does not
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The statement associated with this anecdote has several permutations, though they result in the same
sentiment: “I am looking for an honest man,” or “I am looking for people.”
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Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 162.
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EXPORT emphasizes this woman-animal analogy by showing both female and fish bodies swimming in
a bathtub filled with water in quick succession just before the syncopation of grooming/cooking. Export,
Invisible Adversaries=Unsichtbare Gegner. [1:13:52-1:14:25]
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necessarily offer a way out (or, at least, it needs to be supplemented by a positive moment
of ideological critique or illumination for changing the enemy’s mind). More
problematically, this kynical endeavor of pantomimic critique necessarily redoubles the
very injustices of the critiqued. One parasites the host, but can end up redoubling the
wrongs of the host. When these wrongs are irreversible, especially in violence and death,
the moment of over-identification is outweighed by the gravity of its effects. In other
words, the strategic sacrifice is not worth the moment of kynical illumination.
Perhaps the most dangerous limitation of such kynical strategies is that they are
precariously dependent on the enlightenment or un-cynicization of the subject in power
(in this sense, kynical strategies are, at base, very far from cynicism in their hopefulness
or belief of critique by other means). When Bourgeois identifies with a mutilated she-fox,
or Messager with little fragile sparrows, or EXPORT with a dog or bird, each artist is
assuming the position of a weak force—or a subject position whose very existential
fragility becomes a source of power or protection, at least when recognized as such by
those who would formerly disavow precarious existences. The eminent danger, of course,
is that this avowal is not always assured. The subject in power—in the present case, the
androhumanist—even when presented with his wrongs or absurdities in kynical overidentification may ultimately resist a change of heart. As history has shown, maintaining
power via an enlightened false consciousness is often all too appetizing—a cynicism for
which the kynic is no match.
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CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE POST-ANIMAL IN CONTEMPORARY ART
This dissertation has focused on the 1970s and 80s in France and Belgium, in part
to provide a historical genealogy of the incorporation of nonhuman animals in
contemporary art. These pivotal decades orient modern ecological movements, animal
ethics and posthumanist theory. Prior to this, nonhuman animal life was over-determined
as a cultural symbol or exploitable natural resource—usually in mutual reinforcement
within art and visual culture. While this also remains by-and-large the case today, points
of resistance are increasingly being felt, so much so that Peter Sloterdijk (certainly no
bleeding-heart eco-leftist) predicts a “growing unease among the populations of the great
hothouse in the coming century through an internationalized animal rights movement,
already almost fully developed, that will emphasize the unbreakable connection between
human rights and animal suffering.”1 Through increased visibility of animal issues in
popular culture and the groundswell of academic interest in critical animal studies, what
was germinal in the 1970s and 80s is on the cusp of full bloom today—though it should
be said that progress has been incipient and partial; the history of human supremacy is
tenaciously strong, even in the often utopian-minded denizens of the art world.
In keeping with this critical momentum, my case studies have sought to pry loose
the obdurate humanist over-determination of what “animals” are understood to be (or not
be), providing an expanded field of posthumanist recognition: the animal as ethological
subject demanding ethical consideration, informing environmental well-being on a
planetary scale (Chris Marker’s ethological work of the 1970s and 80s); the animal as
nonhuman agent that sends the differential structure of the “human”—and thus humanism
1

Sloterdijk, In the World Interior of Capital: For a Philosophical Theory of Globalization, 230.
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in all its guises—into crisis (posthumanist exhibitions in the 80s); the animal as a singular
form of life that complicates the relationship between the universality of language and the
particularity of the real, sending the nominal powers of the readymade into paradox when
applied to animals (Marcel Broodthaers and the animal readymade); and the animal as a
state of being-in-the-world that resist violent, andro-humanist historical forces (ecofeminist strategies of identifying with animality).
While other reconceptualizations of the animal can be found in the 1970s and
80s,2 contemporary art’s engagement with animal life has since expanded exponentially,
as can be seen in three recent exhibitions that reflect this proliferation: Animism (2012),
Beastly/Tierisch (2015), and The Beast and is the Sovereign (2015). 3 As is often the case
in contemporary thematic exhibitions, a discipline outside art history provides theoretical
ballast (respectively: cultural anthropology, visual media studies, and Derridean
biopolitics). All three are symptomatic of a posthumanist or nonhuman turn across art and
its disciplines; all three are compelling curatorial deployments of animality in art. Yet the
most recognizable exhibition that lent visibility to issues surrounding animals (albeit far
more obliquely than the three just mentioned) was dOCUMENTA (13), curated by Carolyn
Christov-Bakargiev. A number of installations incorporated animal life, including
Kristina Buch’s The Lover, 2013, an open-air butterfly garden, and Pierre Huyghe’s
Untilled, 2013, an outdoor installation that included a bee colony swarming a reclining
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Some of these I have mentioned in my dissertation, such as Joseph Beuys, Arte Povera, and Fluxus.
Others remain less well-known, yet also manifest the changing conception of animals in art: Rose FinnKelcey’s performances, the Polish poet and conceptual artist Andrej Partum’s 1980 Animal Manifesto, and
Bill Viola’s early video work, for example.
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Anselm Franke, Animism (Berlin; New York: Sternberg Press, 2010). Duncan Forbes et al.,
Beastly/Tierisch (Leipzig; Winterthur: Spector Books ; Fotomuseum Winterthur, 2015). "The Beast and is
the Sovereign," ed. Württembergischer Kunstverein Stuttgart (2015).
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female statue and a dog running free with a fluorescent pink leg.4 [ill. 5.1-2] Interestingly,
in many respects these works are contemporary repetitions of installations from the 1970s
and 80s (notably, Mass Moving’s breading of butterflies, Mark Thompson’s performance
with beehives, and Jacques Lizène gallery environment for dogs). I would need more
space to account for the meaning behind this repetition, and why the earlier works with
nonhumans would probably remain neglected were it not for their more contemporary
(and possibly more fashionable) echoes. Yet it is safe to say that the ecological crisis,
which since the 1970s has forebodingly accelerated into today’s widespread acceptance
of anthropogenic climate change, in many ways has sanctioned the animal (along with all
other markers of the more-than-human world) as a seriously minded concern for
contemporary art.
Seriously minded concerns, however, are not always met with sufficient rigor in
contemporary art. Julian Stallabrass’s damning review of dOCUMENTA (13) argues that
the exhibition is symptomatic of an art world that has a long way to when it comes to
both a sound articulation of its concepts and their manifestation in environmental
viability. Stallabrass takes issue with an “overbearing theoretical frame” that amounted to
a farrago of “phenomenology, quantum theory, feminist thinking and psychoanalysis,
[which pushed] the centre of human cultural concerns away from subject–object
oppositions towards a perspective that would include the viewpoints of all entities,

4

It is for this reason that dOCUMENTA (13) quickly received the nickname “dog-umenta.” This included the
Thai artist Araya Rasdjarmrearnsook’s Village and Elsewhere: In this circumstance the sole object of
attention should be the treachery of the moon (2012), which involved her living in a house in Kassel’s
public Karlsaue park with her dog. Yet less domestic animals were present. For example, in Allora &
Calzadilla’s video Raptor’s Rapter, 2012, the Turkish artists Füsun Onur’s Dance of the Crows, 2012, and
the Australian artist Fiona Hall’s taxidermy.
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organic and inorganic.”5 He then points out the cognitive dissonance at the heart of
international exhibition-making that, on the one hand, takes up issues of
environmentalism while, on the other, materially contributes to its degradation: “There is
nothing green about any of this [i.e. the infrastructure of dOCUMENTA (13) in the broadest,
systemic sense], and the curatorial moves to evoke environmental issues, like the green
hue of the BP logo, are an insulting camouflage.”6 Ultimately, Stallabrass claims these
two failings fed into each other when “the aesthetic performance of a curator armoured
with an elaborate theoretical mysticism is supposed to allow viewers to glide over the
deep contradictions between art’s ethos and its business model.”7
What Stallabrass diagnoses is a deep contradiction at the heart of the
contemporary art world vis-à-vis ecology: the conditions of possibility for its display and
traffic are often at odds with the ways in which its institutions and cultured pleasures are
deleterious to the material sanctity of the more-than-human (art) world.8 I run through
this argument because we find an analogous situation with the related question of animals
in art. Bucher’s work with butterflies and Huyghe’s with dogs supply an art world fix for
novelty, amusement, and living décor, without leading to deeper ecological, political, and
ethical engagement with nonhuman animals.9 In ways that are as nebulous as
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Julian Stallabrass, "Radical Camouflage: At DOCUMENTA 13," New Left Review, no. 77 (2012): 129,
124. Stallabrass’s critique asserts that curators often assimilate new theoretical ideas—in this case,
Speculative Realism, Object Oriented Ontology, and New Materialism—in ways that become facile and
reductive.
6
Ibid., 132.
7
Ibid., 133.
8
Perhaps, recalling Michael Bess’s phrase, we should call this the light-greening of contemporary art.
9
The contemporary art world often finds aesthetic ambiguity more interesting than clear-cut ethicopolitical knowledge, and this pressure to resist resolution sways some artists, who might otherwise be
amendable to taking nonhumans seriously in ethical and political thinking. As Stallabrass says of ChristovBakargiev’s curatorial rhetoric, this lack of commitment amounts to a fear of closure, which he found to be
at play relentlessly at dOCUMENTA (13). It also remains debatable whether or not closure is necessarily
opposed to aesthetic interest.
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environmental impaction (though in many ways more concrete), cultural institutions
continue to associate with an animal industrial complex that renders nonhumans as mere
objects for pleasure (aesthetic, gustatory, sartorial, and so on). The more the animal
becomes a central concern for artists, curators, and attendant disciplines, the more this
contradiction will become acute—ideally, one day soon, to the point of being unbearable.
What grounds this re-articulation of animality in the recent contemporary
exhibitions I have just mentioned is a historical development whose implications cannot
be overstated—even if it is not yet avowed by the much of the (art) world: the advent of
the animal as potential victim. This historical process of recognition has heretofore been
reserved for human-to-human self-recognition in the other, yet increasingly what counts
today as appreciable inter-facing far exceeds the jealous rearguard anthroproprietors of
humanist history. As cognitively complex social beings with various degrees of affinities
with humans, nonhuman animals have become potentially “grievable life,” to use Judith
Butler’s term.10 Or as François Laruelle has conjectured, “crimes against animality” will
begin to preoccupy twenty-first century thinking.11 Tracing this historical progression of
nonhuman recognition that began in the nineteenth century to its acceleration today
would be the work of another dissertation, but here I offer the example of two wellknown elephants—one at the beginning of the twentieth century, the other at the twentyfirst, as micro-emblematic of these historical changes.
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Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009). Pet-keeping practices
have made certain nonhuman animals grievable since at least the nineteenth century. For an excellent
history of pet-keeping and its affects, see Kathleen Kete, The Beast in the Boudoir: Petkeeping in
Nineteenth-Century Paris (Berkeley; London: University of California press, 1995).
11
François Laruelle, General Theory of Victims, trans., Jessie Hock and Alex Dubilet (Cambridge; Malden,
MA: Polity, 2015), 2.
274

Thomas Edison’s film production Electrocuting an Elephant (1903) documents
Topsy the elephant being killed by electricity on Coney Island; it is one of the earliest
experiments in film. [ill. 5.3] In keeping with a well-established tradition of criminalizing
nonhumans, the elephant was originally to be hanged in public (unwanted and unsellable,
Topsy had a reputation for retaliating against her handlers and a sometimes abusive
public). After protests from the American Society of the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, Edison was brought in to euthanize the large mammal with his DC current
instead. Part spectacle, part snuff film, the footage begins with Topsy being led to her
execution, chained to the spot, and subject to a lethal electrical current that courses
through her massive frame; Topsy becomes rigid, plumes of smoke emit from under her
feet, and she falls dead off to one side.
Exactly one century later Topsy’s fallen body finds a companion in Douglas
Gordon’s Play Dead; Real Time (2003), a three-channel video installation featuring
another elephant, this time filmed performing in Gagosian Gallery, NY. [ill. 5.4] The
moving images are projected across both sides of two obliquely hung projection screens,
as well as screened on a television monitor on the floor. Gordon has described this
installation as part nature film, part scientific study. The driving question was whether or
not elephants can lie down, a position in which they are rarely seen.12 While there is an
ethological dimension to this work (its focus on a single subject, documenting details and
behaviors in the relatively controlled environment of the gallery space), there is also an
affective dimension that exceeds neutral observation. The camera angles are consistently
horizontal and track from a low vantage point (as if the spectator is on all fours or has
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become-mouse). The camera also whirls around the subject in 360 degrees, creating a
feeling that both the filmed floor of the projected image and the floor of the gallery space
in which it is viewed are moving. The nonhuman viewpoint, coupled with the sensation
of co-movement, gives rise to an embodied and affective relationship between human
viewer and nonhuman performer. This human-nonhuman interfacing is driven home by
close ups of the elephant’s eyes, blinking, scanning the space, and opening up a mediated
recognition from one viewing mammal to another.
Placed alongside Electrocuting an Elephant, the differences could not be starker:
the elephant is alive, relatively free to move about free from pain and in accordance with
her abilities, and is given attention for her vital being-in-the-world rather than for her
demise. In this way, advances in cognitive ethology mirror the technological advances
from film to video between 1903 to 2003. The fact that an elephant can “play dead” (as
alluded to by Gordon’s title) is of great consequence, since such behavior reflects
complex cognitive interiority, and an ability to communicate, play, and pretend. Such
sociability, self-awareness, and intellectual sophistication complicate the use of an
elephant as mere property in various forms of forced performance. Comparing the two
films gives rise to a dark, ironic echo from one elephant to another—one that is
perpetually dying on film and the other perpetually playing dead on video, but both with
the ability to play dead.13
An agonistic field of parallel developments in art and culture informs this near
history of the changing attitudes towards animals. On the one hand, the general expansion
13

However, ethical problems persist in Gordon’s video: what ties these two elephants together is the circus
that provided their bodies, albeit for different purposes (one disposal, the other performance). While the
elephant is afforded a temporary visibility and wondrous presence on film, she came from and went back to
an institutional structure that keeps her in unfreedom. Since Douglas’s work in 2003, Barnum and Bailey
circus has expedited the retirement of its elephants.
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of the readymade in art since the sixties has meant the world at large and all within it has
become fair game for art making, including nonhuman animals—even while the
readymade gesture lost all critical institutional thrust in the process. Lambs, chickens,
pigs, goats, horses, and many more were used simply as props for human initiatives.
Alive or dead, animals provided just one more material in an expanded field of art
practices, be it combine, assemblage, installation, action, performance, or moving image.
Recall Allan Kaprow’s ontologically flat list for possible objects in happenings, which
includes a dog alongside inanimate objects: “paint, chairs, food, electric and neon lights,
smoke, water, old socks, a dog, movies, a thousand other things that will be discovered
by the present generation of artists.14 On the other hand, our expanded knowledge of the
lives of animals during this same period has forced a reconsideration of their use as
generalizable objects (more recently, during the writing of this dissertation the French
parliament ruled that nonhuman animals are no longer the legal equivalent of furniture
but, in fact, sentient beings). These competing moments of deregulation are both
aesthetic—a deregulation of what counts as an art object—and politico-ethical—a
deregulation of what counts as a form of life with value beyond the anthroproprietary.
One prioritizes aesthetic liberation, the other eco-social justice.
Grafted onto art since 1960, the amplifications of artistic and institutional freedom
appear diametrically opposed to issues of eco-social justice, which, by comparison, seem
restrictive to aesthetic enterprise. This dual agonistic field mirrors Luc Boltanski’s and
Eve Chiapello’s analysis of the post-’68 vicissitudes of the “artistic critiques” and the
14

Allan Kaprow, "The Legacy of Jackson Pollock," in Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life, ed. Jeff
Kelley (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2003), 9. This does not mean that
contemporary artists today no longer incorporate animals in similarly uncritical ways; a number of artists
continue to use nonhumans for mere novelty—Maurizio Cattelan and once more Damien Hirst come to
mind.
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“social critiques” of capitalism. The success of one seems proportionate to a distancing
of the other, and the relative ease of capitalism’s co-option of the artistic has meant the
occlusion of the social (which I argue should include nonhuman eco-sociability).15
Historically, we may be at the point where the readymade has become a reactionary
process—and that, peculiarly enough, deregulating art is now a conservative maneuver.
The aesthetic freedom to use anything whatsoever often satisfies the pampered demands
of art world trends or quirkiness (or simply an experience out of the ordinary). This
fetishization of freedom of materials lends very little to the progressive eco-social
demands of the twenty-first century. This does not mean calling for censorship or
bureaucratic regulation; the hope would simply be that instrumentalizing nonhumans in
art production (and humans, for that matter) would simply become both uninteresting and
intuitively untenable in an increasingly precarious world. This discussion is reminiscent
of Franco “Bifo” Berardi’s discussion of poetry and finance when he reminds us that the
term deregulation “was first proposed by the poet Arthur Rimbaud, and later recycled as
a metaphor by neoliberal ideologues.”16 As with financial markets, the more progressive
eco-social direction for art is not one with ever more novel configurations and expansions,
but one that privileges thoughtfulness, coherent nonviolence, responsibility, and an
openness to alterity rather than its blind assimilation or domination. In short, a
posthumanist direction.
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Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, trans., Gregory Elliott (London; New
York: Verso, 2005), 346.
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IMAGES
CHAPTER ONE – POSTHUMANIST INTERIORITY: CHRIS MARKER’S ETHOLOGICAL WORK OF
THE 1970S AND 80S
[ill. 1.1] Chris Marker, Zoo Piece (1985-90)

[ill. 1.2] Chris Marker, Slon Tango (1985-90)
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[ill. 1.3] Chris Marker, An Owl Is an Owl is an Owl (1985-90)

[ill. 1.4] Chris Marker, Chat écoutant la musique (1985-90)
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[ill. 1.5] Konrad Lorzenz, Tous les chiens, tous les chats, 1970 (trans. Chris Marker)

[ill. 1.6] Jacques Prévert and racoon, in Chris Marker and André Pozner, L’Animal en
question (1970)
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[ill. 1.7] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (cartoon whale)

[ill. 1.8] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (cetacean book)
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[ill. 1.9] La Compagnie Maritime Des Chargeurs Reunis et La Compagnie Fabre, Agenda
1972

[ill. 1.10-11] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (Inuit with tools/whales floating)
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[ill. 1.12] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (Taiyo Fishing Company “killing”)

[ill. 1.13] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (Taiyo Fishing Company “flensing”)
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[ill. 1.14] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (Taiyo Fishing Company “oil factory”)

[ill. 1.15] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (Dutch sea painting)
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[ill. 1.16] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (photograph of U.S. port with oil barrels)

[ill. 1.17] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (pectoral film (first moving image)
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[ill. 1.18] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (Foyn)

[ill. 1.19] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (maw of floating factory ship)
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[ill. 1.20] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (Nisshin Miru)

[ill. 1.21] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (final shot, flap of skin)

304

[ill. 1.22] Chris Marker, Vive la baleine!, 1972 (whale-bomb)

[ill. 1.23] Chris Marker, La Jetée 1962 (natural history museum scene)
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[ill. 1.24] Chris Marker and Alain Resnais, Les Statues meurent aussi (1952) (dead
gorilla)

[ill. 1.25] Chris Marker and Alain Resnais, Les Statues meurent aussi (1952) (hands)
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[ill. 1.26] Chris Marker, Sans Soleil (1983) (dying giraffe)

[ill. 1.27] Chris Marker, Le fond de l’air est rouge (1977) (shooting wolves)

307

[ill. 1.28] Chris Marker, Si J’avais quatre dromadaires (1966/74) (girl with racoon in
cage)

[ill. 1.29] Chris Marker, Si J’avais quatre dromadaires (1966/74) (racoon washing on
stage)
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[ill. 1.30-31] Chris Marker, Si J’avais quatre dromadaires (1966/74) (cat with hobby
horse, children playing basketball)
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[ill. 1.32-4] Chris Marker, Si J’avais quatre dromadaires (1966/74) (billboard “First
village for bêtes heureuse, or “happy animals”)/ a sign “Refuge pour les oiseaux – Loi du
3 Mai 1844,” which offers legal protection to bird nests/street advertisement for
veterinary services in Havana, Cuba)
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[ill. 1.35-7] Chris Marker, Si J’avais quatre dromadaires (1966/74) (au
profit/agression/voir et connaitre)
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[ill. 1.38] Chris Marker, Si J’avais quatre dromadaires (1966/74) (final shot monkeys)

312

CHAPTER TWO—POSTHUMANIST EXHIBITIONS: FROM ECOLOGY TO BIOPOLITICS
[ill. 2.1]: Raoul Dufy Le Pouple (Octopus) in Guillaume Apollinaire’s Le Bestiaire ou
Cortège d’Orphée, 1911
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[ill. 2.2] Michel Jamsin, Le lampadaire cruel (The Cruel Floor Lamp), 1985

[ill. 2.3-4] Simon Lacour, Een nieuwe optiek (A New Optic), 1985
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[ill. 2.5] Camiel van Breedam, Voortvarende (Dynamic), 1982

[ill. 2.6] Jacques Lennep, Le Talus, 1978
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[ill. 2.7] Philippe de Luyck, Création d’un territoire pour 4 serpents au moyen d’un
champ calorifique, (Creation of a territory for 4 snakes by means of a heated site), 1974

316

[ill. 2.8] Daniel Dutriuex, L’inestimable toit se cache, ailée l’éclipse (The Incalculable
Roof Hides Itself, Winged Eclipse), 1984

[ill. 2.9] Daniel Dutriuex, L’uniforme point s’ecarte sévère le temps (The Uniform Dot
Moves Away Strict Time), 1984
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[ill. 2.10-11] Jean-Marie Gheerardyn, Tableau Experimental, 1982-84/ flies breeding
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[ill. 2.12] Jacques Lizène, Pièce pour un eventual visituer de l’espece canine (Piece for
an Evenutal Visitor to a Space for Canines), 1974-75

[ill. 2.13] Mass Moving, Butterfly Project, 1972 (Pamphlet, Venice Biennale 1972)
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[ill. 2.14] Mass Moving, Butterfly Project, 1972 (incubator in the Piazza San Marco,
Venice Biennale 1972)
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[ill. 2.15] Mass Moving, Butterfly Project, 1972 (Tokyo)
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[ill. 2.16] Yves de Smet, SKIN II-PERMANENTLY, 1978-9

[ill. 2.17] Dominique Ampe, Vibrerende kippepluimen (Vibrating Chicken Feathers),
1984
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[ill. 2.18] Les Immatériaux (Paik)

[ill. 2.19] Duchamp’s installation for the 1938 International Surrealist Exhibition
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[ill. 2.20] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Nu vain)

[ill. 2.21] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Habitacle)
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[ill. 2.22] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Toutes les copies)

[ill. 2.23] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Ration alimentaire)

325

[ill. 2.24] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Manger pressé)

[ill. 2.25] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Précuisinié-Préparlé)
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[ill. 2.26] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Arôme simulé)

[ill. 2.27] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Deuxième peau)
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[ill. 2.28] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Corp éclaté)

[ill. 2.29] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Langue vivante)
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[ill. 2.30] Les Immatériaux Inventaire (Theatre du non corp)

[ill. 2.31] Nam June Paik, Sonatine for Goldfish, 1975
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[ill. 2.32] Stiletto, Flying Spots, 1984/86

[ill. 2.33] Christina Kubitsch, The Bird’s Tree, 1987
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[ill. 2.34] Luis Benedict, Biotrom, 4000 Living Bees, from the 1970 Venice Beinnale
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[ill. 2.35] Denis Masi, Barrier, 1977-80)

[ill. 2.36] Denis Masi, Hidden Sign, 1978-80)
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[ill. 2.37] Hans Haacke, Ant-Cooperative, 1969

[ill. 2.38] Hans Haacke, Rhine-Water Treatment Plant (1972)
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[ill. 2.39] Hans Haacke, Norbert, “All Systems Go” (1970/71)

[ill. 2.40] Arnulf Rainer with Chimp
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[ill. 2.41] Marianne Greve’s Frog Music I—Tadpoles, 1984

[ill. 2.42] Timm Ulrich, Bees, Wasps, Hornets. An Acoustic Environment (1971)
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[ill. 2.43] Henning Christiansen, Symphonia Natura (1985)

[ill. 2.44] Felix Hess, Chirps and Silence (1986/87)

336

[ill. 2.45] Mark Thompson, Live-In-Hive (1976)
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CHAPTER THREE – MARCEL BROODTHAERS AND THE ANIMAL READYMADE
[ill. 3.1-2] Marcel Broodthaers photographs, Antwerp Zoo, Rhinoceros and Crocodile
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[ill. 3.3] Marcel Broodthaers, Les Animaux de la ferme, 1974

[ill. 3.4] Original Deyrolle print
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[ill. 3.5] Hieronymus Bosch, The Garden of Earthly Delights, 1503-15

[ill. 3.6] Marcel Broodthaers, the Section des figures, 1972, installation view

340

[ill. 3.7] Marcel Broodthaers, the Section des figures, 1972, detail (beer bottles, corks)

[ill. 3.8] Marcel Broodthaers, the Section des figures, 1972, detail (eagle perched)

341

[ill. 3.9] Marcel Broodthaers, the Section des figures, 1972, detail (eagle swooping)

[ill. 3.10] Marcel Broodthaers photograph, Antwerp Zoo, Eagle (From Section des figures
catalog, 1972)

342

[ill. 3.11] Marcel Broodthaers, Echelle avec alphabet, 1965-71

[ill. 3.12] Marcel Broodthaers, Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hazard. Image, 1969

343

[ill. 3.13] Marcel Broodthaers, Pot of Mussles, 1968

[ill. 3.14] Marcel Broodthaers, Belgian Lion, 1968

344

[ill. 3.15] Marcel Broodthaers, Moules Oeufs Frites Pots Charbon, 1968

345

[ill. 3.16] Marcel Broodthaers, Ne dites pas que je ne l’ai pas dit—Le Perroquet, 1974

[ill. 3.17] Marcel Broodthaers, Dites partout que je l’ai dit, 1974

346

[ill. 3.18] Marcel Broodthaers feeding chickens outside gallery, 1966

[ill. 3.19] Marcel Broodhtaers with camel, Palais des Beaux-Arts, 1974

347

[ill. 3.20] Eli Lotar, …pad of butter

[ill. 3.21] Eli Lotar,…hooves
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[ill. 3.22-3] Andy Warhol, Cows, 1966/Gerhard Richter, Kuh, 1964
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[ill. 3.24] Jef Geys, Cow Passports, 1965-91 (selection)
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CHAPTER FOUR: KYNICAL FEMINISM—STRATEGIES OF (OVER)IDENTIFICATION WITH
ANIMALITY

[ill. 4.1] Louise Bourgeois, She-fox, 1985

351

[ill. 4.2] Louise Bourgeois, La Fillette, 1968

[ill. 4.3] Louise Bourgeois, La Fillette, 1968 (Mapplethorpe’s photography, 1982)

352

[ill. 4.4] Lynda Benglis, Ad in Artforum, 1974

[ill. 4.5] Louise Bourgeois, He Disappeared Completely into Silence, Plate 7, 1947

353

[ill. 4.6] Louise Bourgeois, Destruction of the Father, 1974

[ill. 4.7] Lee Miller, Severed Breast from Radical Surgery in a Place Setting, 1930

354

[ill. 4.8] Annette Messager’s studio schematic
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[ill. 4.9] Annette Messager, Les Pensionnaires (Little Boarders), 1971-2

356

[ill. 4.10] Annette Messager, Ma collection de proverbs (My Collection of Proverbs),
1974

357

[ill. 4.11] Annette Messager, Mon livre de cuisine (My Cookbook), 1972

[ill. 4.12] Annette Messager, Mes depense quotidiennes pendant 1 mois (My Daily
Expenses Over the Course of a Month), 1973.
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[ill. 4.13] VALIE EXPORT, Aktionshose: Genitalpanik (Action Pants: Genital Panic),
1969

[ill. 4.14] VALIE EXPORT, TAPP und TASTKINO (TAP and TOUCH CINEMA), 1968

359

[ill. 4.15] VALIE EXPORT, Aus der Mappe der Hundigkeit (From the Portfolio of
Doggedness), 1968

[ill. 4.16] Otto Muehl, Material Action No. 3, February 26, 1964. Meuhl apartment
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[ill. 4.17] Hermann Nitsch, 31st action “The Immaculate Conception,” 1969 December 8,
1969. Atelier Hans Peter Zimmer, Munich
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[ill. 4.18] VALIE EXPORT, Mann & Frau & Animal (Man & Woman & Animal), 197073 (detail)

[ill. 4.19] VALIE EXPORT, Mann & Frau & Animal (Man & Woman & Animal), 197073 (detail)
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[ill. 4.20] Songs of the Humpback Whale (1970)

[ill. 4.21] VALIE EXPORT, Asemie - die Unfähigkeit, sich durch Mienenspiel
ausdrücken zu können (Asemia - The Inability to Express Oneself Through Facial
Expression), 1973
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[ill. 4.22] VALIE EXPORT, Implementation (Implementation), 1974-75

[ill. 4.23] VALIE EXPORT, HANDVOGEL (BIRDHAND), 1974
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[ill. 4.24] VALIE EXPORT, Restringierter Code (Restricted Code), 1979

[ill. 4.25-26] VALIE EXPORT, Invisible Adversaries (1977), (details) grooming+fish
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CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE POST-ANIMAL IN CONTEMPORARY ART
[ill. 5.1-2] Kristina Buch’s The Lover, 2013/ Pierre Huyghe’s Untilled, 2013

366

[ill. 5.3] Thomas Edison’s Electrocuting an Elephant (1903)

[ill. 5.4] Douglas Gordon, Play Dead; Real Time, (2003) (detail)
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